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Chapter III
CLAIMS TO MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER ON THE OCEANS

C

hapter II demonstrates that attempting to preserve minimum public order
in the Gulf during the Tanker War involved many participants with varying (sometimes mUltiple) perspectives in different arenas and situations with
numerous coercive and persuasive strategies at their command. 1 This and succeeding chapters examine claims to authority in the effective power process as part
of the ongoing global social process. 2 As McDougal and his associates have noted,
international law as the effective global power process is subject to claims by participants to optimize their goals in that process.3 In some instances these claims
are part of the civic order, i.e., private orderings or private claims, as opposed to
public order norms or claims to public order. 4 But civic order claims, as will be
seen, may have serious and strong impact on public order claims and claimants.
For example, attacks on merchant ships caused phenomenal increases in insurance rates; these in turn affected global oil prices, and rising oil prices undoubtedly influenced government decisionmakers. S By the same token, decisions of
governments, based in their perception oflaw, undoubtedly influenced their considerations on assisting one or both belligerents and their attitudes toward private
parties who had dealings with belligerents. The tilt toward supporting Iraq that
grew throughout the war, and a corresponding decline in support ofIran, although
there were cross-currents the other way, is an example of this interrelationship.6
Although Jessup argued for an interstitial transnational law,7 more recently
Lowenfeld has made the point, as law of war manuals have for a sliding scale of
conflict between war and peace,8 that there is a sliding scale relationship between
public law and transnational law that governs matters between private actors and
between private actors and States, sometimes an actor's own country and sometimes another nation. 9 And while the Chapter III-VII analysis in this volume concentrates on public law analysis, the incidence of civic order relationships, i.e.,
transactions governed by transnational law, must be borne in mind.
Because of the Charter's trumping effect on treaty law 10 and its strong influence
on customary norms,11 and because several participants in the Tanker War, e.g.,
France and the United Kingdom, believed that the Charter and not the LOAC
governed,12 analysis begins with study of Charter-related claims, particularly issues of self-defense and neutrality. This Chapter ends with an examination of the
law of treaties and its relationship with crisis and armed conflict.

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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Part A. UN Charter Norms; Related Issues
The history of the Charter, and its drafting and record of negotiations, have
been well-documented. 13 The general contours ofpractice under the Charter have
also been chronicled. 14 This is not the place to mine anew these lodes. What follows is a statement of provisions of the Charter, followed by summaries of claims
and counterclaims 15 under the Charter and related sources oflaw, with conclusions (outcomes) as to the current state of the law.
1. Norms Stated in the Charter
Five parts of the Charter are relevant to the Tanker War: i ts Preamble, Purposes
and Principles; self-defense and related concepts in the Charter era; lawmaking
under the Charter; pacific settlement of disputes; and action under the Charter to
deal with l:hreats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. A half
century of practice under the Charter has developed in some instances. In other
cases pre-Charter norms still have force.

a. The Preamble, Purposes and Principles of the Charter. The Charter Preamble
initially expresses Member States' determination:
to save succeeding generations from the scourge ofwar[;] ... to reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights, ... in the equal rights of ... nations large and small [;] to
establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from
treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained [;] and to promote
social progress and better standards for life in larger freedom.

To achieve these goals, UN Members have pledged:
to practice tolerance and live together in peace ... as good neighbors, and to unite
our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the
acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be
used, save in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for
[promoting] economic and social advancement of all people[.]16

All Persian Gulf States, and all countries that were Tanker War participants, although perhaps as States not parties to the conflict, are UN Members. Iran and Iraq
are original Members. 17
Little use of the Preamble's statements have been made since 1945. One recent
example, however, occurred during the Tanker War itself, when the Security
Council noted "that Member States pledged together to live together in peace with
one another as good neighbors in accordance with the Charter... ,,18 The Preamble
in other cases "reinforces, without being essential to, the propositions [founded on
other parts of the Charter] being advanced,,19 There have been occasional uses of
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the Preamble in other Council and General Assembly resolutions relevant to this
study, however. The General Assembly's Uniting for Peace (UFP) Resolution discussions in 1950 referred to the Preamble. 20 The General Assembly's Friendly Relations Declaration ofl970 21 also employed Preamble language. To the extent that
these resolutions have been incorporated by practice, e.g., by subsequent General
Assembly-recommended peacekeeping operations under a UFP precedent,22 or
have been incorporated by reference in later resolutions 23 or authoritative pronouncements, the Preamble has had added vitality.
In any event, the drafters intended that all Charter provisions "being ... indivisible as in any other legal instrument, are equally valid and operative." Each provision must be construed and applied together.
(a) The "Preamble" introduces the Charter and sets forth the declared common intentions which brought us together in this Conference and moved
us to unite our will and efforts, and made us harmonize, regulate, and organize our international action to achieve our common ends.
(b) The "Purposes" constitute the raison d'etre of the Organization. They are
the aggregation of the common ends on which our minds met; hence, the
cause and object of the Charter to which member States collectively and
severally subscribe.
(c) The chapter on "Principles" sets, in the same order of ideas, the methods
and regulating norms according to which the Organization and its members shall do their duty and endeavor to achieve the common ends. Their
understandings should serve as actual standards of international conduct. 24
Thus the Preamble is an integral part of the Charter as a statement of "motivating
ideas and purposes," although it does not define UN Members' obligations. These
ideas and purposes can be, and have been, used to evidence the Charter's ideas and
purposes in considering the articles of the Charter. In effect, the Preamble is a series of pledges,25 fulfillment ofwhich are in the Charter's Purposes, Principles and
constitutive provisions.
i. Purposes of the Organization: Articles 1(1), 1(2). Although the United Nations
as contemplated under the Charter is "a multipurpose organization, ... maintenance of [international] peace and security is the primary purpose of the Organization and takes priority over other purposes." The order of listing the UN's
Purposes, Charter article 1(1) stating the goal of international peace and security
first, supports this view: 26
The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to
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the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches
of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity
with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach
of the peaceP
Goodrich and his collaborators note the difference between Article l(1)'s language, i.e., the United Nations may "take effictive collective measures" to prevent
and remove threats to the peace, to suppress aggression or other breaches of the
peace, the "measures" language of Articles 39, 41 and 42, Article 50's "preventive
or enforcement measures," Article 5's "preventive or enforcement action," and the
"enforcement measures" Article 2(7) mentions. This language difference has been
cited as authority for the UFP Resolution; the Council might have a duty to take
"measures" or action, but the General Assembly'S responsibility and powers under
Article 10 should be determined by Article 1(1)'s twofold injunction for "effective
collective measures" to maintain or restore peace. 28 Article 1(1) also assumes that
resolution of a dispute or situation will be in accordance with international law
and "justice," a provision inserted to protect small States,29 a corollary to the sovereign equality of all UN Members. 30 Implementing Article 1(1), at least in terms of
the Charter language, has been through Articles 2(3), 2(4), and Chapter VI-VIII.
Therefore, analysis of the use of Article 1(1) will be deferred untillater. 31
Another of the UN's Purposes is "to develop friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle ofequal rights and self-determination ofpeoples,
and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.,,32 Most
analysis has focused on elevating self-determination to a human right,33 sometimes in mutilateral conventions,34 and often invoked in efforts to end colonialism, the Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples being a watershed. 35 A collateral effect has been developing the idea that
self-determination includes permanent sovereignty over natural resources 36 and a
State's right to freely dispose of its natural wealth and resources. 37
Assembly and Council interpretations of Article 1(2) played a background role
in naval matters after World War II. In the Algerian Civil War (1957-59) the Assembly referred to "the right of the Algerian people to self-determination,,38 after
France gave Algerians the right to determine their status. 39 The resolution passed
after the French interdiction campaign 40 and had no impact on claims oflegality
of that operation. Assembly Resolution 1514, declaring all peoples including those
under cc10nial rule have self-determination rights, was incorporated by reference
in Council resolutions on Rhodesia (1965-80).41 In this case the Royal Navy enforced Council-directed interdiction of Beira-bound tankers loaded with oil invoiced to Rhodesia.42
Article 1(2) played no stated role in the Tanker War; self-determination was not
an issue. However, the issue of "the inalienable right" of all States "freely to
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dispose of their national wealth and resources,,43 was behind the desires of States
like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to export petroleum, part of their "natural wealth,"
through their ports and all sea lanes. Shipping flagged under other States was engaged in lifting petroleum from these ports and otherwise in legitimate trade
within the Gulf.44 The Council condemned hostilities in "sea-lanes, navigable waterways, harbour works, terminals, offshore installations and all ports with direct
or indirect access to the sea .... ,,4S The Council later reaffirmed "the right of free
navigation in international waters and sea lanes for shipping to and from all ports
and installations of the littoral States ... not parties to the hostilities[.]" Iran had
attacked commercial shipping en route to and from Kuwaiti and Saudi ports. 46 To
the extent that these attacks frustrated the rights of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and
other Gulf States not parties to the war to dispose of their natural wealth, attacks on
shipping carrying these exports could be seen as a violation of Article 1(3) as interpreted by the Assembly and the Council.

ii. Principles in the Charter: Articles 2(3), 2(4). The principle expressed in Article 2(3) is a logical corollary of the principle of Article 2(4), which prohibits threat
or use of force against a State's territorial integrity or political independence, or in
any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. Article 2(3) requires UN Members to settle their international disputes by peaceful means so
that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. A legacy
from the League Covenant era, the language of Article 2(3) has been incorporated
in many international agreements. 47 Its substance, mingled with Articles 33-36's
parallel policies,48 has been restated in many UN resolutions, including Security
Council Resolution 479, the first Council action in the Iran-Iraq war.49
Article 2(4) of the Charter "lays down one of the basic principles of the United
Nations,"SO incorporating by reference Article l's Principles and declaring, "All
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."Sl Article
2(4) must be interpreted in the context of other Charter norms; i.e., it may be tempered by other rights (e.g., of self-defense) under the Charter or general intern ationallaw under a number of theories.S2 The point of difference is the relative
scope of the right of self-defense and the extent to which the right of self-defense
qualifies Article 2(4), an analysis deferred for consideration in the context of
self-defense and related issues. S3
Definition of terms lies beneath the problem of interrelationships between Article 2(4), which at least restates a customary rule,S4 and other claims. Two views
have developed on what "threat or use of force" means: Does "force" mean only
"armed force," or does it include economic or political pressure?SS Most commentators say force means only armed force and does not include economic or political
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pressure. 56 Recent treaty negotiations support a narrow definition of "force."
States have negotiated separate provisions prohibiting coercive economic or political methods. 57 Proponents of a clause to include economic coercion with military
coercion as a ground for voiding a treaty, failed in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties negotiations. 58 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
Between States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations also lacks such a provision. 59 Although the General Assembly has adopted
resolutions calling upon States to refrain from economic or political coercion, neither the Assembly nor the Council has determined that such coercion equates with
use offorce under Article 2(4).60 The Assembly may have come close with the 1970
Friendly Relations Declaration, but analysis reveals that the line has not been
crossed. 61 Other examples are consensus approval of a definition of aggression 62
and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (NIEO).63
Similar to the US position that aggression "cannot be so comprehensive as to include all cases ... and cannot take into account the various circumstances which
might enter into the determination of aggression in a particular case[,],,64 the Resolution definition of aggression parallels Article 2(4): "Aggression is the use of
armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter ... , as set out in this Definition.,,65
A State's first use of armed force in violation of the Charter is prima facie evidence of an act of aggression, although the Security Council may determine that,
under the circumstances, no act of aggression has been committed. 66 The Definition considers the following as acts of aggression whether or not there has been a
war declaration:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces ofa State of the territory of another
State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another
State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another
State;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another
State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, marine
and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another
State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such
territory beyond the termination of the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of
aggression against a third State;
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(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such
gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement
therein. 67

The list is not exhaustive.68 Article 5(1) is the only direct reference to economic
strategies: "No consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic,
military or othenvise, may serve as a justification for aggression.,,69 Thus economic need cannot justify aggression, but that does not mean that a coercive economic strategy is aggression.
As with the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration, NIEO Article 32 proclaims
that "No State may use or encourage ... economic, political or any other ... measures to coerce another State ... to obtain ... subordination of the exercise ofits sovereign rights.,,70 Because of the vote on NIEO (118-6-10) and developed States'
solid opposition, and NIEO's status as not being a first measure of codification and
progressive development,71 it is unlikely that Article 32 recites custom. State practice under the Vienna Convention confirms this view.72
One issue, for which there are no clearcut answers in Charter practice, is
whether the "territorial integrity" phrase in Article 2(4) includes the "floating territory" ofa vessel flying a State's flag.13 The Corfu Channel Case settled the issue for
warships; the judgment included an award for damage to the UK ships and for personnel injured or killed.14 Security Council resolutions affirmed freedom of navigation in the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict 75 and in the Tanker War;76 in the past
other resolutions approved interdiction of Beria-bound merchantmen as part of
sanctions action against Rhodesia. 77 The freedom of navigation resolutions confirmed vessels' right to be free ofbelligerent interference; the Rhodesia interception resolution can be seen as a derogation on a right of "floating territorial
integrity" in the sense of Article 2(4).18
Even if a ship might not be considered part of a State's territory and therefore
not subject to Article 2(4), attacks on individual merchant ships are acts of aggression and are subject to self-defense response(s) under Article 51. This issue was
particularly relevant for the Tanker War.
Although Article 2(4) does not cite aggression specifically, it does prohibit
Members from acting "in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations" in their international relations. Article 1(1) states the UN's primary 79 Purpose as maintaining international peace and security through collective action to "suppress ... acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace ...."
Therefore, UN Members have an obligation to refrain from acts of aggression
against other States. And, as also developed under the self-defense analysis,80 the
Nicaragua Case adopted the broader French-language version of the Charter, Article 51. Article 51's English language version reads:
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Nothing in the ... Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this
right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the ... Council and shall not in
any way affect the authority and responsibility of the ... Council under the ... Charter
to take at any time such action as it deems necessary ... to maintain or restore
international peace and security.

The French version reads:
Aucune disposition de la ... Charte ne porte atteinte au droit naturel de legitime
defense, individuelle ou collective, dans Ie cas ou un Membre des Nations Unies est
l'objet d'une agression armee, jusqu a ce que Ie Conseil de Securite ait pris les mesures
neccaires pour maintenir la paix et la securite internationales. Les mesures prises par
des Membres dans l'exercice de ce droit de legitime defense sont immediatement
portees a la connaissance du Conseil ... et n'affectent en rien la pouvoir et Ie devoir
qu'a Ie Conseil, en vertu de la ... Charte, d'agir a tout moment de la maniere qu'il
judge necessaire pour maintenir ou retablir la paix et la securite internationales. 81

The right of self-defense, however defined,82 arises when there is an "armed attack," under the English language version, or under the French version when
there is an "agression annee," which connotes a broader range of activity or situations triggering a right of self-defense. 83
Both versions and those in the Chinese, Russian and Spanish languages are
equally authentic. 84 However, since the languages in which the drafting was done
were English and French, Goodrich and his associates argue that more weight
should be given the English and French texts and, if there is a discrepancy between
the two, the interpretation most likely to be correct would be that based on the language of the text that was originally adopted. 85 Under this view, since Article 51 is
the result of a UK, i.e., English language, proposal,86 the "armed attack" phrase of
the English language version should prevail.
Linnan has advocated using the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to
guide analysis ofthe relationship between Articles 2(4) and 51. 87 The same approach might be taken for the situation of equally authoritative texts where words
chosen for versions in differing languages have different meanings. The Vienna
Convention, article 33, provides in pertinent part:
1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is
equally authoritative in each language....
3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text.
4.... [W]hen a comparison of the authentic text discloses a difference of meaning which the application of articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the meaning
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which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the
treaty, shall be adopted.

Articles 31 and 32 of the Convention provide:
31. General rule of interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light
of its object and purpose.
2. The context for ... interpret[ing] ... a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the
text, including its preamble and annexes[.] ...
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context ...
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules ofinternationallaw applicable in the relations between
.
the parties.

4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
32. Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances ofits conclusion, ... to confirm
the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning
when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. s8

There have been several theories for interpreting treaties,89 but Jimenez de
Arechaga says Vienna Convention principles declare existing law. 90 Although
other approaches have appeal,91 the Convention's mainstream approach will be
the principal path of analysis.
Article 31(1) "establishes ... the 'golden rule' of interpretation[:],,92 Give a
treaty its ordinary meaning in its context and in the light ofits object and purpose.
Article 31 (2) further defines the context to include the treaty preamble. Along with
the context these are relevant, for this purpose: subsequent practice establishing
the parties' agreement as to its interpretation, Article 31 (3)(b ); and relevant applicable rules of international law, Article 31(3)(a); and a special meaning to a term if
the parties agree to such, Article 31(4). Therefore, the first task is to examine intrinsic evidence; the second is a gradual progression from this center to more peripheral evidence, with a concession to parties' specific intent "ifit is established,"
convincingly, "that the parties ... intended" such. 93 The last qualification does not
apply, since the problem lies with the meaning of Article 51's wording, for which
there is no terminological consensus.94 The problem in terms of Vienna Convention
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Article 31 analysis boils down to an issue of subsequent practice and relevant, applicable international law rules. 95
The most recent authoritative pronouncement on the meaning of "armed attack"-"agression armee" in Article 51 is the Nicaragua Case. The IC} accepted the
broader French-language Article 51 version, stating in dictum that the Definition
of Aggression Resolution, Article 3(g), stated a customary rule; sending armed
bands, irregulars or mercenaries across a border would be armed attack justifying
self-defense. (The Court went on to say, however, that supplying arms or other
logistics across a border was not aggression and that therefore a US collective selfdefense claim under Article 51 was not admissible. )96 And since the same word"agression"-is used in Article 1(1) and Article 51, 97 the same meaning should be
imported into Article 1(1) as incorporated by reference in Article 2(4).
The narrow question is whether there can be armed aggression against ships.
The Definition of Aggression Resolution, Article 3, declares: "Aggression is
the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Charter ... as set out in this definition.,,98 Although it could be argued that "territorial integrity" in Article 1 includes the "floating territory" of ships, the negotiators did not address this possibility; they voted down amendments to refer to the
territorial sea and airspace, although one State (Indonesia) added it by interpretative statement. Article 1 only covers armed aggression, and not economic or political coercion; it does not cover threat of force, as distinguished from use of force. 99
Article 2 declares a first use offorce in violation of the Charter to be prima facie evidence of aggression, but that the Security Council may determine that no aggression has occurred, perhaps because the act(s) or consequence(s) are not that
serious. lOO The Definition also recites certain per se principles, subject to Article
2's first-use and de minimis principles, in Article 3, which provides in part:
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and in
accordance with the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of aggression:
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the1and, sea or air forces, or marine
and air fleets of another State ...

Article 3(c) says that blockading coasts or ports by armed forces is aggression. lOl
The ICJ has stated that article 3(g), denouncing sending armed bands across a border, states custom; one commentator says all of Article 3 probably restates custom,
although others disagree. 102 The Article 3 list is nonexclusive. 103
An ambiguity remains as to the phrase "marine and air fleets." Does this include a single merchantman flagged under a target State's flag? Article 3( d) covers
attacks on a warship, a warship formation, or a group of merchantmen, e.g., a
fishing fleet. 104 Attacking a single neutral warship is never permitted in territorial

World Public Order

117

waters,105 and by well-established custom on the high seas as well. 106 Choice of the
expression "fleets" for article 3(d) was done "advisedly, ... to exclude from the purview of the Definition the use of force [by an attacking State] against a single or a
few commercial vessels ..., especially when they enter [attacking State] jurisdiction," according to Dinstein, who cites Broms, chair of the UN committee that
produced the Definition. 107 Dinstein concludes that "A reasonable degree offorce
(in the form of search and seizure) may be legitimate against foreign merchant
ships even on the high seas.,,108 However, Broms did not refer to merchant ships
generally; he and the Committee referred only to fishing vessels and fleets. 109
Dinstein's view appears inconsistent with what the Committee actually decided. It
is also clear that coastal States, engaged in legitimate policing of their coastal waters (e.g., territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ) do not commit aggression under
article 3(d) when they pursue, and possibly attack, merchant ships for violationsYo
The Dinstein view is inconsistent with what the UN Committee actually decided. The UK Committee delegate pointed out during negotiations that Article
3(d) would not impugn coastal State action "in accordance with intemationallaw for
the legitimate enforcement of its authority." A saving clause describing coastal
State rights had been omitted from Article 3(d). Including it would
risk that such a clause might be taken to imply that any vessel ... which ventured
within the jurisdiction of another State might be subjected to any degree of forceeven an armed attack-that the State might choose to inflict on it in the exercise of its
own authority, which was not the ... Committee's intention.1 11

Thus, far from indicating that attacks on independently-sailing merchant ships
could not trigger a self-defense response, the Committee was trying to avoid the
problem of unlawful attacks in the first place. There is no indication that the Commi ttee even considered self-defense in this con text. The Committee did not in tend
to exclude attacks on independently-steaming merchantmen from the Definition,
for which self-defense or other legitimate response(s) might be appropriate.
As incidents like the Mayaguez seizure demonstrate,112 to say that not all attacks on merchant ships can result in an aggression claim justifying a self-defense
response is dangerous business indeed. Even as a self-defense response that is not
proportional can become aggression,113 not every attack on an independently-sailing merchantman should be shielded from an aggression claim. Some merchant
ships, e.g., passengeriiners, are forbidden targets in any case; 114 even with modern
commercial shipping's highly automated nature, and the resulting relatively low
size of crews, a deliberate attack on a single cargo merchantman can involve many
people's lives. The liner exception does not cover the situation of other vessels carrying hundreds of passengers, e.g., ferries or work-boats transporting employees of
offshore drilling rigs, nor does it cover a common situation of cargo vessels with a
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small passenger manifest. Moreover, the reality of merchant traffic on the seas is
that no merchant ships, unless they are fishing vessels or tugs and tows, ever sail in
company. A view that all independently-sailing merchant ships could be attacked
without the attacking State risking being branded an aggressor would mean that
no merchant ship would be safe, under any circumstances, since all sail independently.llS Presumably an all-out, simultaneous, world-wide attack on all ships
flagged under the target State would qualify for Dinstein, but that hypothetical
lacks reality.
The "fleets" expression does not follow the principles of prior treaty law,
whether ratified or not. These agreements point to coverage of attacks on single
ships as enough to trigger a risk of a charge of aggression if the act or its consequences are serious enough, under the Definition Resolution formula. 1l6 Charter
era State practice buttresses this conclusion. The Resolution includes blockade as
a qualified per se instance of aggression. 1l7 As a practical matter, blockade runners
do not try to avoid interception in groups. Ifit is assumed that the law of blockade
still includes an ultimate right to attack and destroy merchant vessels trying to
evade blockade, and it is submitted that this remains the case,118 then illegal use of
blockade includes the illegal destruction of blockade runners as part of unlawful
aggression. And if such be true in the context of blockade, then it is likewise true
that illegal destruction of a single merchantman, sailing independently, would be
likewise susceptible to condemnation, if the situation is serious enough, 119 under
the Resolution formula. Even if attacking a single merchant ship does not come
under Article 3(d)'s "marine ... fleets" principle, prior treaty law and State practice
since 1945 points toward a strong potential of a finding of aggression for such an
attack. 120
The record of treaties negotiated before the Charter era and immediately after
1945 is mixed as to whether attacks on shipping constitute aggression; no recent
agreements have been concuded on the issue. Some multilateral and bilateral
agreements categorize them as acts of aggression;121 many do not. 122 For purposes
of this analysis, however, it is most significant that Iran bound itself twice, and
Iraq once, to multilateral agreements specifically defining attacks on "vessels or
aircraft of another State" as acts of aggression. 123 Did "vessels" include merchantmen as well as State ships? Contemporary USSR proposals in the League of Nations, similar to the Definition list without the latter's non exclusivity clause,
spoke of "knowingly attacking the naval or air forces of another State.,,124 Applying general principles for interpreting ambiguous treaty terms, it would seem .
that the unmodified words, "vessels" or "ships," meant not only State vessels, i.e.,
warships, but merchantmen as well. The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, Article 31(1) restates a customary rule: "A treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given the terms ... in
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.,,12S The ordinary meaning
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of "ship" or "vessel," unadorned by an adjective, is just that-it connotes all seagoing conveyance, military or commercial. This is reinforced by the context of the
era. The USSR, a primary promoter of an aggression definition, was a socialist,
command economy, in which the State owned all commercial ships through trading companies. 126 At the time the USSR claimed an absolute theory of sovereign
immunity,127 as distinguished from capitalist countries' acceptance of modified,
restricted forms of immunity.128 Although the USSR might have advocated a
more narrow theory for aggression in League debates, 129 when treaties were negotiated with other, often capitalist, States, these conventions' coverage was broaden
enough to cover all ships. Other countries' positions cannot be determined with
certainty, but Comments to the Harvard Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of
States in Case of Aggression, proposed exclusively by US (and therefore capitalist)
commentators,130 support a view that "vessel" or "ship" meant all vessels or ships,
regardless of relationship with a registry State. 131 Moreover, including attacks on
merchantmen within a definition of aggression would further the treaties' policies
in minimizing opportunity for legally-sanctioned violence.
Language of multilateral agreements contemporaneous with the Charter were
inconclusive or would appear to have drifted toward a view that only attacks on
warships would constitute acts of aggression; however, examples given were
non-exclusive. 132 Thus there is some support in treaties for a view that States have
considered attacks on single merchantmen an act ofaggression; this is particularly
true for Iran and Iraq, whose treaty record is clearer than that of most States. 133 To
be sure, the law of treaties says that treaties cannot create rights for third States unless these States accept them, but treaty rules can state custom. 134
State practice since 1945 supports a view that attacks on single ships can amount
to aggression. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Syrian navy seizedRomantica,
an Italian liner, later released upon the Italian ambassador's intervention. 135 Loss
of the neutral Venus Challenger, sunk with all hands as a victim of an Indian missile
during the 1971 India-Pakistan conflict, has been severely criticizedY6 The
United States protested and responded with force to Cambodia's seizure of the
US-flag Mayaguez in 1975, claiming self-defense. 137 A US Court of Appeals found
Argentina liable for its attack on Liberian-flagHercules outside a declared war zone
during the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War. 138
If today diminished in value because of failure of ratification 139 or acceptance
of the final text, draft multilateral treaties or single-action proposals carry some
weight as a secondary source because of their authors' eminence as scholars. 140
These sources support a view that "vessels" include merchantmen sailing alone. In
this regard the 1933 USSR proposal is interesting; it would have said the first attack
on another State's "naval or air forces" was an act of aggression. 141 The full League
Committee's 1933 draft Act Relating to the Definition of the Aggressor changed
this to the first attack on another State's "vessels or aircraft," 142 some indication of
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accepting a broader definition of targets that could trigger a claim of aggression.
The 1939 Harvard Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of States in Case of Aggression says that a single merchantmen, if attacked, could trigger a claim of aggression. 143 Few Charter era commentators 144 have expressed a view,
independently of the "fleets" expression in Definition of Aggression, Article
3(d),I4S perhaps because it is now obvious that an initial attack on a neutral merchant ship, traveling alone, can be an act of aggression. I46 If we presume availability of the 1977 Hague RecueilI47 or its equivalent in Baghdad and Tehran when the
Tanker War began, the legal rationale for destruction and loss oflife may be predicated on this view, at least in part.
Appraisal. Although the record of claims and counterclaims is not clear, it is
submitted that an attack on a merchant ship, steaming independently on lawful
purposes, can be an act of aggression that can merit a self-defense response. An attack on a man-of-war, sailing alone, can also be an act of aggression. Attacks on a
formation ofwarships, or on a fleet of merchantmen (e.g., a fleet of fishing trawlers)
can be aggression that will support a self-defense response. As McDougal and
Feliciano and others have shown, 148 not every "attack" is serious enough to merit a
self-defense response, and a self-defense response must be necessary and proportional in any event. 149 A target State may choose to make no response, or to counter
with retorsions or non-force reprisals, ISO perhaps in connection with self-defense
measures. Moreover, some attacks may be subject to defenses, e.g., mistake, as in
the Stark and Airbus cases. lSI Any proportional self-defense response to an assault
perceived at the time 152 as an aggressive armed attack is legitimate.
Thus, the logical corollary of the principle in Article 2(4), prohibiting the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State,
or in any manner inconsistant with the UN's purposes,I53 is the principle expressed in Article 2(3): "All Members shall settle their international disputes by
peaceful means in such a manner that in ternational peace and security, and justice,
are not endangered." 154 A legacy from the League Covenant era, Article 2(3)'s language has been restated in many international agreements. 155 The substance of
Article 2(3), commingled with the parallel policies of the Charter, Chapter VI, Articles 33_36,156 has also been restated in the Friendly Relations Declaration. IS7

b. The Inherent Right ofSelf-Defense Under Article 51; Other Concepts. As noted
above, Article 51's French language version (agression armee) connotes a broader
meaning than the English language phrase, "armed attack."IS8 (Both versions,
along with the other official languages, are equally authentic but a commentator's
analysis may point to the English language version as the one to follow.)IS9 Another difference in meaning between Article 51 's two versions is the English language phrase, "inherent right of ... self-defense," which in French becomes "droit
naturel," i.e., the connotation of "natural right." Thus there is an "inherent" or
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"natural" right to self-defense by a State whenever there is armed aggression
against that State. The problem is compounded by use of English in important
treaty negotiations for 20 years before the Charter negotiations.
During negotiations leading to the Pact of Paris, which outlaws war as an instrument of national policy, 160 US Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg sent identical notes to participants, stating that the draft Pact did nothing to "restrict or
impair in any way the right of self-defense inherent in every sovereign State and
implicit in every treaty." Self-defense was characterized as "inalienable" and a
"natural right," which "[e]very nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty
provisions" to exercise. 161 Great Britain had expressed a similarly broad view of
the matter earlier,162 as had other States. 163 Ultimately all parties accepted or
"noted" the US interpretation when the Pact was signed August 27,1928.
About a year earlier the PCIJ had decided the Lotus Case, which strongly recognized States' sovereignty to act as they chose in the absence oflaw. l64 (State sovereignty, although occasionally assailed by some,165 remains a fundamental principle
of internationallaw.)166 Under Lotus, States should have been as free to act within
the law ofself-defense as it then stood when their sovereignty was threatened by an
act ofwar that was a violation oflaw; i.e., there was no law to support the act. Thus if
it be assumed that the self-defense gloss on the Pact of Paris carries over into the
UN Charter drafting less than a generation later, there is at least the possibility ofa
latent ambiguity, if Article 51's English or French version carries with it a different and broader right of self-defense than the other, a right extending back into
pre-Charter understandings of the scope of the right. The same issue lurks in the
difference between "armed attack"-with its connotation of actual, physical assault-and "aggression annee," "armed aggression," connoting a lower threshold
for triggering a right of self-defense.
We have seen how Linnan's analysis, employing interpretation methods in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, was helpful in determining the meaning of "armed attack"- "agression annee" in Article 51. 167 Since the same issues are
at stake with respect to the point on the "inherent right" -"droit naturel" dichotomy, that method will be employed to determine the meaning of this phrase.
The most recent authoritative pronouncement on the meaning of "inherent
right" - "droit naturel" in Article 51 is the Nicaragua Case, where the ICI accepted
the broader French version of Article 51 to state that the right ofindividual or collective self-defense is a matter of customary intemationallaw, as evidenced in the
Friendly Relations Declaration interpretation of Article 51. 168 Sohn has convincingly noted the similarity oflanguage between the understandings to the Pact of
Paris and the "droit naturel" language of the French text ofArticle 51. 169 The Court
accepted the broad view of "inherent right" advocated by Bowett and others. 170
\Vith respect to the "armed attack" - "aggression annee" issue, the Court agreed with
the Definition ofAggression 171 that sending armed bands, irregulars or mercenaries
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across a border was aggression, where this amounted to an actual armed attack by
regular forces. In The Case involved incursions across land borders, but it is reasonably clear that the Court accepted the French text's slightly broader definition. 173 Therefore, it may be inferred that other forms of armed attack listed in the
Definition, e.g., naval blockade,174 also declare customary law. And if this is so,
there may be other forms of aggression that customary law now defines as such 175
in a particular context to justify a self-defense response. The Court did hold, however, that cross-border assistance to rebels in providing weapons, logistics, or other
support was only a threat of use of force or perhaps intervention into the affairs of
another State, and therefore not enough to be characterized as an aggression so as
to justify action by the target State in self-defense. 176 Two dissents pointed out that
some situations involving logistics might be characterized as an armed attack, i.e.,
aggression. l77 The Court declined to consider anticipatory self-defense issues; the
parties had agreed it was not an issue. 178
Although the Court's opinion is a secondary source and has no precedential
value in the common-law sense,179 its recitation of customary principles is, however, entitled to great respect. Other Charter era instances of customary claims for
national self-defense, particularly in the context ofnaval warfare, are ambiguous.
The Definition of Aggression does not enlarge or contract the right of self-defense: "Nothing in this definition shall be construed as ... enlarging or diminishing the scope of the Charter, including its provisions concerning cases in which the
use of force is lawful.,,180 States may respond to aggression in self-defense or by
other appropriate means,181 e.g., retorsion or nonforce reprisals. 182
There is no evidence ofa special meaning given Article 51 by the intent of the
parties. 183 Thus recourse to supplementary means of interpretation under Vienna
Convention Article 32 is necessary, i.e., examining preparatory works. To be sure,
use of preparatory works should not be considered as a second phase or as a resort
when ambiguity or obscurity remains,184 but they do assume increased importance when Vienna Convention Article 31 analysis yields mixed results. 1SS
The Charter drafters negotiated against a background of the League ofNations
Covenant and the interwar years. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for the Charter
had no equivalent to Article 51,186 and the negotiating history of the conference
that produced the Charter stated in part that "The unilateral use of force or similar
coercive measures is not authorized or admitted. The use of arms in legitimate self
defense remains admitted and unimpaired.,,187 (The Nicaragua Case 188 has demolished the opposing argument, that the right of self-defense is wholly confined to
Article 51 which preempts any customary norm.)189
If the right remains "admitted and unimpaired," reference must be had to the
latest major agreement before the Charter concerned with the issue, i.e., the Pact of
Paris still in force with about 69 parties as ofJanuary 1,1998,190 and negotiations,
including general understandings, before signature and ratification. 191 There
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were no reservations concerning self-defense attached to the Pact; diplomatic correspondence constituting part of that treaty's preparatory works were interpretations, i.e., understandings. 192 Resort to analysis by analogy under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties 193 confirms that the diplomatic correspondence 194 on the Pact contained understandings, not reservations. The Vienna
Convention, Article 2(1)(d), says a reservation is "a unilateral statement, however
phrased or named, made by a State when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving
or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect
of certain provisions ... in their application to that State." The US notes to prospective parties were transmitted June 23, 1928, two months before signature of
the Pact. 195 Ratifications were exchanged much later. 196 Moreover, since self-defense was not mentioned in the Pact, the diplomatic notes, even if they might othenvise be considered reservations, could not "exclude or modify the legal effect of
the treaty ...." In effect, then, the notes were "clarification[s] of the State[s'] position," or "declarations of a purely explanatory character.,,197 The contemporary
position of two US Secretaries of State was that the self-defense corollary to the
Pact was an understanding, not a reservation. 198
Appraisal. The Nicaragua Case confirms that a separate customary norm for
self-defense may exist alongside the Charter recitation in Article 51. 199 Article 51
says the right ofindividual and collective self-defense is "inherent," the same word
used in the reservations 200 for the Pact ofParis. 201 Such being the case, whether
Article 51 applies to a situation, or whether a customary norm applies, the result is
the same. The right of individual and collective self-defense as understood and
practiced before ratification of the Charter continues unabated, subject to application of conditioning factors, e.g., developing custom, perhaps stated in resolutions
(the Definition of Aggression 202 comes to mind); treaties, and other sources of
law,203 including jus cogens norms. 204 If the right of individual and collective
self-defense has risen to the status of ajus cogens norm, as some have claimed, e.g., it
takes priority over other treaty norms like Charter provisions not havingjus cogens
status. 20S If anotherjus cogens norm,e.g., the right to territorial integrity and political independence recited in Charter Article 2(4), is involved, ajus cogens right of
self-defense must be balanced against the otherjus cogens norm(s).206
i. Individual Self-Defense. When commentators' views and Article 51's interpretation through treaty canons analysis are considered,207 a relatively broad right to
self-defense has developed. "U.N. practice in Art. 51, composed as it is of scanty,
vague and contradictory elements, says nothing, or at least nothing clear, about the
grounds for self-defense.,,208 Besides maritime conflicts, only a handful of situations have involved published self-defense claims by a participant. In one of these,
the Security Council rejected Israel's anticipatory self-defense claim for its raid on
an Iraqi nuclear reactor. 209
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In the Corfu Channel Case, referred to the ICJ by the Council,210 the Court said a
second passage of UK warships, ready for action if Albania again tried to use force
to oppose passage, was not illegal because of Albania's prior Channel mining and
resulting loss of British lives and ships.211 Waldock interpreted the Court's approving UK readiness for Albanian attack as legitimate preparation for imminent
threat of attack. 212 Using force to defend the formation would have been legal. 213
(The case also decided that the United Kingdom could not invoke forcible
self-help, i.e, necessity, to justify use of force; this was held not legitimate in the
Charter era.p4 The decision did not mention Article 51, 215 probably because Albania was not a UN Member when the Court's jurisdiction was invoked. 216 The
decision was based entirely on customary law. Although this aspect of the case was
little noticed, Corfu Channel predicted the Nicaragua Case result three decades
later, when the case confirmed a parallel customary self-defense norm, in the latter
decision coterminous with Article 51. 217
In 1948 the Security Council heard Jewish Agency for Palestine claims, before
Israel became a State, that Transjordan and Egypt were guilty of aggression.
Transjordan (now Jordan) and the Arab League claimed self-defense to protect
Jordanian and Arab nationals and to restore peace, security and law and order. Belgium raised self-defense in the Council. Council resolutions did not mention
self-defense.218 This was also true for Indian and Pakistani self-defense claims in
the 1948 Jammu and Kashmir dispute. 219
The beginning of the Korean War in 1950 again illustrates the point, in the collective security context. Although Council resolutions condemned North Korean
aggression as a breach of the peace and called upon UN Members to assist UN
forces and refrain from assisting North Korea,zzo the Council did not mention the
right of self-defense. Similarly, the General Assembly's Uniting For Peace Resolution, passed when the USSR's return to the Council and subsequent Soviet vetoes
made Council decisionmaking impossible, does not mention self-defense. 221 (Article 51 provides for a right of collective as well as individual self-defense, and the
United States ordered its forces to come to the aid of South Korea before the Council acted. 222 Hence, the Council could have, but did not, approve, disapprove or define South Korea's self-defense rights and other States' self-defense efforts for
South Korea.)
In 1951, the Council rejected Egypt's self-defense claim for closing the Suez Canal to, and asserting a right of visit and search of, Israeli merchantmen over two
and a half years after hostilities had ceased. The resolution also noted that restrictions of passage of goods through the Suez Canal to Israeli ports were denying
valuable supplies to nations not connected with the conflict, and that these restrictions, together with Egypt's sanctions on ships that had visited Israel ports "represent[ ed] unjustified interference with the rights of nations to navigate the seas
and to trade freely with one another, including the Arab States and Israel[.],,223
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(Commentators debate whether a right of visit and search during an armistice exists.)224 The resolution was not supported;225 there were more seizures and protests. 226 The USSR vetoed a second Council resolution. 227 Five years later the
United Kingdom justified its Suez Canal intervention on self-defense, to protect
its nationals; France, who combined with Britain in the sea-land operation, did
not do so. The justification seemed to lack factual foundation; it has been said General Assembly rejection of the UK argument "cannot be regarded as conclusive to
its validity in law.,,228
From February-April 1957, however, US destroyers patrolled the Gulf ofAqaba
and the Straits ofTiran to successfully prevent Egyptian interference with US flag
merchantmen bound for Israel; other US warships evacuated US citizens and
"friendly nationals" on a space-available basis from Haifa, Israel, and Alexandria,
Egypt. 229 During 1958-59 UK warships escorted and protected British fishing
trawlers in waters Iceland claimed as territorial sea. The United Kingdom eventually withdrew from the "Cod War," and diplomacy resolved the issue. 230 In 1960
Belgium claimed a right to use force, but not based on self-defense, to extract its nationals from the strife-torn Congo. 231
During the Algeria civil war France's self-defense claim for intercepting and
boarding or diverting vessels whose cargoes were suspected to be bound for Algerian rebels was protested vigorously by States whose flag the ships flew. France had
declared a 20 to 50 kilometer (11-28 mile) customs zone off Algeria, but high seas
interception occurred off Algeria; 45 miles off Casablanca, Morocco; in the Atlantic Ocean; and in the English Channel. It is not clear whether protests were directed at interceptions wherever occurring, or for those outside the zone, i.e., in the
Atlantic and the Channel. Although a large-scale operation (4775 ships visited,
1330 searched, 192 rerouted, 1 arrested in 1956), ships whose cargoes were seized
were smuggling arms to the rebels. Although arms were imported from the sea off
the Algerian coast, others were brought overland through Libya, Morocco or Tunisia, and then across the Algerian border, perhaps through a third State, e.g., Tunisia. Sometimes bogus shipping documents were used. Fishermen smuggled in
arms. 232 The Council did not pass a resolution related to the matter.
In 1964 no Council resolution responded to a US self-defense claim in the Gulf
of Tonkin (Maddox-Turner Joy) incident. 233 From the US perspective, other aspects of the Vietnam War were actions in collective self-defense. 234
No Council decisions were in resolutions related to Israeli actions against Syria
(1964, 1966) and Jordan (1966).235 Israel was condemned for attacks on Jordan
(1966, 236 1969 237 ) and Lebanon (1968- 82 238 ), however. 239 Although draft resolutions were presented, the Council took no position during the 1967 Six-Day
War. 240 During that war Egypt's submarines sank innocent Greek freighters in the
Mediterranean Sea, one off Alexandria and another further west. 241 Britain
warned it would join other States to assure Straits ofTiran right of passage. A UK
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carrier group and the US Sixth Fleet were concentrated in the Eastern Mediterranean, and a second UK carrier was in the Red Sea, but nothing came of the show of
force. U.S.S. Liberty, a warship on the high seas in the eastern Mediterranean monitoring Israeli transmissions during the Egyptian phase of the war, was damaged in
an Israeli PT boat and aircraft attack. Israel later compensated the United States
for loss oflife, crew injuries and damage to Liberty, without admitting fault. Liberty
was configured like a merchant cargo ship but flew a US ensign, was painted haze
grey like all US warships in the Mediterranean, and had traditional US white pendant numbers on the bow and stern. The attack occurred during daylight. US
forces were not allowed to retaliate. Israel had declared an imprecise exclusion
zone, warning ships to keep away from "the coasts ofIsrael during darkness." As to
what coasts (e.g., conquered territory also?), the warning was less than clear. An informal private warning also had been given the United States. 242 No self-defense
claims were raised. The Liberty attack might be compared with the sinking of the
Israeli destroyer Bilat, a belligerent warship steaming on the high seas, during resumption of hostilities in October 1967 Bilat was destroyed by Styx missiles fired
from an Egyptian patrol boat in Port Said harbor. 243 The difference was that the
Bitat attack occurred during a period of hostilities, whereas the Liberty incident
came out of the blue.
In 1968 North Korea seized USS. Pueblo, another electronic reconnaissance
warship, on the high seas, outside of claimed territorial waters. The crew was returned 11 months later. Other than diplomatic overtures, there was no US response,244 and the United Nations did not act.
In the 1965 India-Pakistan conflict, Pakistan declared war, published lists of
absolute and conditional contraband, and established a prize court, asserting these
measures were lawful exercises of self-defense. India's position was ambivalent; it
responded with an absolute contraband list, but it is not clear as to whether India
acknowledged existence of a war. Since India responded with its contraband
lists,245 this at least indicated that India considered itself an object of an armed attack (if Pakistan would be considered the aggressor), or entitled to respond to Pakistan's actions, if the latter is taken as a self-defense response to Indian actions.
Late in 1966 the General Assembly called on the belligerents to observe the rules of
warfare. 246 Apparently there were no self-defense claims.
The 1971 India-Pakistan war was over in two weeks;247 this conflict also resulted in attacks on and destruction ofinnocent merchantmen. After dark, neutral
vessels were not allowed to approach the Pakistan coast closer than 75 miles. The
Indian Navy sought to capture or destroy Pakistani merchant ships. More than 115
neutral ships were inspected; India diverted neutral vessels to Calcutta if they carried cargo of military significance after India discovered that ship markings and
names had been changed. Three Pakistani merchantmen were captured; a Liberian and a Spanish ship were also sunk. Two merchantmen were destroyed by
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Indian surface to surface missiles while at anchor in Karachi roadstead, and the
neutral inbound Venus Challenger was hit and sunk by a missile 26.5 miles off
Karachi. All hands were lost. A Pakistani destroyer also went to the bottom that
night, the target of a Styx missile attack. The cause of destruction of Venus Challenger was probably the missiles' "capricious behavior" and malfunction or inadequate operation of guidance systems. A week after destruction of Venus Challenger,
the Bengal Chamber of Commerce published its 40-mile dawn to dusk warning. 248
Again, apparently there were no self-defense claims.
During the 1973 Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War, international shipping was
warned about entering the region of conflict, which first comprised Egyptian and
Israeli territorial waters, but later further parts of the sea plus Egyptian, Libyan
and Syrian ports. In October the Syrian navy captured and diverted a Greek liner,
Romantica, which was released the next day after the Italian ambassador's intervention. No further such incidents occurred, perhaps because of international
protests, although Egypt regularly stopped, visited and searched neutral merchantmen. Third States' reactions varied. African countries unilaterally suspended or ended diplomatic relations with Israel; Arab countries boycotted oil
exports to Israel and the United States. Britain embargoed arms, and this largely
affected Israel; except for Portugal, other Western European nations refused to allow use of their territories for supplying or assisting any belligerent. Arab navies
adopted a tactic of sheltering beside merchant ships in their harbors after firing
missiles at Israeli warships. Egypt declared a blockade in the Red Sea and attacked
but missed an Israel-bound tanker. In the Gulf of Suez Egypt acted to blockade the
Abu Rudiers-Eilat route used by Israeli-chartered tankers carrying oil from the Israeli-occupied Sinai fields to Eilat. Responding to Egypt's blockade of the Straits
ofBab el Mandeb, Israel counter-blockaded the area. 249 Protests regarding Syria'S
attack on Romantica are an indicator that States considered the attack a delict and
perhaps also subject to self-defense reaction by Greece if Greece had chosen to respond with proportional force.
In 1972 Iceland asserted a 50-mile fishing zone and cut a UK fishing boat's trawl
wires. A UK frigate deployed outside the zone. The next year UK frigates entered
the zone after continued Icelandic harassment. Incidents involving UK and German trawlers continued through 1973. In 1972 Britain had sued Iceland in the International Court of Justice, the Court indicated interim measures in 1973, and in
1974 the Court held that Iceland could not bar Britain from historic waters. The
parties were admonished to negotiate differences. 250 At about the same time US
fishermen experienced seizures of boats and crews, mostly off Latin America's
west coast and in the Gulf of Mexico, by States claiming territorial seas or economic zones beyond those claimed by the United States. The US reaction was an
insurance system to secure crews' and boats' releases, coupled with US diplomatic
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protests. 2SI Some countries' fishing boats were attacked in Western Hemisphere
waters. 2S2 There were no claims of self-defense in responses.
In 1973, responding to US assistance to Israel during the Yom Kippur War,
Libya declared the Gulf of Sidra below 32 degrees 30 minutes North latitude (the
"Line of Death") as Libyan internal waters. The United States and other countries
protested; only a few States have recognized the claim since then. 253 The United
States began challenging the claim by warships' use of the Gulf, establishing a formal Freedom ofNavigation (FON) program in 1979. 254 During a 1981 FON exercise, two Libyan air force jets launched missiles against Navy aircraft, which
dodged the missiles and downed the Libyan planes. The United States asserted a
right of self-defense. Libya escalated threats against US warships and praised terrorists who hijacked the Italian liner Achille Lauro in 1985. Further US FON exercises were undertaken in the Gulf, including one below the Line of Death. US
NOTMARs and NOTAMs published these exercises. In 1986, after Libyan
land-based missiles were launched against Navy aircraft flying in international
airspace but below the Line, and Libyan aircraft penetrated an announced exercise
area, the FON force commander declared any Libyan military forces leaving Libyan territorial waters or airspace and threatening US forces would be considered
hostile. Thereafter, when Libyan missile patrol boats headed toward US forces,
and Libyan shore-based target acquisition radars were activated "with the evident
object of firing upon U.S. aircraft," the boats and radars were destroyed or damaged. The boats were not attacked when seeking refuge alongside a neutral merchantman or engaging in search and rescue operations. The United States claimed
a right of anticipatory self-defense.255
Although the United States notified the Security Council of its self-defense responses in the 1975 Mayaguez incident,256 when US naval aircraft were attacked by
Libyan aircraft over the Gulf of Sidra in 1981, and in 1986 when the United States
responded to Libyan patrol boat advances, the Council passed no resolutions on
the situations. 257
In 1981 US forces operated under the recently revised Peacetime Rules of Engagement (ROE), which provided "word picture[s]" giving commanders listings
of military indicators of hostile intent to consider in self-defense, i.e., when there
was a demonstration of a hostile intent to attack that could justify response in anticipatory self-defense. Although ROE might authorize units to respond to the
limits of principles of self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense, reaction in
a given situation might not rise to the line of permissible responses under the law
of self-defense. To the extent permitted by law, national policy and operational
plans and orders, force commanders also have discretionary judgment to make
other responses. Although US ROE have been classified in most cases, it is commonly known that US force commanders always have the obligation to defend
their unites). Failure to observe restrictive national ROE in protecting a unit under
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a legitimate claim of self-defense cannot result in a counterclaim of a violation of
the law of self-defense. 258 In other words, ROE-based responses may articulate a
claim of self-defense; if the ROE response is more restrictive than the law of
self-defense might permit, practice under the ROE cannot be interpreted as setting
the boundaries of self-defense. ROE and the law of self-defense are therefore independent variables, although ROE cannot exceed the boundaries of the law.
During the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas war, although the United Kingdom based
its military operation on Art. SI, no Council resolutions passed on the conflict took
a clear position on the point. 259 On April 7, 1982 the United Kingdom declared a
200-mile Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ), to be effective April 12, for Argentine
shipping around the Falklands/Malvinas. On April 23 the United Kingdom established a Defensive Sea Area (DSA) or "defensive bubble" around its task force,
warning that approach by Argentine civil or military aircraft, warships or naval
auxiliaries would be dealt with "appropriately." On May 1, when fighting started
in the islands, the MEZ was changed to a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) for ships
supplying the Argentine war effort. MEZ coverage was extended May 7 to sea areas
more than 12 miles off the Argentine coast. Argentina had declared a 200-mile Defense Zone (DZ) offits coast and around the Falklands/Malvinas on April 13, after
having protested the UK action. MEZ enforcement capability came on the day it
was effective, April 12. 260 Presumably Argentina could have enforced its DZ if it
chose to do so, but after the cruiser General Belgrano sinking, Argentine naval
forces, except land-based naval aviation and possibly submarines, did not figure in
the war. On May 11 Argentina declared all South Atlantic Ocean waters a war zone,
threatening to attack any UK vessel therein. Apparently the only neutral-flag ship
attacked by Argentina in the war zone was Hercules, a Liberian-flag, US interests-owned tanker in ballast. Although the USSR belatedly protested lawfulness of
the UK TEZ, it did apparently not object to the Argentine DZ and observed the
UK TEZ.261 The United States had published warnings to US vessels and ships
owned by US interests, e.g., Hercules, two days before she was hit. 262 On July 12,
1982, active hostilities in the war ended, but the UK TEZ and economic sanctions
were continued. Ten days later the TEZ was lifted, but the United Kingdom
warned Argentina to keep military ships and aircraft away from the islands, declaring a ISO-mile Protection Zone. 263 The TEZ was relatively successful, although
Argentina succeeded in airlifts to the islands until the last days of the war. Apparently Argentine sealift efforts failed,z64
In the Iran-Iraq war, although the Security Council recognized the right offreedom of navigation and called for protection of the marine environment 265 in a
context of belligerent and other States' self-defense claims,266 there was no Council action to take charge of the conflict by decision, as the Charter provides. 267 Both
belligerents declared defense, war or exclusion zones,268 and aside from Council
resolutions calling for recognition of freedom of navigation rights and protection
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of the environment,269 the Council did not purport to regulate these. No Council
resolution explicitly determined the validity of the self-defense claims of Iran or
Iraq.
Thus, at least in 1986 when Combacau's analysis was published on Security
Council practice in defining self-defense, "whatever the official pretence, and perhaps the legal situation, the international community is ... back where it was before 1945: in the state of nature; and ... the notion of self-defense makes no sense
there.,,270 The latter part of Combacau's conclusion is overblown, for we may at
least draw upon the understandings of the Pact of Paris, as its concepts were carried forward into Article 51. 271 The 1990-91 Gulf War, the most serious challenge
to the Council since the Korean conflict, shed no light on the issue. Council Resolution 661 merely confirmed the right of individual and collective self-defense as
stated in the Charter.2n As Combacau intimates, much of this is due to the structure and powers of Charter institutions. Action by the Council must be taken with
permanent members' concurrence,273 and the Soviet veto was a regular feature of
Cold War politics. However, other countries (including the United States) vetoed
resolutions when allies, friends or interests were involved.274 Mindful of this, and
the "sovereign equality of [UN] ... Members,,,275 it is no wonder that self-defense
has not figured strongly in Council resolutions, which nearly always have been
nonmandatory recommen,dations or calls for action. 276
The General Assembly record is also relatively meager. Except for certain competences not relevant here, the Assembly's function is recommendatory and subordinate to the Council on matters related to international peace and security.277
Article 12(1)'s requirement, that the Assembly cannot make a recommendation on
a matter relating to international peace and security while the Council is seized of
it, explains the Assembly record in part. Usually States will complain to the Council first, as the Charter provides. 278 While the Council debates the matter, the Assembly is impotent. If the Council acts, even through nonmandatory calls for
action or recommendations instead of binding decisions under Articles 25 and 48,
it remains seized of the matter. If vetoes stop Council action on a particular crisis, it
may still remain seized of the matter, depending on its prior resolutions. 279 On the
other hand, if the matter comes to the Assembly first, the Assembly may make recommendations until the Council takes it up.
The Assembly's nonmandatory resolutions may recite, and therefore strengthen,
customary and treaty norms, or may lead to development of new norms, however. 280 Certain of these resolutions have asserted claims relative to self-defense.
General Assembly Resolution 378 (1950), companion to the Uniting for Peace
Resolution passed during the Korean War, recites these recommendations:
(a) That if a State becomes engaged in armed conflict with another State or States,
it take all steps practicable in the circumstances and compatible with the right
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of self-defence to bring the armed conflict to an end at the earliest possible
moment;
In particular, that such State shall immediately, and in any case not later than
twenty-four hours after the outbreak of the hostilities, make a public statement wherein it will proclaim its readiness, provided that the States with
which it is in conflict will do the same, to discontinue all military operations
and withdraw all its military forces which have invaded the territory or territorial water of another State or crossed a demarcation line, whether on terms
agreed by the parties to the conflict or under conditions to be indicated to the
parties by the ... United Nations;
That such State immediately notify the Secretary-General, for communication to the Security Council and to the Members of the United Nations, of the
statement made in accordance with [(b)] ... and of the circumstances in which
the conflict has arisen;
That such State, in its notification to the Secretary-General, invite the appropriate organs of the United Nations to dispatch the Peace Observation Commission to the area in which the conflict has arisen, if the Commission is not
already functioning there;
That the conduct of the States concerned in relation to the matters covered by
the foregoing recommendations be taken into account in any determination
of responsibility for the breach of the peace or act of aggression in the case under consideration and in all other relevant proceedings before the appropriate
organs of the United Nations[.]281

That same year the "Peace through Deeds" resolution "reaffirm[ed] that ... anyaggression ... is the gravest of all crimes against peace and security" and "That
prompt united action be taken to meet aggression wherever it arises[.],,282 The
1970 Friendly Relations Declaration again condemned the threat or use of force,
declared a war of aggression to be a crime against peace, and added that "States
have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use offorce." The Declaration added, however, that "Nothing in [its terms should] be construed as enlarging
or diminishing in any way the scope of the provisions of the Charter concerning
cases in which the use offorce is lawful,,,283 i.e., in self-defense. 284.
Specific situations occurring in the Charter era offer little additional guidance
to the meaning ofself-defense. The 1950 UFP Resolution has been discussed. 285 In
1966 the Assembly belatedly called upon India and Pakistan to observe the rules of
warfare, but only as the war wound down. 286 The Assembly condemned the USSR
Afghanistan invasion in 1982 287 and US action in Grenada the next year.288
Thus it might be said, apart from occasional forays into the field or general
statements, e.g., the Friendly Relations Declaration, that General Assembly practice, even during the UFP Resolution era occasioned by permanent Council member vetoes, has been spotty. The result is that the definition ofself-defense remains
as it was in 1945 when the Charter was negotiated in the context of the Pact of Paris
and other midcentury agreements. We are thus left with arguments from history,
analysis of commentators, and rhetoric from some of the latter.
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ii. Collective Self-Defense. Article 51 of the Charter permits collective self-defense under the same terms as the right of individual self-defense. Certain aspects
of collective self-defense differ from the issue of individual self-defense. However,
if the foregoing analysis for the right of individual self-defense is correct, i.e., that
ultimate resort to the context of the Charter's drafting is necessary, then similar
analysis is necessary to appraise collective self-defense.
Unlike individual States' right of self-defense, which is of ancient lineage, the
notion of collective self-defense in the sense of the Charter began with the Congress of Vienna system (1815) established at the end ofthe Napoleonic wars and
continues on a parallel path to this day.289 Although there have been numerous
collective self-defense agreements concluded since 1945, none of these were directly at issue in the Tanker War. North Atlantic Treaty countries operated together during the conflict, but the territorial limits of the Treaty 290 meant they
operated under principles of "informal" self-defense, analyzed below. Similarly,
two ANZUS Pact members, Australia 291 and the United States, were Tanker War
participants; ANZUS did not apply, covering only Pacific area defense. 292 Warsaw
Pact countries were participants, the USSR through naval deployments, aid and
diplomacy and other Soviet Bloc nations through weapons sales to belligerents,293
but there was no perceived direct threat to or attack on any Pact party except for attacks on USSR-flag merchantmen, and the Pact was not invoked. 294 Many Arab
League States were involved in the war, but a combination of internal dissension
within the League, at least at the beginning of the Tanker War,295 and an apparent
interpretation that this regional defense treaty 296 pointed only toward outside aggressors resulted in its not being invoked against either belligerent. The Arab
League seems to have functioned during the Gulf War as a regional arrangement
that attempted to maintain international peace and security pursuant to Article 52
of the Charter. 297 Although late in the Tanker War the Gulf Cooperation Council
Summit approved a comprehensive security strategy that some have said amounts
to a collective self-defense pact,298 there has been no formal publication of this arrangement as a treaty. The strategy can be viewed as an example ofinformal collective self-defense, also permissible under the Charter.299
The Charter thus "contains the first real attempt to reconcile the imposition of
duties to maintain international peace and security with the problem posed by the
freedom which each sovereign State normally would have[,] to decide when and
how such a duty may be fulfilled.,,300 Given the context of the preparation of Article 51 while the Act ofChapultepec was going forward to signature,301 McDougal
and Feliciano are correct in saying that the essence of the right ofcollective self-defense lies in maintaining international peace and security through collaborative
arrangements among States. 302
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1. Other Regional Organizations: Article 52 ofthe Charter. The structure of the Charter
and practice since 1945 confirm the McDougal-Feliciano view. Article 52(1) of the
Charter provides:
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements
or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international
peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such
arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations.

Thus, "the Charter basis of collective self-defense arrangements in Article 51 does
not exclude the possibility that other provisions of the treaties and activities of the
agencies in question came under Article 52.,,303 Indeed, "[f]rom the discussions
leading up to the approval of the Charter, ... regionalism was considered primarily
in connection with the maintenance of international peace and security.,,304
Although formed for other purposes in 1981, the Gulf Cooperation Council had
moved from its initial stated goal of cooperation to protect internal security to a
policy of cooperating in economic and defense security by the end of the war. 305 By
the end of the war GCC members were cooperating among themselves for mine
suppression and other measures, and with other States with navies in the Gul£306
The Arab League also partook of a collective defense treaty and economic cooperation system. 307

II. Practice During the Charter Era; «Informal" Collective Self-Defense. Prior practice
confirms the view that a right ofinformal self-defense, besides Article 51's confirmation of the inherent right of collective self-defense, exists in the Charter era.
Although there was some objection to the concept of regional defense arrangements,30S a number of these agreements, articulating the principle that an attack
on one member is an attack on all, have been concluded and remain in force. 309
State practice has also confirmed regional arrangements, sometimes ad hoc, to deal
with threats to the peace, aggression or other forms of breaches of the peace. There
have also been bilateral or multilateral assertions of collective self-defense, often
without formal prior treaty arrangement.
Lack of a definition of self-defense by the Council or the Assembly in the Korean War has been noted. 310 Ifit is assumed that UN operations (primarily US directed) after Soviet vetoes began in 1950 could not have been grounded in the UFP
Resolution, since General Assembly resolutions have no binding effect,311 one
theory of the multilateral operations in Korea after the USSR veto is "informal"
collective self-defense, i.e., cooperating countries pooled forces to resist North Korea's continued aggression and the PRC incursion. The same might be said for
contemporaneous US naval operations between Taiwan and the China
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mainland.312 For the United States and South Korea or Taiwan, bilateral defense
treaties replaced informal arrangements in 1953 and 1954 respectively.313
The 1951 ANZUS Pact was memorialized Australia-New Zealand-US practice
after World War II and during the Korean War, another example ofinformal collective self-defense.314
In 1962, OAS countries, under US leadership, relied on Charter Article 52,
which permits regional organization resolution of disputes,31S to enforce a naval
quarantine around Cuba during the Missile Crisis. The US proclamation establishing the quarantine, besides citing the Rio Treaty, also relied on a US Congressional resolution recognizing the threat. The proclamation was specific as to
cargoes to be halted, e.g., missiles, bombs, bomber aircraft, warheads, and support
equipment, "and any other classes of material hereafter designated by the Secretary of Defense [to] effectuate" the proclamation. It exempted other cargoes, e.g.,
foodstuffs and petroleum, and declared neutral rights would be respected. No
blockade was declared, and the proclamation limited use of force to situations
where directions under the quarantine were disobeyed if reasonable efforts were
made to communicate directions to an interdicted vessel, "or in case of self-defense." (The Rio Treaty authorized "partial or complete interruption of economic
relations or of ... sea communications; and use of armed force[,]" among other
measures, parallelling Charter Articles 41-42). 316While some said self-defense was
the proper claim,317 and others later asserted that the Nicaragua Case would have
held the quarantine action a matter of anticipatory self-defense,318 the OAS-US
1962 claim was based on Article 52 and not Article 51. The point is that Article 52
organizations can organize for informal collective self-defense in situations threatening regional security without benefit of an Article 51 collective self-defense
treaty. The Missile Crisis thus might arguably be further precedent for informal
self-defense under the Charter.
The 1964 attacks on U.S.S. Maddox and Turner Joy (the Gulf of Tonkin Incident) h:we been ana1yzed. 319 The conflict connecting these incidents, the Vietnam
War, is an example of a claim of informal collective self-defense. The US position
during the Vietnam War was that it and South Vietnam (RVN) were jointly resisting North Vietnamese aggression and therefore were acting in self-defense. (There
were other views; e.g., it was a civil war.)320 During the conflict, patrol areas for Operation Market Time, which sought to deny seaborne supplies to RVN opponents,
was extended to 30 miles off the South Vietnamese coast. Initially Market Time
operations took place in a 12-mile defensive sea area. North Vietnam used small
coastal fishing vessels to support military logistics in the South. Fishermen and
coastal traders were allowed to pass when on legitimate business. 321 In 1972 a mine
quarantine program in North Vietnamese waters sought to seal North Vietnam
ports. 322 Its antecedent had been the RVN's attempted quarantine to stop sealifted
supplies coming to the Viet Cong through the Gulf of Siam and the Mekong Delta.
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A RVN destroyer sank a North Vietnamese trawler, believed to be carrying ammunition, in 1972 during these operations. 323
During the war the United States used Military Sealift Command vessels, US
flag charters and occasionally foreign-flag vessels to deliver war material. Several
ships were hit; two were sunk by Viet Cong attacks while in South Vietnamese
coastal waters. The Viet Cong seem not to have discriminated between vessels carrying war material and civilian-oriented cargoes, e.g., cement. 324 US antisubmarine protection was given high value ships, e.g., troop carriers. 325 While some have
claimed SEATO may have applied, and its formal treaty obligations remain in effect, its supporting organization had been dismantled by 1975,326 and US assistance to South Vietnam might be characterized as another example of informal
collective self-defense.
On the face of it, the Tanker War was a bilaterial conflict. However, as analyzed
above,327 some States or groups of States acted to favor one (or in some cases both)
of the belligerents throughout the war. As in the case ofthe Falklands/Malvinas
War (1982) and unilateral US help for Britain and the multilateral EC embargo on
Argentine goods,328 this kind of participation arguably could be said to recognize
an interim state of nonbelligerency in the Charter era. 329 The same sort ofinformal
participation and influences or attempted influences came through organizations
aligned along geographic lines (the Gulf Cooperation Council), common defense
interests elsewhere (NATO), common economic interests (the EC and the Group
of Seven), and ethnic or religious commonality (the ICO and the Arab League).330
States also had informal arrangements among themselves. Italy's bilateral mine
clearing agreements are an example. 331 The US statement that US Navy protection
was available to third-State merchantmen, upon request and if US naval commitments permitted, is another. 332 The clearest example of informal self-defense arrangements was the December 1987 comprehensive security strategy adopted by
the Gulf Cooperation Council. 333
The belligerents also made arrangements that did not rise to the level of a formal Article 51 self-defense agreement or an Article 52 regional arrangement, at
least on the public record. A notable example was the belligerents' financing their
war through petroleum sales and their importing war goods through third countries. 334 Arms and other sales to belligerents 335 might be seen as another example
of an informal arrangement. Below these governmental efforts were the effects of
organizations, e.g., the General Council of British Shipping, seafarers' unions, and
the marine insurance industry.336

III. Appraisalfor the Tanker War. No formal agreements like the multilateral or bilateral defense treaties of the Cold War era were involved in the Tanker War. However, as with prior conflicts since 1945, e.g., Falklands/Malvinas, States or groups
of States aided one side or the other. When States that were not belligerents
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concerted together, these amounted to informal collective defense assistance arrangements, sometimes with a belligerent and sometimes among other countries
not party to the conflict. There was precedent for this action before and during the
Charter era. 337 It is arguable, for example, that the 1990-91 coalition assembled
against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was governed by principles of informal
self-defense, to the extent that there were no formal collective self-defense treaties
among coalition countries, before the Security Council authorized force in November
1990. 338 After and to the extent the Council became seized of the matter, coalition
actions were governed by Security Council decisions. 339
Whether claims of informal collective self-defense amount to a resurgence of
the pre-Charter concept of an interim legitimate stage of nonbelligerency, between
belligerency and neutrality,340 is an open question. Many States recognize only
neutrality or belligerency.341 It would seem, however, that it is possible that
nonbelligerency may have crept in through the door of practice under the Charter
between 1945 and 1988, before the end of the Cold War. Whetherthis will continue
with revitalization ofthe Security Council since 1989 and the USSR's collapse is
only a guess. If the Council continues relatively powerless, by the veto or adoption
of nonbinding recommendations or calls for action, or if the UFP Resolution procedure is revived with a veto-paralyzed Council, that door remains open.
It would seem, however, that a distinction between belligerency and neutrality
can be retained by referring to informal collective self-defense for some situations,
e.g., US and EC support of Britain during the Falklands/Malvinas War. 342 Whether
informal collective self-defense can sustain actions in all situations must be left to
speculation. The problem lies in a definition of the contours of the doctrine. It is
fairly clear, for example, that there is a customary right for formal treaty partners to
consult before action, and that consultation can include preparation for anticipatory collective self-defense. It is also fairly clear that the inherent right to collective
self-defense includes a right of anticipatory self-defense, however that might be
limited by principles of necessity, proportionality and admitting of no alternative
in a particular situation. 343 Presumably informal collective self-defense includes a
right of consultation, but does it include a right of anticipatory response? If the record ofinformal collective self-defense is sparse in the Charter era, claims to a right
of anticipatory response appear to be even more scarce. There are few reports of it
in the century and a half ofprior practice;344 there may be many, particularly in the
maritime arena since 1914,345 but the record of State practice is not clear on the
point. Lack of media interest, space considerations and relative importance in digests of national practice like Whiteman, lack of commentary by scholars, or national security, may have resulted in no or only episodic reportage.
There is one critical difference between collective self-defense claims, whether
anticipatory or otherwise, published in treaties and those asserted under a right of
informal self-defense. Today most treaties are published, perhaps first in informal
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sources, e.g., International Legal Materials, but nearly always later in national series,
e.g., United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, and perhaps in the
United Nations Treaty Series, although International Legal Materials is selective in
publication and the latter two may be decades behind in printing. Some agreements are never published, due to national security considerations,346 and these
may often deal with defense issues. However, at least for published treaties, there is
some public notice of their terms,347 perhaps qualified or explained by practice. By
definition, there is no similar method of notice by publication of informal collective self-defense arrangements, except what might be deduced from government
notices or the media. It would seem, however, that to avoid claims of unprovoked
aggression under Article 2(4) of the Charter, States should notify informal collective arrangements except where security considerations militate against publicity.
Notices to Mariners. (NOTMARs) and Airmen (NOTAMs) were employed during the Tanker War to publicize defense, war or exclusion zones and warnings of
self-defense action. 348 Even as a requirement of treaty publication is qualified today, e.g., for national security considerations,349 States in informal collective
self-defense arrangements should consider publishing their terms.
iii. Reporting Self-Defense Measures to the Security Council. The Charter also
requires that "Measures taken by Members in [the exercise of this right of] self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any
way affect the authority and responsibility of the ... Council under the ... Charter
to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.,,350 There is little ambiguity in this requirement,
which is not part of customary international law, according to the Nicaragua Case,
which added that failing to report "may be one of the factors indicating whether
the State in question was itself convinced that it was acting in self-defense.,,35 1The
question might be raised, particularly in view of the Court's position that a parallel
customary law of self-defense has developed alongside Charter criteria in Article
51,352 how reporting could be a "factor" for a customary law of self-defense if the
reporting requirement is not a part of customary law. Use of "this right of self-defense" in Article 51 353 underscores requiring reporting only in Article 51-governed situations. Whether an Article 51 reporting requirement applies in cases of
informal collective self-defense, also permissible under the Charter,354 is not
known and perhaps depends on whether a State claims a right to informal collective self-defense under Article 51 or under customary law.
In any event, the Article 51 reporting requirement appears to have been honored more in the breach. 355 A commentator has argued, however, that failure to report at least indicates that measures taken are not defensive in nature. 356
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iv. Anticipatory Self-Defense. The Caroline Case is the classic statement of the
right of anticipatory self-defense, i.e., a target State may resort to self-defense before an actual armed attack where the necessity for that defense is "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." The
action then taken must not be unreasonable or excessive, i.e., it must be proportional to the threat; it must also be necessary. The Tokyo and Nuremberg tribunals
recognized a right of anticipatory self-defense, holding the Netherlands could rely
on it to justify attack on Japan before a formal war declaration but that Germany
could not rely on it to justify attack on Norway.357
Does the right of anticipatory self-defense carry forward into the Charter era, or
must a State "take the first hit" before responding in self-defense, i.e., is only "reactive" self-defense permitted? Commentators 358 and countries 359 divide sharply
on the issue. Commentators 360 and countries 361 may also divide on when self-defense, anticipatory or reactive, is appropriate. The Charter is silent on the point,
except to say that UN Members retain the "inherent" right of individual and collective self-defense.362 The Nicaragua Case did not rule on the issue. 363 Some commentators,364 and undoubtedly some States, have seemed to change views. Others
have taken no clear position. 365
If the methodology of treaty interpretation is employed, practice under Article
51 has been ambiguous. Bowett notes the UN Atomic Energy Commission's initial
report, which said a right of self-defense would arise where a party to a nuclear
arms treaty committed a "grave" violation of the treaty.366 He also cites the SecurityCouncil discussion over the Kashmir invasion, justified by Pakistan on anticipatory defense grounds, where only India argued against the view. 367 In 1952 the
UN Sixth Committee heard four States argue that a State threatened with impending attack might be justified to respond in self-defense. 368
The Definition of Aggression resolution includes specific examples not involving armed attack on a State but which are nevertheless considered aggression under the Charter: blockade of ports or coasts which, if complied with, results in no
use offorce, merely a threat of use offorce; "use" of armed forces of a State, within a
host State's territory by the host's agreement, but contravening conditions in the
agreement initially entitling the visiting armed forces to be there, which might result when such forces are "used" in nonforce situations. 369 The enumeration is not
exclusive 370 and could include other circumstances involving threat of force that
could trigger a potential for self-defense response. Ifacts of aggression can justify a
proportional self-defense response, it is implicit in the Assembly's approval of
these as per se acts of aggression by which an anticipatory self-defense response
could be triggered.
The case of blockade is illustrative. When blockade is declared against a target
State, no armed attack will occur if there are no ships to intercept. There is no way
to determine the blockade's effectiveness until interceptions occur or ships
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successfully evade blockade. If a target State acts to end the blockade before its
goal-intercepting and possibly destroying target State ships-occurs, a target
State would be exercising anticipatory self-defense. Thus if armed aggressionthe French version of "armed attack" in Article S1371-includes blockade as customary law,372 then target State action to end a blockade may include anticipatory
self-defense.
The division of commentators and countries on admissibility of anticipatory
self-defense as an option has been recited. 373 Dinstein offers an intermediate position of"interceptive" self-defense, permitted if a State "has committed itself to an
armed attack in an ostensibly irrevocable way. Whereas a preventive strike [i.e., anticipatory self-defense] which is merely 'foreseeable' (or even just 'conceivable') an
interceptive strike counters an armed attack which is 'imminent' and practically
'unavoidable.' 374 He cites a scenario based on theJ apanese task force ordered to attack Pearl Harbor in 1941:
[h]ad [it] been destroyed on its way to Pearl Harbor, this would have constituted
not an act of preventive war but a miraculously early use of counter-force.... [Pluto ..
another way, the self-defence exercised by the United States (in response to an
incipient armed attack) would have been not anticipatory but interceptive in
nature.3 75

Dinstein thus justifies Israel's first opening fire in the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict. 376 The hypothetical interception to end a naval war in 1941, before the Charter era, is undoubtedly true today, if the Japanese task force was past the point of no
return (i.e., it could not be recalled) and it was reasonably clear from facts available
to the United States at the time. 377 The same can be said ofIsrael's 1967 attack on
Egypt.
Dinstein's analysis does not mention Israel's 1981 raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, condemned by the Security Council and others, arguing that the raid came
during a continuing state of war between Iraq and Israel,378 nor does he mention
two tactical aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflicts, the Israeli attack on the U.s.S.
Liberty, and destruction of the Israeli destroyer Eilat by missiles. 379 Liberty was a
US warship operating in international waters of the Mediterranean Sea, gathering
intelligence for the United States, when it was attacked by Israeli aircraft and PT
boats. The attack clearly violated international law and, as an act of aggression,
could have subjected Israel to US proportional self-defense responses.
Eitat's loss, also on the high seas, due to an Egyptian gunboat'S Styx missiles
launched in Port Said harbor occurring during a resumption of the conflict, illustrates the change in naval warfare between 1941 and 1967. 380 (This attack could
not raise the self-defense issue, since it occurred during hostilities, rather than at
the beginning of hostilities.) Rather than a battleship and carrier formation steaming at 20-30 knots to a position off Hawaii where it could launch raids flown by
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aircraft with top speeds of 400 miles an hour, thus giving days or at least hours for a
target State to anticipate and deliver an interceptive strike, missile attacks from the
same range come in minutes. Moreover, a missile attack is nearly always fatal. One
can compareEilat's loss in 1967, the sinking of Venus Challenger and a Pakistani destroyer during the 1971 India-Pakistan war,38 1 losses ofH.M.S. Sheffield and other
ships during the Falklands/Malvinas war,382 and U.S.S. Stark's near loss during
the Tanker War,383 with survival of many ships during the World War II
Kamikazi attacks, where hundreds of manned Japanese suicide planes crashed US
warships. Aside from aircraft carriers and battleships, World War II men-of-war
were smaller and equally fragile, yet they took many hits before sinking, and most
survived. 384 New occasions teach new duties and responsibilities,385 and ifinternational law is to remain credible, it must parallel technical developments. 386
(That, of course, is the function of custom as opposed to a potentially rigidified
. )387
treaty reglme.
Dinstein's interceptive defense theory seems but another phrase for anticipatory self-defense in the Pearl Harbor attack hypothetical. He is less than clear
about the situation of an anticipated attack on an independendy-steamingwarship
before armed conflict begins. However, as events in the Tanker \'{Tar and previous
incidents demonstrate, some States have asserted a right of anticipatory self-defense 388 or interceptive defense as Dinstein would formulate it.

1. Libya-US Confrontations. Libya-US confrontations from 1973 through 1986 illustrate the two views of the scope of self-defense. 389
In 1973, responding to US assistance to Israel during the Yom Kippur War,
Libya declared the Gulf of Sidra below 32 degrees 30 minutes North latitude (the
"Line of Death") as Libyan territorial waters.
The United States challenged the claim by warships' use of the Gulf of Sidra, establishing a formal Freedom ofNavigation (FON) program in 1979. In 1981, during a FON exercise, two Libyan air force jets launched missiles against Navy
aircraft, who dodged the missiles and downed the Libyan aircraft with missiles.
Under anyone's view of the right of self-defense, the Navy aircraft had a right to
fire in response to the prior Libyan missile attack; it was an example of reactive
self-defense.
Tensions again mounted in 1985-86. Libya escalated threats against US warships and praised the terrorists who had hijacked the Italian liner Achille Lauro.
New US FON exercises were ordered off Libya, including one below the Line. US
NOTMARs and NOTAMs publicized the operations. After Libya launched
land-based missiles against Navy aircraft flying over international waters below
the Line, and Libyan aircraft penetrated the announced exercise area in international waters, the FON force commander declared that Libyan military forces
leaving Libyan territorial waters or airspace and constituting a threat to US units
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would be considered hostile. Thereafter, when Libyan missile patrol boats headed
toward US forces, and Libyan target acquisition radars activated with a likely object of firing on US aircraft, the Libyan boats and radars were attacked and damaged or destroyed. In these cases the US claim was anticipatory self-defense, i.e.,
taking action to protect ships or aircraft after hostile intent (e.g., closing US ships
in an attack profile or illuminating US aircraft with target acquisition radar) was
manifested. There was, of course, no obligation for US forces to attack or desist
from attacking the Libyan vessels or aircraft, but there was the option to do so, subject to limitations of self-defense, i.e., necessity and proportionality.390 Indeed, US
forces did not fire on Libyan missile patrol boats when they sought refuge alongside a neutral merchantman or were engaged in legitimate search and rescue operations, which illustrate these principles.
In April 1986 US Navy and Air Force planes bombed terrorist operations centers in Libya after two US citizens were killed in a Berlin disco terrorist bombing.
The US hard evidence was that Libya was responsible for the disco bombing and
was planning further terrorist attacks on US military and diplomatic facilities in
Europe. The United States claimed self-defense conditioned by necessity and proportionalityas the basis for the operation. French, UK and US vetoes blocked a Security Council resolution condemning the raid. 391

II. The Tanker War. The Tanker War produced numerous examples of reactive
self-defense, i.e., self-defense after an initial attack, as well as anticipatory selfdefense, both individual and informal collective self-defense.392
Iraq responded to Iran's shelling ofIraqi towns in 1980 with a three-front invasion ofIran, claiming self-defense.393 If it is true that the shelling was not responsive to Iraqi invasions, Iraq's claim of self-defense was legitimate. On the other
hand, if Iranian shelling responded to prior Iraqi acts of aggression, the shelling
was a proper self-defense response by Iran, and the Iraqi invasion could not be
claimed as self-defense. In the latter situation, the invasion was a clear violation of
Charter Article 2(4). Use or threat of use of force in response to legitimate selfdefense action cannot be claimed as self-defense. Since UN Security Council Resolution 479 was a "call" for cessation of hostilities,394 and not a "decision,,,395 there
was a strong political, but not a legal, obligation on the belligerents to comply.
Both belligerents declared war zones. 396 After the Iraqi invasion, Iran declared
its coasts a war zone, closed the Shatt al Arab, refused access to Iraqi ports, and
warned ofretaliation ifother countries gave Iraq facilities. Iran said the zone declaration was for defense and for safety of shipping. Iraq's war zone was north of
29-30N in the Gulf and was reportedly reprisal, or retaliation, for the Iranian war
zone declaration.
Iran's war zone declaration was legitimate for Iran's coasts, which were part of
its territory.397 Although the Shatt aI-Arab and Iraqi ports were part of the area of
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conflict, unless Iran had occupied the area or they were vital to its defense, Iran
could not lawfully announce their closure to States not party to the conflict. Still
less could Iran issue a generalized warning of retaliation against these States if they
gave Iraq facilities, unless States were parties to a collective defense agreement or
arrangement with Iraq and employed this treaty arrangement to assist Iraq as the
aggressor. Since Iraq had withdrawn from the Baghdad Pact,398 and was not a GCC
member,399 Iran could not claim that these regional arrangements were assisting
Iraq. Iraq was a party, with Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and other Arab
States, to the Arab Joint Defense Treaty,400 and it may have been to this Treaty arrangemen t that Iran directed its warning. It would have been entirely legitimate, if
Iran committed aggression by shelling Iraqi communities, for the Treaty States to
have collaborated with Iraq in collective self-defense. 401 Although Iran could warn
of retaliation, this did not deprive the Treaty States of their right to assist Iraq with
collective self-defense responses. The Treaty States might have paid consequences,
e.g., by bombing raids on their territory if they did, but they could not be deprived
of theirtreaty obligation by the Iranian warning. On the other hand, ifIraq was the
aggressor, e.g., by invading Iran, the Treaty States could not aid Iraq pursuant to
the Treaty.402 Under no circumstances could Iran claim a right of retaliation
against States not party to any defense treaty or other similar arrangement with
Iraq, e.g., States whose shipping sailed the Gul~ or whose shipping interests used
the Gulf, e.g., France, Liberia, Panama, USSR, the United Kingdom, and the
. United States.
Whether the Iraq war zone declaration was a legitimate reprisal, or was legal in
'terms of area, duration, etc., is addressed later in this chapter 403 and in Part F of
Chapter V. IfIran was the aggressor when it shelled Iraqi communities, then the
Iraq war zone, later named the Gulf Maritime Exclusion Zone (GMEZ), was a legitimate self-defense measure, subject to proportionality, etc., considerations.404
The same is true for the zone's extension, again subject to the same limitations.40S
On the other hand, ifIraq was the aggressor, then the war zones, and the GMEZ,
were not legal self-defense measures.
The GCC's establishment in 1981, with a goal of coordinating, integrating and
interconnecting, inter alia self-defense, among its six western Gulflittoral members,406 was legitimate under Charter Articles 51-52, even though its self-defense
terms were never spelled out like most collective defense treaties. This too is an example of a legitimate "informal" multilateral collective self-defense arrangement.407 Similarly, it was legitimate for Saudi Arabia to request US Air Force
AWACS aircraft surveillance, and for the United States to agree to the operation,
in 1981. 408 This is an example of a legitimate informal bilateral self-defense arrangement.409 In neither case, however, could these informal arrangements be
used to aid an aggressor.

World Public Order

143

The shuttle convoys carrying oil as part ofIran's warfighting, war-sustaining effort down Iran's Gulf coast and through the Iraqi zone were given Iranian naval
protection.410 These vessels were entitled to self-defense protection by Iran. IfIran
was correct in asserting that it was a target ofIraqi aggression, these fleets of vessels, if attacked by Iraq, were also targets ofaggression.4ll Even if they sailed alone,
perhaps with naval escort or perhaps independently, these vessels would be considered targets ofIraqi aggression,412 ifIraq is deemed to have been the aggressor
at the beginning of the war. If, on the other hand, Iran was the aggressor, the attacks were subject to the law of naval warfare. 413
The same analysis applies for Iranian visits, searches and diversions 414 or attacks on vessels bound for Iraq with military equipment, e.g., the Danish flag vessel
Elsa Cat,41S or from Iraq with warfighting or war sustaining cargo (i.e., oil) aboard,
ifIraq was the aggressor. Similarly, ifIraq was the aggressor, and if Kuwait was assisting Iraq, and if, e.g., a Kuwaiti survey vessel 416 was assisting the Iraqi war effort, it was properly subject to search, seizure or detention as part of Iranian
self-defense. These ships were also subject to search, seizure or detention as part of
the law of naval warfare ifIran was the aggressor. 417
Security Council Resolutions 514, 522 and 540 of 1982 and 1983, calling for a
ceasefire, refraining from any action that might endanger peace and security, cessation of military operations against civilian targets, observing humanitarian law,
and affirming the right offreedom of navigation, were not Council decisions pursuantto Articles 25 and 48 of the Charter. They did not speak to the self-defense issue. The effect of incorporation of humanitarian law, etc., by reference in these
resolutions elevated them to Charter law. At least insofar as conflicts between treaties and the resolutions and practice under them, and perhaps insofar as there was a
difference between custom paralleling the treaties, the Charter practice held primacy.418 The same is true of other resolutions; they may have condemned action,
advocated observance of the LOAC, freedom ofnavigation, or protection of the environment, but in no case did they remove a State's right of self-defense, which under the Charter trumped any treaty law and perhaps also customary norms. 419
In January 1984 the United States announced new defensive measures for its
warships in NOTAMs and NOTMARs. These procedures, a "defensive bubble" or
«cordon sanitaire" around the shipes) for a stated distance on the surface of the sea
and above the vessel(s) in the air, were justified on self-defense grounds when Iran
protested.420 The UK Armilla Patrol, deployed in the lower Gulf since the beginning of the war, never published use of a defensive envelope. 421 In terms of self-defense, the US cordon sanitaire was legitimate; although other navies' warships did
not have benefit of a defensive bubble declared by their governments, they could
take self-defense measures if threatened or attacked. If a US warship proceeded independently or in formation without an announced cordon sanitaire, which was the
situation early in the war, that ship and the formation could also take self-defense
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measures. 422 The US cordon sanitaire's validity in terms of area, duration, etc., is
considered separately.423
The Armilla Patrol accompanied UK flag merchantmen in the lower Gulf from
the beginning of the war; these merchantmen were on their own as they proceeded
northward. 424 In October 1985 France began defending French-flag merchantmen. A French warship positioned itselfbetween the Ville d'Angers and an Iranian
warship, warning the Iranian that if it attempted to intercept Ville d'Angers, the
warship would use force to prevent the interception. (French ROE declared French
warships would fire on forces refusing to break off attacks on neutral merchantmen
under attack; the result was a drop in attacks near French men-of-war.) 425 In January 1986 the United Kingdom stated that a right of visit and search of neutral merchantmen, believed carrying cargo to or from a belligerent port, was an aspect of
self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter.426 In March 1986 the United States
recognized a basis in international law for belligerent searches of neutral merchantmen. 427 Nevertheless, in April 1986 a US destroyer warned an Iranian warship off what may have been a planned boarding of President McKinley, a US flag
merchantman.428 When the Soviet flagPyotr Emtsov, bound for Kuwait with arms
ultimately destined for Iraq, was fired upon, stopped and searched by an Iranian
warship in September 1986, the USSR protested. 429
The apparent divergence of views among States depends on the law deemed applicable to the interception, or the interpretation ofit. If Article 51 and Charter law
in general applied,430 and if Iraq was the aggressor, Iran could intercept, search
and under some circumstances attack third-flag State unarmed merchant ships
bound for Iraq, and believed to have warfighting or war-sustaining goods aboard as
a self-defense measure. Treaty law to the contrary would be trumped by the Charter. 431 The only general treaty 432 applying to visit, search and diversion or destruction of merchantmen is the London Protocol, which provides in Article 22
that
... The following are accepted as established rules of international law:
(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to
the rules of international law to which surface vessels are subject.
(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly
summoned, or active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface
vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in
a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the
existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity ofland, or the presence
of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board.433

The Tanker War belligerents were party to the treaty, and among naval powers operating in the Gulf, Belgium, France, Italy, Saudi Arabia, USSR, the United
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Kingdom and the United States were also parties. 434 No other GCC States were
party.435 Although the London Protocol bound many naval powers in the Tanker
War, it could not supersede the Charter 436 and its Article 51 self-defense norms,
particularly ifArticle 51 states ajus cogens norm. 437 However, the Protocol, orprinciples similar to it, could inform the content of self-defense under Article 51. 438
Whether the Protocol applies as customary law or has been superseded by practice
since 1936, at least insofar as an unqualified duty to place those aboard a merchantman in safety is concerned, has been debated by commentators and governments,439 and since the Charter does not address the issue of custom conflicting
with a Charter provision, the question arises as to whether practice is sufficient to
offset specific London Protocol rules as custom. The issue also arises if there is a
parallel, and different, customary self-defense standard to be applied, the situation
in the Nicaragua Case.440 The San Remo Manual would restate the rule:
Merchant vessels flying the flag of neutral States may not be attacked unless they:
..• (f) othenvise make an effective contribution to the enemy's military action, e.g.,
by carrying military materials and it is not feasible for the attacking forces to first
place passengers and crew in a place of safety. Unless circumstances do not permit,
they are to be given a warning, so that they can re-route, off-load, or take other
precautions.

The Manual permits attacks on enemy-flag merchantmen as a legitimate military
objective if, inter alia, they "otherwise mak[e] an effective contribution to military
action, e.g., [by] carrying military materials.,,441 Whether flying an enemy flag or
flying a neutral flag but characterized as enemy because ofits activity,e.g., carrying
war materials to aid the enemy, both classes of merchantmen are subject to rules of
discrimination, military objective and proportionality.442 Certain merchant ships,
e.g., coastal fishermen, are exempt from attack unless they lose exemption by aiding the enemy.443 This standard, whether observed in the context ofinformingthe
content of self-defense or as a law of naval warfare norm, is appropriate. It balances
realities of modern technologies available to merchant ships, which might decide
to advise the State whose war cargo it carries ofan attacker's presence, entitling an
attacking platform to treat a ship as directly aiding the enemy and subjecting it to
destruction on that account,444 and Protocol humanitarian considerations.
If Charter law did not apply to a State's actions, the same rules should have been
applied as the law of armed conflict.445 This would be the case for Iraq, ifIraq was
the aggressor; even though perhaps guilty of aggression, Iraq was bound to apply
the LOAC in prosecuting its actions. If the reverse is true, i.e., Iran was the aggressor and Iraq properly asserted self-defense, the result is the same. Iraq would be
governed by the law of self-defense as applicable to its actions against merchant
shipping, and Iran was required to apply the LOAC even though it might be guilty
of aggression. If neither party was entitled to claim self-defense for these actions,
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i.e., because Charter law including the law of self-defense did not apply, LOAC

principles applied to both belligerents.446 Depending on the view of the Tanker
War by States not party to the conflict, i.e., whether the Charter applied or not,447
these States were also required to apply the LOAC as incorporated into Charter
law, if they perceived that the Charter applied, or the LOAC if their view was that
the law of armed conflict, and not Charter law, applied.
These principles apply to States' protection of their flag shipping on the high
seas that was destined for other than belligerents' ports. It was therefore legitimate
for the United States to organize convoys of reflagged tankers or to escort single
merchantmen, for France and the United Kingdom to accompany UK flag merchantmen, and for France to interpose its warships against belligerents' threatened hostile action against these merchant ships if they were not carrying goods to
sustain a belligerent's war effort. 448 IfIran had attacked escorted or convoyed merchantmen as it threatened,449 convoying or escorting men-of-war could have responded in self-defense. It was legitimate self-defense for these States to operate,
individually or perhaps informally as a collective group,450 to protect against or remove the mine menace from the high seas of the Gulf. 451 It was legitimate for the
United States to remove the Iran Ajr as a minelaying menace for this reason;452
mines threatened merchantmen and warships alike, as damage to U.S.S. SamuelB.
Roberts attests. 453 The United States attacked Iranian platforms used as a gunboat
base in response to the Iranian missile attack on the US-flagged Sea Isle City with
US nationals in the crew,454 and Iranian gunboats that had attacked a Panama-flag, Japanese-owned tanker with US nationals among the crew.455 This
followed from the policy behind the1986 Libya raid, mounted to destroy Statesupported terrorist bases in Libya after two US nationals were killed in a Berlin
disco. 456 If the US view is correct, that self-defense measures against those who
attack American nationals is lawful, these were legitimate excercises of selfdefense. The Sea Isle City response, like the response to the Berlin disco bombing,
was anticipatory self-defense, in that more threats from these sources could reasonably be expected in the future. The reactive response to the Panama-flag vessel
attack and the Sea Isle City response involved US nationals aboard, and Sea Isle City
was US flagged. 457 The United Kingdom committed to a similar response if a vessel, although foreign flagged, had more than half UK beneficial ownership. 458 Foreign-flag vessels could request US protection, which would be given if US forces
were in the area and operational commitments allowed it.459 This too was a legitimate exercise of self-defense, i.e., informal collective self-defense. The request and
acceptance was enough to complete a collective self-defense arrangement.460 However, the practice of some masters in tailing convoys or simulating a convoy 461
would not have entitled those vessels to self-defense protection by warships of
other nations unless it had been agreed upon. 462
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Warship protection was also subject to the law of self-defense. The collective
and individual States' responses to mines has been noted. 463 It was proper for US
and other countries' warnings to declare a defensive bubble or cordon sanitaire
around their warships to respond to attacks on them. It was also proper for Gulfnaval forces to cooperate, perhaps informally as the UK Armilla Patrol did, with
other navies for mutual protection.464 It was proper for the United States to respond to attacks on its seaborne helicopters,465 to the platform-based attack on Sea
Isle City as a possible threat to its combatants in the Gulf,466 and to the mining attack on Samuel B. Roberts. 467 Although a US helicopter did not return fire when a
Greek flag tanker shot at it,468 returned fire might have been appropriate ifthat
would have been necessary and proportionate under the circumstances, which are
less than clear from the record.
There were several examples of mistaken fire in the Gulf War. The first was the
Stark attack.469 US forces fired on several small boats or dhows after the defensive
bubbles were announced. 470 The reason for these latter errors can be attributed to
the real and continuing threat ofIranian small boat attacks on merchantmen and
warships.471 The U.S.S. Vincennes mistakenly shot down Iran Air Flight 655. 472
In the Stark and Airbus cases claims were paid and settled without admitting liability.473 The United States expressed regret over the other losses and probably
compensated for injuries, loss oflife and damage.474 Whether the attacking Iraqi
aircraft observed proper qualifying principles of discrimination and proportionality is unknown; therefore, whether this was a proper exercise of self-defense is
sealed in Baghdad's archives. Whether US forces observed discrimination or proportionalityprinciples in firing on the small boats is likewise not clear from the record; certainly if the commanders reasonably believed that these were Iranian
Revolutionary Guard speedboats, they were correct in opening fire to protecttheir
ships. The same is true for the Airbus tragedy.475 However, if these were reasonably perceived threats, the attacking platforms could fire in self-defense. On the
other hand, if the targets were reasonably perceived to be carrying warfighting or
war-sustaining goods, they were legitimate targets under the law of naval warfare. 476
The Tanker War thus strengthens the case that a right of anticipatory self-defense exists in the Charter era as before. To be sure, States are not unanimous in
this position, but at the least under the principle of sovereignty 477 States adhering
to the use of anticipatory self-defense may continue to advocate it until there is an
authoritative decision to the contrary. This is particularly true if, as analyzed
above, Iran had a right of visit and search as a means of self-defense.478 IfIran had
the right to stop and search a ship under a self-defense theory to check for
warfighting/war-sustaining goods that might not be used for some time against
Iran, this could only be under a theory of anticipatory self-defense, as distinguished from reactive self-defense. The same can be said for Iraqi attacks on ships
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carrying warfightinglwar-sustaining goods for Iran. These in terceptions were subject to self-defense limitations, e.g., necessity and proportionality.479 And if such
be the case, then those States protecting, escorting, accompanying or convoying
these ships also had a right of self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense, if
Iran or Iraq chose to attack instead ofvisiting and searching merchantmen not carrying warfightinglwar-sustaining goods to a belligerent.480 These States' warships
also had a right of self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense, of their
units. 481
The Tanker War strengthens the precedent for informal collective self-defense
among States opposed to the belligerents' sink-on-sight policies. Gulf naval forces
developed these ad hoc coalitions to clear mines,482 to protect each other,483 and to
protect merchantmen flagged by States other than their own. 484
The foregoing has proceeded on a theory that the Charter governed these interactions. As will be seen in Chapter V, if certain aspects of the Tanker War were not
governed by the law of the Charter, e.g., Iranian visit and search procedures, those
procedures were strengthened through practice.
v. Necessity. As noted above,485 a criterion for invoking self-defense, whether in
the anticipatory defense mode or in the reactive mode after armed attack, is
whether a response with force is necessary, i.e., admitting of no other alternative.
Necessity is an accepted principle of international law conditioning the right of
self-defense.486 It applies to war at sea.487 Alternatives to self-defense run the
gamut from nonforce reprisals,488 retorsions,489 diplomatic protests 490 or other
diplomatic initiatives,491 use ofan adjudicative srrategy,492 orperhaps doing nothing at the time, to await a more propitious moment for asserting a claim, perhaps
along with others, in a general adjudicative, diplomatic or other resolution. 493 The
difficulty with these choices is that an inappropriate signal may be sent to the initial actor or other participants in the world community. The strategy of force, or alternatives to it, may be used alone, in combination, and in varying degrees.494
Today the general principle is that self-defense through force is justified only if a
goal of compelling compliance with international norms violated in the initial attack cannot reasonably be achieved by other means, i.e., "[F]orce should not be
considered necessary until peaceful measures have been found wanting or when
they clearly would be futile.,,495 As the San Remo Manual expresses it,
The effect of these principles [of necessity and proportionality] is that the State
which is the victim of an armed attack is entitled to resort to force against the attacker
but only to the extent necessary to defend itselfand to achieve such defensive goals as
repelling the attack, recovering territory and removing threats to its future
security.496
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Commentators differ on whether Charter self-defense norms apply after war begins. 497 However, since LOAC and Charter law necessity principles are virtually
the same,498 and LOAC principles may inform Charter standards if the principles
are in a treaty 499 or ifArticle 51 statesjus cogens norms,SOO the analysis assumes that
standards are the same, or should be, in any case.
Brownlie and Dinstein advance a hypothetical case ofa target State's submarine
depth-charged by another State's destroyer on the high seas, stating that necessity
permits immediate counterattack by the submarine. The same would be true for a
destroyer against whom a submarine fires a torpedo, and for neutral merchantmen
attacked while under individual or collective defensive warship protection, e.g.,
while convoyed or steaming independently and being accompanied or escorted,SOl
the Tanker War situations. S02 On the other hand, if a destroyer drops a hand grenade-if reasonably perceived by a submarine as an unfriendly irritant and not an
attack-or if a frigate tickles a submarine hull with sonar as an unfriendly but
nonthreatening act, no right of self-defense by a submarine would arise. S03 By the
opposite token, if a frigate indicates hostile intent to a submarine, e.g., by using active, attack-mode sonar and maneuvers demonstrating reasonable probability of
attack, or if a submarine behaves similarly, e.g., by setting up a firing solution
flooding torpedo tubes and opening torpedo tube doors, the target could take immediate self-defense action as a matter of necessity.
These hypothetical cases illustrate necessity in a case of anticipatory self-defense and are similar to Dinstein's hypothetical, justifying interceptive self-defense to destroy the Japanese task force headed toward Pearl Harbor. S04 As with
Israel's 1981 raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor,SOS a critical anticipatory self-defense
issue is the qualification of necessity. The submarine-destroyer hypotheticals,
where no weapon has been fired when self-defense action is taken, are relatively
easy cases, and fall into the same category as situations involving missiles, including the over-the-horizon variety. If anticipatory self-defense (or interceptive
self-defense as Dinstein has it) is a principle of international law, then target
shipes) can respond if necessary for self-preservation.
The Japanese task force, as Dinstein recites it hypothetically, mayor may not
have been subject to destruction in self-defense. Other alternatives, e.g., interposing a superior US fleet between it and Hawaii at a point beyond flying range of its
targets on the high seas, might be considered a reasonable alternative, at least in
the 1941 context. If the task force, known to be bound for an attack on Hawaii,
would have proceeded onward after warning, the US fleet would have been justifying in destroying it in anticipatory self-defense. If the Japanese task force intentions were not known or there was no reason to believe that attack on Hawaii was
planned, there would be no necessity for anticipatory self-defense. When its intentions became known, e.g., through positive intelligence, and there was no reasonable
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alternative to forestall attack, the US fleet would have been justified in acting in
anticipatory self-defense.
The fleet hypothetical also articulates the problem of national, as opposed to
unit, self-defense. 506 Although beyond the scope of the Tanker War analysis, the
problem of national survival (as distinguished from survival of a destroyer, for example) may call forth different considerations ofnecessity.507 Nations' survival,
because of their need for Gulf oil, was a policy behind the Carter Doctrine. 508 Destruction of single tankers could not be pegged on national survival, but necessity
could be predicated on a need to save human life endangered during illegal attacks. 509 Accumulating these "pinpricks" to justify a massive attack on a belligerent might have provoked claims of disproportionality.510
What distinguishes one situation from another in the context of the necessity
component is considering all relevant factors known to the target at the time,511
e.g., participants, their perceived goals, methods of attack and response, conditions
at the time, and probable effects. 512 "The most important condition ... is the degree of necessity as that necessity is perceived and evaluated by the target-claimant
and incorporated in the pattern of its expectations-which, in the particular instance, impels the claimant to use intense responding coercion," i.e., military
force. The necessity standard-"great and immediate," "direct and immediate,"
or "compelling and instant"-has been carried over from customary law into the
Charter era. 513
The Tanker War illustrates several examples of necessity in the self-defense
context.
US announcements of a defensive bubble or cordonsanitaire 514 were cases of putative necessity. The warning area was advance announcement that unidentified
vessels or aircraft not responding to warnings and threatening US warships were
subject to being destroyed out of necessity for a ship's self-protection.
Applying the principle of self-defense to Iranian visits and searches of merchantmen suspected of carrying warfighting or war-sustaining cargoes for Iraq is
another example of necessity. It was necessary for Iran to visit and search on the
high seas if the offending goods were to be seized; once the cargo was ashore, it
would be difficult to stop its delivery to Iraq. Attempts to bomb truck convoys in
Iraq might have resulted in collateral destruction and more deaths and injuries
than in a properly executed visit and search. Iraq, which had no effective navy, resorted to air attacks on shipping moving Iranian warfighting or war-sustaining
cargoes. The choice was to permit the cargoes to arrive or to attack on the high seas.
A case can be made that the Iraqi attacks were necessary. The same can be said for
Iranian attacks on Iraq-bound cargoes. Whether the belligerents exercised proper
target discrimination or proportionality is another issue. 515 Whether viewed from
a self-defense or LOAC perspective, the standards were the same as under the
LOAC for visit and search or attacks.
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Convoying and other protective measures for innocent merchantmen were also
necessary, in view of repeated belligerent attacks on these ships, regardless ofcargo
or flag.
Another example of necessity was the US capture and destruction ofIranAjr. 516
Given repeated illegal mining in Gulf shipping lanes, it is clear that Iran would
have continued to lay mines. A sure way to end the problem was to end a source of
mines, Iran Ajr. The same considerations justified States' mine clearance operations, necessary to remove the mine menace, regardless of origin. 517
Operation Praying Mantis, the destruction ofIranian frigates employed in attacks on neutral merchantmen and of offshore oil platforms serving as a base for
speedboats preying on merchant shipping and warships, was also a case of necessity. If the frigates were allowed to continue their deprivations, merchant shipping
would continue to suffer attacks, and if the oil platforms were not destroyed, they
would have continued as a haven for the boats. 51S Likewise, firing on attacking
speedboats engaged in shooting up merchantmen was necessary. If there had been
no such response, it is ludicrious to think that other action by naval powers (e.g.,
verbal radio warnings) would have stopped an ongoing attack. Diplomatic protests, often long after the fact, would have availed nothing to resurrect dead crewmen, restore a burnt-out hull, or raise a sunken ship.
Given evidence of a strong possibility of an Iranian suicide plane or conventional attack on US warships engaged in self-defense at the time, Vincennes' destruction of Flight 655 519 was necessary from a self-defense perspective, if
tragically mistaken in result.
The same might be said for US responses to Libyan attempts to forcibly intercept US ships, or to shoot down US aircraft. 520 It takes little logic to justify force
responses if missile have been deployed, or hostile intent has been clearly demonstrated, under the circumstance of Libya's challenges to freedom of navigation.
vi. Proportionality. In both anticipatory self-defense and self-defense after armed
attack (reactive self-defense) response must be proportional.
(I) Introduction. The limiting principle of proportionality, like necessity, in a
self-defense response is well established in custom. 521 It applies to naval warfare. 522 The proportionality principle applies whether self-defense responds to
armed attack or other armed aggression, or whether self-defense measures are anticipatory to imminent armed attack or other armed aggression. However, "responsibility ... for a war ofaggression may be incurred by the target State, should it
resort to comprehensive force in over-reaction to trivial incidents.,,523 This is a
decisionmaker dilemma when confronted with an event that reasonable evaluators would say is an act of aggression. The problem is further compounded by a
view that a single so-called trivial act may be rolled into a collection of other
pin-pricks, with the result that a self-defense response against the sum of them all
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may be proper.524 Responses with force that seem disproportionate to a present
pin-prick carry a risk that the target of the response might argue that the response
is disproportionate, is in effect an armed reprisal, and is therefore an armed attack
by the responding State. 525 "Genuine on-the-spot reaction [would have closed the]
incident,,526 and may be a preferable course in many, if not most, situations. "The
effect ... is that a State which is the victim of an armed attack is entitled to resort to
force against the attacker but only to the extent necessary to defend itself and to
achieve such defensive goals as repelling the attack, recovering territory, and removing threats to its future security.,,527
The analysis for necessity, i.e., whether Charter self-defense principles and limitations on them govern throughout a war, or whether the LOAC applies once a
war has begun so that different standards are then employed, also applies to proportionality issues. If proportionality principles are in treaties, the Charter's
clause paramount provision trumps them. If self-defense norms arejus cogens, they
trump custom or treaty based proprotionality norms. Whether a customary proportionalitynorm can supersede a Charter norm is not clear. Customary and treaty
based proportionality norms can, and should, inform any binding Charter or jus
cogens norms. 528 This analysis takes the position that proportionality norms limiting a right of self-defense and those developed under the LOAC should be the
same.
(II) The Elements or Indicia of Proportionality. The foregoing comments on a
self-defense measure's relative position on a time-line between attack (or imminence ofattack, for anticipatory self-defense) and the defensive measure(s) taken is
but one index of whether the action is proportional under the circumstances.
Another major factor is the methodology and intensity of the coercion.529 Besides the now threadbare (and refuted) argument that a massive conventional attack cannot be met by a non-conventional (e.g., nuclear) response, i.e., there must
be response in kind,530 there are finer gradations of the problem. US destruction of
IranAjr in response to Iranian minelaying in shipping lanes 53 I_in effect, going to
the source of the illegality and eliminating it-is one example. Another example is
destruction ofthe oil platforms from which Iranian speedboats had operated. 532
There need not be identical or even similar response to satisfy the proportionality
requirement.
Moreover, such proportional response, as Ago and others have pointed out,
need not necessarily be proportional in response to force used in the initial aggression or attack.
The requirement of the proportionality of the action taken in self-defence ...
concerns the relationship between that action and its purpose, namely-and this can
never be repeated too often-that of halting and repelling the attack or even, in so far
as preventive self-defence is recognized, of preventing it from occurring. It would be
mistaken, however, to think that there must be proportionality between the conduct
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constituting the armed attack and the opposing conduct. The action needed to halt
and repulse the attack may well have to assume dimensions disproportionate to those
of the attack suffered.533
Put another way, force used in self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense,
must be "strictly confined to the object of stopping or preventing the infringement
[of the target State's rights] and reasonably proportionate to what is required for
achieving this objective.,,534 Or, as Dinstein comments in a context of full-scale
war, once a war has started, "it can be fought to the finish. 535 ... An aggressor State
may lose its appetite for continuing ... hostilities, but the defending State need not
be accommodating.,,536 Individual or collective self-defense may carry responses
to the source of the aggression, beyond driving the aggressor back to the line
(whether geographic or theoretical) until there is total victory 537 if necessary to
achieve proportional response in the sense of achieving the objective of ending the
source of aggression. 538
Thus, it was proper under pre-Charter law, for US insistence on Japan's unconditional surrender. 539 It was likewise proper for the Netherlands, which declared
war on Japan on December 8,1941 as anticipatory defense with invasion ofthe
Dutch East Indies imminent,540 to also insist on Japan's unconditional surrender.
It would have been proper for Iran, if invaded by Iraq in 1980 to start the war, to
have carried the war to the complete destruction ofIraq,541 if this were a proportional response necessary to force Iraq to comply with the law. 542 The same is true
with respect to Iraqi responses to Iran, ifIran was the aggressor. 543 (As events had
it, both sides agreed to a UN-sponsored ceasefire, effectively ending the conflict,
including its Tanker War aspects.)544 Proportionality applies to all levels and intensities of conflict or potential conflict, from anticipatory response to pin-pricks
to general war. 545
O'Connell and Greenwood advance a view that self-defense must occur in the
theater of operations generating the claim. In a regional confrontation, a target
State would be limited to responding there. For example, in the Falklands/
Malvinas War, Britain would have been limited to attacks on military units in the
South Atlantic Ocean; a lone Argentine frigate in the Pacific could not have been
attacked unless it gave clear evidence of launching an attack.546 The US Navy
could not have responded to North Korea's Pueblo seizure except by attacking
North Korean assets in Korean waters.547 Under this view, Iran could not have attacked the Iraqi frigates in the Mediterranean Sea, or perhaps the Atlantic and Indian Ocean off South Africa if after being launched in Italy 548 they had sailed
through the Mediterranean and either through Suez or around Africa.
This thesis, while appealing in simplicity and symmetry, lacks reality. To be
sure, proportionality means an amount of force necessary to achieve a goal of preventive (i.e., anticipatory) self-defense or repulsing attack. 549 A hypothetical case
from the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War illustrates the fallacy of the position.
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If a UK warship encountering an Argentine frigate in the Pacific, thousands of
miles from the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War theater of operations, in terms of
ship-to-ship combat, what would have stopped the Argentine-as USSR menof-war might have during the Cold War-from tailing the other and firing later
(e.g., after dark or in bad weather), when the UK warship could not sense a potential for attack? To take the other extreme, from either antagonist's geopolitical
world view, a frigate represented a potential asset, wherever located, for prolonging (and perhaps enlarging) the conflict. It might be argued the frigate could only
be attacked when it was apparent it was proceeding to contribute to the war. The
first question is how that could be determined, since most belligerents do not willingly hand over intelligence, or they may distribute disinformation; recall the
cruise of the Goeben into Turkish waters during World War I. The second is a
surveillant power's problem: Must it follow the frigate once located across the Pacific to be sure it does not reappear at the scene of hostilities? To borrow a phrase,
"Use it or lose it"; if ordnance is not used on the frigate in hand, the opportunity
(and the frigate) will be lost, only to reappear in a theater ofoperations. Despite satellite and similar reconnaisance advantage for certain countries (e.g., the United
States), not all States are so equipped for worldwide tracking, and in a world of
smaller navies and nations less attuned to alliances and friendships, such a State
(even if it is the victim of aggression in the first place) may find itself in a situation
worse than Britain's attempt to locate surface raiders in World Wars I and II or a
wounded Leviathan like Bismarck during World War II. And if targets should be
limited in a full-scale war, how can other military aspects of proportionality-geographical scope, weapons used, etc.,-be limited? It is incongruous that worldwide
economic sanctions were asserted against Argentina 550-some of which had clear
reprisal overtones 551_and yet military options would be limited territorially under the proposed analysis.
The third practical aspect deals with the nature ofwars as belligerents have seen
them. Most since 1945 have been symmetrical, two-State affairs where belligerents
had about the same quality and quantity of forces. 552 Most conflicts since1945
have not been wars of national survival. A problem for proportionality, from a military perspective, arises when some or all of these conditions do not exist. What
may be a routine, middle to low-level conflict for one belligerent may be a war for
national survival for the other, particularly if two or more middle-level States'
forces are opposed to one State's forces, which might have been able to contend
with some but not all opponents. Forthe sole State, the war is a high-intensity conflict; for its opponents, it may be low or medium intensity. During the Korean
War, given other States' overt and covert relationships with North and South Korea,
it was initially a war of national survival for the South, and then for the North. 553
Israel, nearly always surrounded by opponents, has claimed its wars 554 were matters of national survival; it is doubtful whether its opponents always perceived
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them thus. The 1980-88 Iran-Iraq conflict, of which the Tanker War was a part,
was a war of national survival, or nearly so, for both sides. These might be compared with, e.g., Falklands/Malvinas,555 or the India-Pakistan conflicts,556 where
neither side seriously considered it was involved in a war of national survival. If
one side-perhaps because of allies arrayed against it, or for other valid reasons-would validly consider it was fighting a war of national survival where destroying every warship of opponentes) would make a difference, would this mean
that in the hypothetical of the frigate in the Pacific,557 one side could shoot on
sight because it had to do so to survive, while the other would have to wait for evidence ofimminent attack, because it had a low-intensity conflict on its hands? The
situation is even more egregious if the force-heavy State was a target of aggression
and would have to await another "first hit" from a State initially in the wrong.
In terms ofinternationallaw, the theater ofoperations view may be correct from
a perspective for force proportionality, but if proportionality is considered in
terms of the object,558 i.e., righting the wrong, then the analysis is askew. If rectifying the situation-i.e., inducing end to aggression-means destroying the Pacific
Ocean frigate, then the frigate is fair game for that reason alone. In terms of a war of
national survival by a target State, proportionality with respect to the object
sought-maintaining political independence and territorial integrity of equal,
sovereign States, all Charter Purposes 559-necessarily rises to an ever-higher level
of permitted violence to preserve these Charter goals for the State affected. Moreover, in a collective self-defense context, the level of military coercion the Charter
permits is that necessary to assure survival of a State threatened with annihilation
by aggression. Thus in the 1990-91 Gulf War self-defense agreements with the
United States,560 it was the force necessary to assure Kuwaiti survival, not survival
of the United States, Kuwait's alliance partner.
There is no precedent for the theater ofoperations argument. 561 Iran could have
attacked the Iraqi warships, once launched and on their way to Iraq through the
Mediterranean Sea and either the Red Sea and Indian Ocean or the Atlantic and
Indian Oceans. Conversely, Iraq could have attacked Iranian military assets wherever it found them. During the last year of the Tanker War, Iranian speedboats and
military aircraft operated in the lower Gulf and the Strait ofHormuz, near the Arabian Sea, a part of the Indian Ocean. Iraq could have attacked these platforms in
the Indian Ocean as well as striking oil facilities near the entrance to the Persian
Gulf. 562
The proportionality principle was demonstrated during the Tanker War.
Announced US defensive measures that could be expected if an unidentified
aircraft or ship ventured within the defensive bubble for US warships 563 were proportional. The only object of response would be the intruder, and the warning
area-up to five miles on the surface and relatively low altitude-was minimal. To
be sure, there were mistakes, e.g., when US ships fired on small boats that wandered
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into the bubble, but if they appeared to display hostile intent, the US response was
proportional under the circumstances. The United States expressed regret over
these accidents and undoubtedly offered compensation. 564
Iranian visit and search procedures for merchantmen suspected of carrying
cargo for Iraq's war effort were also proportionate, in that the ship would be released if no offending goods were found. However, it is not clear whether adjudicatory procedures were established for detained vessels until late in the war. 565
Whether Iran could detain ships after the ceasefire 566 depended on terms of the
ceasefire and practice under it. For detained ships, the response may not have been
proportionate in terms of time. On the other hand, the belligerents' indiscriminate
firing at or mining merchantmen and neutral warships alike, or neutral military
helicopters, where there was no evidence that they were aiding the enemy, lacked
any semblance of proportionality.567
Belligerents' attacks on ships in neutral territorial waters or neutrals' oil facilities 568 were clear violations of the Charter. 569 Either the littoral State or the State
of the vessel's flag could respond proportionally in self-defense. The coastal State
could respond proportionally for attacks on its facilities. 570
Belligerents' attacks on their opponent's oil tanker convoys, oil platforms and
coastal petroleum facilities in self-defense were legitimate, since belligerents' oil
sales financed the war. 571 However, attacks had to be proportional; it is doubtful
whether some (e.g., Nowruz)572 were.
US destruction ofIranAjr and the offshore oil platforms were also proportional.
IranAjr was caught laying mines, and its destruction eliminated a source ofIran's
illegal action. 573 Oil platforms supported the Iranian speedboats attacking merchantmen; while the response may not have destroyed the same platforms that
supported a particular attack or mode of attack in the case of their destruction in
response to the Silkworm attack on Sea Isle City,574 this response was also legitimate; it was confined to the kind of platform that could have launched the attack
and was in response to attack on onlythattanker. Proportionality contemplates responses parallel in intensity to an initial aggression and designed to discourage future attacks. If the launch platforms were destroyed, there could be no future
attacks from them. There was no need to respond to the particular platform that
launched the attack on Sea Isle City. 575
Defense against Iranian speedboats or warships attacking merchantmen, US
military helicopters or US warships was also proportional. As in the case of the announced defense measures, the only targets were the attacking craft or their bases,
the oil platforms. 576 The United States was not required to respond, as it chose not
to do in the case of the Stark attack. 577 Any response to the Stark attack would have
had to have been proportional in nature, however. From a self-defense perspective,
laying aside the mistaken identity issue, Vincennes' destruction of Flight 655 578
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was proportional. The perceived threat was an aircraft, mistakenly thought to be
an F-14; only the aircraft was targeted, and only the aircraft was brought down.
Responses to the Libyan aircraft that fired at US aircraft, or electronically
locked on to them, and to Libyan missile boat forays, were also proportional. Only
those aircraft or boats were targeted and hit. Similarly, the 1986 raid on Libyan terrorist bases was proportional. To be sure, there was collateral damage as in any
bombing operation, but the targets were the terrorist operations that had caused
the Berlin disco bombing. S79
(III) Forbidden Targets: Per Se Disproportionality. Under the law of warfare (jus in
bello) certain targets are forbidden objects of attack, no matter how proportionate
the response in other respects, and even ifproportional armed reprisal is appropriate under the circumstances. S80 The Corfu Channel Case authoritatively stated
that the general principle of humanity condemned mining of an international
strait with resultant loss of life and UK naval vessels S81 when these ships attempted straits transit passage S82 in a nonwar context. Although the law of naval
warfare has developed a relatively concrete list of forbidden targets for armed conflict situations,S83 there has been little Charter era practice for immunity claims
for these targets in the self-defense (anticipatory or otherwise) context. Nevertheless, the Corfu Channel principle should apply to deny amenability of these objects
as legitimate targets regardless of how proportional or necessary a self-defense response might othenvise be.S84 The LOAC should inform the law of self-defense
under these circumstances.S8S
vii. "No Moment for Deliberation." Anticipatory self-defense, unlike reactive
self-defense, carries a third requirement, from the Caroline Case: there can be no
moment for deliberation. S86 This principle is often lumped with necessity; the
Tanker War illustrates the difficulty of application as a discrete concept.
US defensive measures announcements and actions under themS87 are relatively straightfonvard examples. Given the relatively high speed of aircraft or
small boats, whether carrying shipkilling missiles or on a suicide mission, and a
high risk to a warship of small boats carrying Exocets or the like, it is easy to see
that there can be no time for deliberation-i.e., careful consideration up a chain of
command-before action must be taken.
Where analysis begins to break down under current views of anticipatory
self-defense is in the situation ofIranian visits and searches.S88 If"no moment for
deliberation" means time for investigation by other means, then the concept slides
semantically into necessity. On the other hand, if the phrase means no other means
for investigation, the result is the same. The same comments could be made as to
States that ordered or accepted (acquiesced in) convoying or other forms ofprotection,S89 if that is considered anticipatory self-defense.
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The Vincennes incident,590 if considered an anticipatory self-defense case, illustrates the weakness (or elasticity) of the concept as a separate requirement.
Vincennes' commanding officer had five minutes to deliberate, but was that real
"deliberation"? He never knew, due to erroneous information, about Flight 655's
true identity; he thought it was an F-14 homing on his ship. In a sense, he had time
to deliberate, but only enough time to decide that it was imperative, i.e., necessary,
to defend the ship. Under this analysis, there was no moment for deliberation,
and Vincennes' downing Flight 655 satisfied the third principle of anticipatory
self-defense.
Thus the third principle of anticipatory self-defense, "no moment for deliberation," if it exists as a separate concept, was met in these incidents of the Tanker
War.
viii. Rules of Reprisal; Retaliation. Reprisals, i.e., use of force or other methods
(e.g., economic coercion) otherwise illegal to confront a State engaging in illegal
conduct (e.g., aggression) to force compliance with international norms, has been
characterized as a kind of self_help591 or sanction. 592 Most say that reprisals involving force where States are not engaged in armed conflict are illega1. 593 Post1945 practice tends to confirm this view. Anticipatory reprisal using force is forbidden.594
The Corfu Cannel Case dismissed the UK argument that directing mine clearance of an international strait was an act oflawful self_help.595 Israel responded
with massive reprisals against Syria for its repeated armistice violations. These too
were condemned. 596
The 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration stated that "States have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force," which the Resolution asserted was declaratory of internationallaw.597 "Subject only to the proviso that
'force' ... be taken to mean military force, the Western States [agreed] on the question of reprisals.,,598
Even massive economic coercion does not justify a force response, according
to the majority view. 599 On the other hand, nonforce reprisals (e.g., economic sanctions or "economic warfare") remain legitimate in the Charter era. 600 There can be
collective nonforce economic reprisals, like those the European Community imposed during the Falklands/Malvinas war. 601 Although many States or their nationals aided one belligerent or the other, or both, there was no apparent declared
system of economic reprisals during the Tanker War.
Even if justified, reprisals cannot be inflicted against third States. The Cysne arbitration held that although Germany might have been justified in reprisals
against Great Britain during World War I, Germany could not destroy a neutral
Portuguese vessel carrying goods covered by the reprisal declaration to Britain.602
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All reprisals are subject to three requirements, carried forward from the
pre-Charter era and stated in the N aulilaa Arbitration and the Cysne Case: previous deliberate violation ofinternational law by the other State, an unsuccessful demand for redress, and the reprisal must be proportional to the injury suffered.603
Some objects cannot be an object of reprisals, whether economic or otherwise;
commonly these are considered in the context of the LOAC (jus in bello) and will
be analyzed in that situation.604 However, such reprisals are be subject to the general principles of humanity in the context of "peacetime" reprisals, discussed here,
on the same theory that these objects are barred as self-defense targets. 60S
Security Council decisions can, at least in theory, go beyond customary limitations for sanctions amounting to reprisals. 606 A State not injured by illegal actions
of another state might be directed to apply sanctions. Sanctions that some might
perceive as disproportionate to an illegal action might be imposed. Third States
might be harmed by Council decisions, although Charter Article 50 allows a State
confronted with special economic problems arising from carrying out those measures a right to consult with the Council for solution of those problems.607 The
Council can be informed by humanity principles and other sources oflaw, but it
can override treaties to the contrary, and its resolution might state a jus cogens
norm. 60S
Sanctions against South Africa, which began in 1977, are an example of the potential for overriding general reprisal sanction principles.609 The earlier Rhodesian embargo, which had law of naval warfare overtones, is another example. In
1965-66, as part of the governance transition from Southern Rhodesia to independent, majority-rule Zimbabwe, the Council passed a series of resolutions, denouncing the white Rhodesian government as illegal, and calling on States to
refrain from assisting the white minority regime and to institute an oil embargo.
One resolution requested that the United Kingdom enforce the embargo. Because
the resolution only spoke in terms of embargo and did not authorize blockade or
similar measures, the Royal Navy could not order tankers inbound for the
Mozambican port ofBeira, Rhodesia's access to the sea, to divert. A later resolution
specifically authorized diversion, and the Royal Navy ordered diversion when
other tankers tried to call at Beira.610 While the oil interdiction operation had an
entirely laudatory purpose, ifit is assumed that Rhodesia had no additional petroleum sources, and there were essential needs of the civilian population-e.g., gasoline for ambulances, diesel oil for hospital emergency generators, etc.,-a violation
of humanitarian law principles might have occurred, and interdictions might be
said to have gone beyond customary LOAC rules. 611
The 1990-91 Gulf War, which erupted after the Tanker War ended, is a third situation where Council sanctions overrode customary law.612 Resolution 665 authorized Coalition interception of vessels bound for Iraq or occupied Kuwait on
August 15, 1990, without reciting humanitarian exceptions. 613 A month later,

160

The Tanker War

Resolution 670 imposed an air embargo but permitted food and medical supplies
shipments, subject to Council supervision.614 At least in theory, the Council could
be said to have overridden humanitarian principles denouncing deprivation of the
civilian population of food and medical supplies 615 by the omission in Resolution
665. (It was partly cured a month later by Resolution 666, permitting foodstuffs
shipments under certain conditions, but the Resolution said nothing about medical supplies.)616
ix. The Temporal Problem: When Does Liability Accrue?617 Convictions at
Nuremberg and Tokyo were based on what the defendants knew, or should have
known, when they made decisions to invade other States. 618 Since then there has
been no authoritative statement on whether liability accrues on what decisionmakers knew, or should have known, when a state responds in reactive or anticipatory self-defense. Commentators seem to have been tempted to justify opinions, at
least in part, on evidence available after a self-defense decision, perhaps years
later.619
The developing law forjus in bello confirms that the appropriate time for predicating liability is what a decisionmaker knew, or should have known, at the time an
operation is authorized. Hindsight can be 20/20; decisions at the time are often
clouded with the fog of war 620 or crisis.
Four countries' declarations of understanding 621 to Protocol I 622 to the 1949
Geneva Conventions state that as to protection ofcivilians in Article 51, 623 protection of civilian objects in Article 52,624 and precautions to be taken in attacks,
stated in Article 57, 625 a commander should be liable based on a commander's assessment of information available at the relevant time, i.e., when the decision is
taken. 626 Two of the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention's four protocols
have similar terms, i.e., a commander is only bound by information available when
a decision to attack is made. 627
Protocol I, with its understandings, and the Conventional Weapons Convention are well on their way to wide acceptance among States.628 These treaties'
common statement that commanders will be held accountable based on information they had at the time for determining whether attacks are necessary and proportional has become a nearly universal norm. The San Remo Manual has
recognized it as the standard for naval warfare, and in 1999 the Second Protocol to
the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention also adopted this standard.629 It can
be said with fair confidence that this is the customary standard forjus in bellum. It
should be the standard forjus ad bellum. A national leader directing a self-defense
response, whether it be reactive or anticipatory in nature, should be held to the
same standard. That leader should be held accountable for what he or she, or those
reporting to him or her, knew or reasonably should have known, when a decision
to respond in self-defense is made.
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There is no public record of what those who initiated self-defense measures,
whether in reaction to an attack or in anticipation of one, knew or should have
known, as was the case in the Nuremberg or Tokyo trials. 630 Therefore, there can
be no appraisal ofwhetherthe temporal standard was met during the Tanker War.

2. Related Issues
a. State o/Necessity and Self-Preservation in the Charter Era. State of necessity
and the now-outmoded concept of self-preservation have often been confused,
sometimes with the notion that necessity as a component of self-defense or the
LOAC may be so intense that in a situation involving survival of the State that necessity overrides all other factors to permit any action by the target State. This
claim of self-preservation, or self-help, is now inadmissible. A state may, however,
respond in self-defense.631
There is, however, a separate, distinct concept of necessity, apart from a similar
term that is a conditioning factor for self-defense or the LOAC, in that in a separate
claim ofstate of necessity, a State against whom action is taken ("a third State") has
committed no wrong against a State that takes the action (an "acting State"), and
an acting State does not consider itself the third State's target. In self-defense, a target State seeks to defend against aggression by a country in the position of a third
State, i.e., the aggressor. 632 State of necessity can be invoked "to preclude the
wrongfulness of conduct adopted in certain conditions ... to protect an essential
interest of the [target] State, without [the latter'S] existence being in any way
threatened. 633 There remain cases "where a ... [right] of a [third] State can be sacrificed for the sake of a vital interest of the [target] State which would otherwise be
obliged to respect that right.,,634
Not all commentators agree on the state of necessity doctrine today.635 However, LOS Convention, Article 221 allows States "to take [proportionate] measures, in accordance with international law, beyond the limits of the territorial
sea" to protect their coastline "or related interests, including fishing, from grave
and imminent danger" from pollution or the threat ofpollution. The Intervention
Convention is to the same effect.636 These provisions would have vindicated UK
action in bombing the derelict Torrey Canyon after that Liberian-registered vessel
grounded off Britain, threatening the English coast and its population.637 Although frequently decided on other grounds, ICI decisions and international arbitrations have recognized the doctrine in many contexts. 638
The record of State practice and other sources is thus less than clear, but the International Law Commission Special Rapporteur summarizes state of necessity
and its scope today, provided a target State invoking state of necessity acts proportionally to a peril:
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Article 33. State of necessity
1. A state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act of that State not in conformity with an international obligation of the State unless:
(a) the act was the only means of safeguarding an essential interest of the
State against a grave and imminent peril; and
(b) the act did not seriously impair an essential interest of the State towards which the obligation existed.
2. In any case, a state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground
for precluding wrongfulness:
(a) if the international obligation with which the act of the State is not in
conformity arises out of a peremptory norm of general international
law; or
(b) if the international obligation with which the act of the State is not in
conformity is laid down by a treaty which, explicitly or implicitly,
excludes the possibility of invoking the state of necessity with respect to that obligation; or
(c) if the State in question has contributed to the occurrence of the state
of necessity.
The Commission draft also says: "[W]rongfulness of an act ofa State not in conformity with an international obligation of that State is precluded if the act constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence taken in conformity with the Charter...,,639
Tanker War participants did not claim state of necessity for their actions, but they
could have.
The primary example is US and other States' protecting third-State crews
from attacks by Iranian speedboats and aircraft. Self-defense permitted protecting vessels flagged under the ensign of a covering warship or aircraft or protection of nationals of the same State and, upon request, third-State crews. 640 States
have a general obligation to act to preserve life at sea, independent of an ongoing
armed conflict. 641 This obligation carries with it a right to engage in necessary
and proportionate response, in the nature of self-defense, with respect to such
ships and personnel. The right to respond could also be based on a theory of state
of necessity.
A clearer case involved the Nowruz oil slick created by Iraqi attacks in 1983. 642
Although the slick dissipated without any State's having taken action, littoral
countries threatened with loss ofcoastal fisheries or desalination plants could have
acted proportionally with force to eliminate the leakage from Iranian platforms.
Similarly, ifpetroleum leakage from vessels hit on the high seas of the Persian Gulf

World Public Order

163

was serious enough and threatened a coastal State's shore or other interests, that
State could have acted to intervene. Precedent for this is clear.643 During the
1990-91 war, US aircraft, as a defensive measure, bombed oil manifolds at terminals in occupied Kuwait opened by Iraq. Besides risk to coalition warships, there
was risk to western Gulf coastal fisheries and desalination plant intakes.644 Kuwaiti permission was undoubtedly given, but ifit had not, the strikes could have been
justified by the state of necessity doctrine.

b. Retorsion. A retorsion, or retortion, is a lawful but unfriendly response of a target State to another state's unfriendly practice or act whether illegal or not, to coerce the latter to discontinue that practice or act. 645 Commentators agree that a
retorsionary response must be proportional.646
During the Tanker War, the US defensive bubble or cordon sanitaire warnings in
NOTAMs or NOTMARs may have seemed unfriendly acts, but they were legitimate warnings of the right of self-defense if an aircraft or vessel came within
range. 647 Accompanying, escorting or offering protection to merchantmen not
carrying warfighting or war-sustaining goods to belligerent ports, including outbound cargoes of Kuwaiti or Saudi petroleum, may have seemed unfriendly, iflegal, acts to the belligerents, particularly Iran. 648 Iran's naval maneuvers in its
territorial sea were legal,649 but they may have seemed unfriendly acts to its neighbors or to some navies. These retorsions were proportional.

Part B. UN Mechanisms for Breaches of the Peace, Threats to the
Peace, and AggreSSion
If there has been uneven development of Charter norms as a coherent body of
law for States' individual or collective responses to breaches of the peace, threats to
the peace, or aggression, the UN record as an Organization has been even less clear.
This Part first examines the methodology of UN lawmaking and then sketches the
organizational framework for UN lawmaking and in other groups permitted by the
Charter in the context of situations involving the law of naval warfare.

1. Making the Rules and Stating the Principles: The Security Council
Aside from General Assembly competence for UN Membership, the budget and
trust territories,650 the only source of positive, primary-source 651 norms is the Security Council. Under Charter Articles 25 and 48, Members agree to carry out "decisions," particularly those related to action to maintain international peace and
security.6S2 However, the Charter also gives the Council authority to make
nonbinding "recommendations" for pacific settlement of disputes,653 and "recommendations" on issues involving breaches of the peace, threats to the peace or aggression. 654 It may "call upon" parties to resolve a dispute, whether it threatens the
peace or not,655 and it can "call upon" Members for measures to assist in enforcing
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decisions. 656 Recommendations and authority to "call upon" Members for action
are nonbinding, although "call upon" connotes a stronger prescriptive principle
than recommendations; if a call for action is coupled with a decision, the call is
binding. 657 A further restriction on Council practice is that Article 2S decisions
can only be taken under Chapter VII, dealing with breaches of the peace, threats to
the peace and aggression,658 and with an Article 39 determination to that effect. 659
Thus although Article 2S appears in the Charter just before Chapter VI, stating the
Council role in pacific dispute settlement,660 it has been used along with Article 48
for Chapter VII decisions.
The narrow problem is whether the Council has made a decision. The Namibia
opinion declared principles of resolution interpretation; there must be reference
to "terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolution ...,,661 In other words, when is a
Council resolution a binding decision?662 Or, perhaps more important for this
analysis, when is what appears to be a binding decision nothing more than a
nonbinding recommendation, although not so styled?
Analysis of Council decisionmaking-in the broad, nontechnical sense of the
word-reveals a trend toward establishing norms affecting law of naval warfare
standards.

a. The Korean War. Bailey has aptly summarized Council actions for the Korean
War: "The ... Council decisions on military enforcement ... were not binding and,
indeed, were only possible because of the fortuitous absence of the Soviet Union.,,663 Resolution 82, calling for ceasing hostilities, calling upon North Korea to
withdraw north of the 38th parallel and calling upon Members to assistthe United
Nations,664 was recommendatory, being issued under Articles 39_41. 665 The Secretary-General felt there had been only a threat to the peace, the United States
charged aggression had occurred, and the Council toned down the Resolution to
find a "breach of the peace.,,666 Resolution 83 followed two days later, recommending that Members assist South Korea "to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area," finding North Korea had breached the
peace.667 Besides welcoming assistance given South Korea, and "Recommend[ing]"
that Members make forces and assistance available to the United States as head of a
unified command, Resolution 84 followed the pattern. 668 The only decision of the
war was a Council invitation to the PRC to be present for its discussion of a UN Korean command special report. 669 With the USSR's return and its veto in the Council, UN lawmaking potential shifted to the Assembly.670
b. Arab-Israeli Conflicts. The Arab-Israeli conflicts generated positive lawmaking
before and after the Korean War.
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After hortatory resolutions based on Articles 39 and 40,671 Resolution 50 (1948)
called upon Governments and authorities to stop importing or exporting war material into or to Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan
or Yemen during a recommended ceasefire. It "Decide[ d]" that if this resolution
were rejected, or later repudiated or violated, "the situation ... [would] be reconsidered with a view to action under Chapter VII," i.e., for possible measures involving force. 672 This, the Council's first attempt to define and regulate warfightingl
war-sustaining material,673 was only recommendatory. The only decision was for
further action if the parties rejected the resolution's terms. Later resolutions "Order[ ed)" a cease-fire, "Decide[d]" the belligerents' responsibility under the ceasefire, and "Decide[d]" on an armistice.674 After a recommendatory call upon the
belligerents for a ceasefire late in 1948, the Council "Reaffirm[ed]" its prior "order" for ceasefire and obeying armistice agreements. 675 These were binding in nature. When fighting broke out again in 1951, the Council called upon parties for a
ceasefire, reminding them of Chapter VI obligations to settle disputes by peaceful
means. 676 In September 1951 Resolution 95 "not[ed] ... present practice of
[Egypt's] interfering with the passage through the Suez Canal ofgoods destined for
Israel" and "[found] further that such practice [was] an abuse of the exercise of the
right of visit, search and seizure[.]" The Resolution "Further [found] that the
practice in the prevailing circumstances cannot be justified on the ground that it is
necessary for self-defence[,]" and noted that
... restrictions on the passage of goods through the Suez Canal to Israel ports are
denying to nations at no time connected with the conflict in Palestine valuable
supplies required for their economic reconstruction, and that these restrictions
together with sanctions applied by Egypt to certain ships which have visited Israel
ports represent unjustified inferference with the rights of nations to navigate the seas
and to trade freely with one another, including the Arab States and Israel[.]

The Resolution concluded by "Call[ing] upon Egypt to terminate the restrictions
on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez
Canal wherever bound and to cease all interference with such shipping beyond
that essential to the safety ofshipping in the Canalitselfand to the observance of ...
conventions in force.,,677 Because it ended with a recommendatory "call" upon
Egypt under Article 40, the Resolution could not be considered binding. However,
the Resolution declaration that seizures in the Canal abused traditional rules had
evidentiary weight as to a norm.678 Resolution 101 (1953) similarly "[found] that
the retaliatory action at Qibya taken by ... Israel on 14-15 October 1953 and all
such actions constitute[d violations of the ceasefire, the armistice] and the Charter ...." Israel was censured.679 In 1955 Israel was "Condemn[ed] for a similar attack as inconsistent with [the armstice] and under the ... Charter.,,680 The next
year an attack on Syria was "Condemn[ed]" after Israel experienced interference
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using Lake Tiberias by Syria in violation of the armistice. 681 In 1962, after exchanges of fire between Syria and Israel, Resolution 171 "call [ed] upon the two
Governments ... to comply with their obligations under ... the Charter by refraining from the threat as well as the use offorce." The Council reaffirmed its prior resolution condemning retaliatory breaches of the armistice, and determined that
Israel's attack on March 16-17 was "a flagrant violation of that resolution.,,682 A
"grave Israel military action" in southern Hebron against Jordan in 1966 earned
Israel a censure. The Council "Emphasize[ d] ... that ... military reprisal cannot be
tolerated and that, if ... repeated, the ... Council [would] consider further and
more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against the repetition of
such acts.,,683
When the 1967 war broke out, the Council called upon the belligerents for a
ceasefire and ceasing military activities, on the model of the opening of the Korean
War. 684 Later resolutions "Demand[ed]" a ceasefire and observance of it.685 Resolution 237 only "Recommend[ed]" compli~ncewith the Third Convention,686but
Resolution 242 "Affirm [ed] ... the necessity ... [f] or guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area[.],,687 Resolutions 248 and 256
condemned the "large-scale and massive" or "large scale and carefully planned" attacks on Jordan in response to Jordanian violations of the ceasefire in 1968. 688 A
1969 resolution condemned similar "preplanned" Israeli air attacks on Jordanian
population centers as a "flagrant" violation of the Charter and the cease-fire resolutions. It repeated a previous resolution's warning, that the Council would meet
again "to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to
ensure against repetition of such attacks.,,689
The 1973 war precipitated a Council call for ending hostilities and a ceasefire.690
In 1981, while Iraq was heavily committed in its war with Iran, Israeli aircraft
struck an Iraqi nuclear facility near Baghdad. Israel claimed a right of anticipatory
self-defense in that the facility was manufacturing nuclear weapons to be used
against Israel. 691 Upon Iraq's complaint,692 the Council cited Charter Article 2(4)
and "[s]trongly condemn[ed] the military attack by Israel in clear violation of the
Charter ... and the norms of international conduct." The Council called upon Israel to refrain from any such acts or threats in the future and stated that Iraq was
entitled to "appropriate redress, responsibility for which has been acknowledged
by Israel.,,693
In 1982, the Council "[ d]emand[ ed] that ... Israel lift immediately the blockade
of the city of Beirut ... to permit the dispatch of supplies to meet the urgent needs
of the civilian population and allow the distribution of aid" by UN agencies and
nongovernmental organizations, particularly the ICRC. The resolution referred to
other resolutions citing the 1949 Geneva Conventions and "regulations attached
to the Hague Convention of 1907.,,694
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c. Rhodesia: 1965-79. The Rhodesia decolonization process, which included embargo and maritime interdiction before Zimbabwe independence was assured, began with General Assembly action. Assembly resolutions noted "a threat to
freedom, peace and security in Africa," and called upon States to refrain from rendering assistance to Rhodesia. 695 Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence,
and the Assembly "[i]nvite[d]" the United Kingdom to implement the Assembly
resolutions and "Recommend[ed that] the ... Council ... consider [the] situation
as a matter of urgency.,,696
Condemning the independence declaration, the Council first "[d]ecide[ d] to
call upon all States ... to refrain from rendering any assistance to this illegal regime.,,697 Resolution 217 called upon the UK Government to quell the rebellion
and "to take all other appropriate measures which would prove effective in eliminating the authority of the usurpers ..." The Council also called upon States to desist from providing arms to Rhodesia and to break economic relations, "including
an embargo on oil and petroleum products." Continuance of the rebellion was determined to be "in time a threat to international peace and security.,,698 Thereafter
the United Kingdom declined to intercept Beira-bound tankers. 699 The Council
then passed Resolution 221, which "[c]all[ed] upon" Portugal to deny pier and
pumping facilities and "[c]all[ed] upon all States" to divert their vessels "reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for ... Rhodesia which may be en route for
Beira." The Council also "[c]all[ed] upon" the United Kingdom "to prevent, by
the use of force if necessary, the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be
carrying oil destined for ... Rhodesia." Specific authority was given to arrest and
detain Joanna V upon departure from Beira if she discharged petroleum cargo
there.1° o The United Kingdom acted upon this resolution, stopping possible
blockade runners.1° 1
A month later the Council, "Acting in accordance with Articles 39-41" ofthe
Charter, determined the Rhodesia situation was a threat to international peace and
security. The Council "Decid[ed] that ... Members ... shall prevent:"
(a) The import into their territories of asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar,
tobacco, copper, meat and meat products and hides, skins and leather originating in ... Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of the present
resolution;
(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are
calculated to promote the export of these commodities from ... Rhodesia and
any dealings by their nationals or in their territories in any of these commodities originating in ... Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of the
present resolution, including in particular any transfer offunds to ... Rhodesia
for such activities or dealings;
(c) Shipment in vessels ... of their registration of any of these commodities originating in ... Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of the present
resolution;
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(d) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are
calculated to promote the sale or shipment to ... Rhodesia of arms, ammunition of all types, military aircraft, military vehicles, and equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in ...
Rhodesia;
(e) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are
calculated to promote the supply to ... Rhodesia of all other aircraft and motor
vehicles and of equipment and materials for the manufacture, assembly, or
maintenance of aircraft and motor vehicles in ... Rhodesia; the shipment in
vessels ... of their registration of any such goods destined for ... Rhodesia;
and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or
are calculated to promote the manufacture or assembly of aircraft or motor vehicles in ... Rhodesia;
(f) Participation in their territories or territories under their administration or in
land or air transport facilities or by their nationals or vessels of their registration in the supply of oil or oil products to ... Rhodesia; notwithstanding any
contracts entered into or licenses granted before the date of the present
resolution[.]

Members were "[r]emind[ed]" of obligations under Article 25; the resolution also
"[c]all[ed] upon" them to carry out "this decision of the ... Council.,,702
Resolution 253 followed in 1968; "[r]eaffirming its determination that the ...
situation in ... Rhodesia constitute[ d] a threat to international peace and security
[and a]ctingunder Chapter VII ofthe Charter ...," the Council "[ d]ecide[ d] that ...
Members ... shall prevent":
(a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating
in ... Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution
(whether or not the commodities or products are for consumption or processing in their territories, whether or not they are imported in bond and whether
or not any special legal status with respect to the import of goods is enjoyed by
the port or other place where they are imported or stored);
(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote
or are calculated to promote the export of any commodities or products
from ... Rhodesia; and any dealings by their nationals or in their territories in
any commodities or products originating in ... Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution, including ... transfer of funds to ...
Rhodesia for the purposes of such activities or dealings;
(c) The shipment in vessels ... of their registration or under charter to their nationals ... of any commodities or products originating in ... Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution;
(d) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories of any commodities or products (whether or not originating in their territories, but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, educational
equipment and material for use in schools and other educational institutions,
publications, news material and, in special humanitarian circumstances,
food-stuffs) to any person or body in ... Rhodesia or to any other person or
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body for ... any business carried on in or operated from ... Rhodesia, and any
activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply;
(e) The shipment in vessels ... of their registration, or under charter to their nationals, ... of any such commodities or products which are consigned to any
person or body in ... Rhodesia, or to any other person or body for the purposes
of any business carried on in or operated from ... Rhodesia[.]

Members were again reminded of Article 25 obligations. The Council established
a Committee to receive reports and obtain information.1°3 In 1970 the Council
"[d]ecide[d]," in accordance with Article 41, "that Members would inter alia,
sever all trade and transportation ties with Rhodesia; the Council" "[r]equest[ed]"
the UK government to rescind all trade, etc., agreements with Rhodesia and
"[R]equest[ed]" that Members "take all possible further action under Article 41 of
the Charter [i.e.,options not involving the use offorce], ... not excluding any ...
measures provided in that Article[.],,704
In 1972 Resolution 314 deplored the failure of States to abide by the embargo
sanctions and declared that any national legislation to the contrary "would undermine sanctions and would be contrary to the obligations of States.,,70S In 1973
Resolution 333 "[c]all[ed] upon" States to enact legislation "providing for the imposition of severe penalties" for evasion or breach of sanctions. It also
5. Request[ed] States, in the event of their trading with South Africa and Portugal, to provide that purchase contracts with those countries should clearly
stipulate, in a manner legally enforceable, the prohibition of dealing in goods
of ... Rhodesian origin; likewise, sales contracts with these countries should
include a prohibition of resale or re-export of goods to ... Rhodesia;
6. Call[ed] upon States to pass legislation forbidding insurance companies under
their jurisdiction from covering air flights into and out of ... Rhodesia and individuals or air cargo carried on them;
7. Call[ed] upon States to undertake appropriate legislative measures to ensure
that all valid marine insurance contracts contain specific provisions that no
goods of ... Rhodesian origin or destined to ... Rhodesia shall be covered by
such contracts;
8. Call[ed] upon States to inform the Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) on their present sources of supply and quantities of chrome,
asbestos, nickel, pig iron, tobacco, meat and sugar, together with the quantities of these goods they obtained from ... Rhodesia before the application of
sanctions.106

The economic noose was tightened further in 1976 by Resolution 388, decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, that Members would ensure that their nationals
and persons in their territories did not insure:
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(a) Any commodities or products exported from ... Rhodesia after the date of the
present resolution in contravention of ... resolution 253 (1968) which they
know or have reasonable cause to believe to have been so exported;
(b) Any commodities or products which they know or have reasonable cause to
believe to be destined or intended for importation into ... Rhodesia after the
date of the present resolution in contravention of resolution 253 (1968);
(c) Commodities, products or other property in ... Rhodesia of any commercial,
industrial or public utility undertaking in ... Rhodesia, in contravention of
resolution 253 (1968)[.]

The Council also decided that
... Member States shall take appropriate measures to prevent their nationals and
persons in their Territories from granting to any commercial, industrial or public
utility undertaking in ... Rhodesia the right to use any trade name or from entering
into any franchising agreement involving the use of any trade name, trade mark or
registered design in connexion with the sale or distribution of any products,
commodities or services of such an undertaking[.f07

The same approach (graduated embargo, Committee reporting system) under
Chapter VII of the Charter was employed with respect to South Africa?08
Majority rule came in 1979, and the sanctions were lifted that year?09
The General Assembly also played a role in the transition to Zimbabwe. Besides
passing nonbinding 710 resolutions within its sphere,711 the Council cited the Assembly's prior law-declaring resolutions, e.g., the Declaration on Granting oflndependence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.712

d. India-Pakistan: 1965, 1971. The 1965 naval war was part of a renewed conflict between India and Pakistan. The Security Council, as in other situations, "[c]al1[ed]"
upon the belligerents to take steps for a cease-fire and to respect the frontier line at
issue?13 The 1971 war was over so quickly that Council Resolution 307 only noted
the Pakistani agreement to a cease fire and "[d]emand[ed]" compliance with it. 714

e. Falklands/Malvinas: 1982. Two Council resolutions impacted this relatively
brief conflict. Resolution 502 was stronger than many initial responses to a crisis.
Finding "a breach of the peace," the Council "[ d]emand[ed]" immediate cessation
of hostilities and withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falklands/Malvinas and
"[c]all[ed] on ... Argentina and the United Kingdom ... to seek a diplomatic solution ... and to respect fully the purposes and principles of the Charter. ,,715 The second resolution "[u]rge[d]" parties to cooperate with the Secretary-General's good
offices efforts.716

f. The Iran-Iraq Conflict and the Tanker War, 1980-88. As Charter era conflicts
went, the Iran-Iraq war was a long, eight-year affair with heavy losses all around.
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Security Council action was relatively minimal: 17 resolutions 717 in that time.
Several bear upon the Tanker War and the law of naval warfare.
Resolution 479 (September 23, 1980, issued shortly after the war begani 18
"[e ]all[ed] upon" the belligerents to refrain immediately from further use of force
and to settle the dispute "by peaceful means and in conformity with international
law," echoing Charter Article 33. The resolution"[u ]rge[d]" Iran and Iraq to accept
mediation, conciliation, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other
peaceful means. It "[e ]all[ed] upon" States to exercise restraint and to refrain from
anything to further escalate and widen the conflict. The Secretary-General's offer
to suggest good offices was supported.719 Although it did not mention freedom of
navigation, Japan and the United States stressed the primary importance of that
principle.720 Iraq accepted Resolution 479, denying it had any territorial ambitions; Iran rejected it, demanding condemnation ofIraqi aggression. 721 In October, however, Iraq rejected a UN good offices offer to allow 70 merchantmen
trapped in the Shatt aI-Arab by the war to depart under a UN or perhaps an ICRC
flag; Iran accepted the proposal. 722
Nearly two years later, Resolution 514 again "[e]all[ed]for" a ceasefire and belligerent forces' withdrawal. The Council "[d]ecid[ed] to dispatch a team of [UN]
observers to verify, confirm and supervise the ceasefire and withdrawal." Continuing Secretary-General mediation efforts was "[u]rge[d]." Other States were
again asked to abstain from action that might contribute to continuation of the
conflict.723 An October 4,1982 resolution was in the same vein, and welcomed a
"part[y's]" (Iraq's) acceptance of Resolution 514's terms and "call[ed] upon the
other [Iran] to do likewise[.],,724
Resolution 540 (1983) deplored mutual destruction of civilian lives, cities,
property and economic infrastructures. The Council condemned violations ofhumanitarian law, particularly that stated in the First through the Fourth Conventions, and called for "cessation of all military operations against civilian targets,
including city and residential areas[.]" Resolution 540 "[alffirm[ed]"
... the right of free navigation and commerce in international waters, call[ed] on
all States to respect this right and also call[ed] upon the belligerents to cease
immediately all hostilities in the region of the Gulf, including all sea-lanes, navigable
waterways, harbour works, terminals, offshore installations and all ports with direct
or indirect access to the sea, and to respect the integrity of the other littoral States[.]

It also "[e ]all[ed] upon both parties to refrain from any action that [might] endanger international peace and security as well as marine life in the region of the
Gulf.,,725
In June 1984 Resolution 552 responded to a letter from the GCC States (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE)726 complaining ofIranian acts of
aggression on the freedom of navigation to and from their ports. Although Iran
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justified its attacks on reaction against aid to Iraq by States in the region and on
other bases, the Council heard States and the Arab League's complaints concerning ship attacks and the right of freedom of navigation,727 and passed Resolution
552. The Council,
Noting that Member States pledged to live together in peace with one another as
good neighbours in accordance with the Charter ... ,
Reaffirming the obligations of Member States with respect to the principles and
purposes of the Charter,
Reaffirming also that all Member States are obliged to refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State,
Taking into consideration the importance of the Gulf region to international peace
and security and its vital role to the stability of the world economy,
Deeply concerned over the recent attacks on commercial ships en route to and from
the ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia,
Convinced that these attacks constitute a threat to the safety and stability of the
area and have serious implications for international peace and security,
1. Call[ed] upon all States to respect, in accordance with international law, the
right offree navigation;
2. Reaffirm[ed] the right of free navigation in international waters and sea lanes
for shipping en route to and from all ports and installations of the littoral
States ... not parties to the hostilities;
3. Call[ed] upon all States to respect the territorial integrity of the States ... not
parties to the hostilities and to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain
from any act which may lead to a further escalation and widening of the
conflict;
4. Condemn[ed] the recent attacks on commercial ships en route to and from the
ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia;
5. Demand[ed] that such attacks should cease forthwith and that there should be
no interference with ships en route to and from States ... not parties to the
hostilities;
6. Decide[ed] in the event of non-compliance with the present resolution, to meet
again to consider effective measures ... commensurate with the gravity of the
situation ... to ensure the freedom of navigation in the area[.]

The Council requested the Secretary-General to report on progress in implementing the resolution. 728
Resolutions 540 and 552 had no lasting effect. In February 1986 Resolution 582
"[d]eplore[d] ... escalation of the conflict, especially ... attacks on neutral shipping
or civilian aircraft, the violation of international humanitarian law and other laws
of armed conflict and, in particular, the use of chemical weapons contrary to ... the
Geneva Protocol." It also "[e ]all[ed] upon ... Iran and Iraq to observe an immediate
cease-fire, a cessation of all hostilities on land, at sea and in the air," to withdraw
their forces behind their borders, and called upon the belligerents to submit the
conflict to mediation or other peaceful settlement methods. The now-familiar
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provision, calling upon other States to refrain from escalating or widening the conflict, was also included.729 Resolution 588 (October 1986) expressed alarm over the
continuing and intensifying conflict and called upon the belligerents to implement Resolution 582. 730
Resolution 598 Guly 1987) again "[d]epZore[d] ... attacks on neutral shipping or
civilian aircraft, the violation ofinternational humanitarian law and other laws of
armed conflict and, in particular, the use of chemical weapons contrary to ... the
1925 Geneva Protocol[.]" Citing Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter, the Council
"[a]ct[ed]," "[d]emand[ing] that... Iran and Iraq observe an immediate ceasefire ...." Other States were admonished notto escalate or widen the war. The Secretary-General was requested to explore, in consultation with the belligerents, entrusting an impartial body with inquiring into responsibility for the conflict and a
report to the Counci1.731 This was the first time the Council cited Chapter VII of
the Charter (threats to the peace, etc.) during the war. Iraq accepted Resolution 598
almost immediately.732 The European Community, the Arab League, NATO
countries and the GCC passed resolutions supporting Resolution 598, the GCC
urging the Security Council to implement it. The U~ Secretary of State and other
foreign ministers referred to the binding nature of Resolution 598. 733
During 1987 a UN naval force was discussed; Italy and the United States had
supported the idea, the United Kingdom was unenthusiastic, and the United
States was willing to consider it but only if a collective action concept was spelled
out clearly. The United States would not support a UN force replacing US and
US-aligned forces. The idea got nowhere7 34
Resolution 612 again condemned chemical warfare in May 1988. 735 Iran accepted Resolution 598 in August 1998, and a ceasefire ended hostilities7 36 Subsequent resolutions, 1988-91, condemned use of chemical weapons, called upon
States to control export of such to the belligerents1 _established the UN Iran-Iraq
Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) to supervise the ceasefire, and disbanded
UNIIMOG in 1991 with intensification of the crisis over Kuwait7 37
g. Appraisal ofSecurity Council Lawmaking. Security Council intervention with
binding or recommended norms affecting war at sea has been episodic and often
limited. There are several reasons for this.
Use of the veto, at first largely by the USSR and later by other permanent Council members (France, Great Britain, United States),738 has affected lawmaking for
some maritime conflicts. Permanent members filed vetoes on these maritime incidents or wars: Corfu Channel, 1947; Korean War; Arab-Israeli conflicts; IndiaPakistan, 1971; Rhodesia; Falklands/Malvinas739 In some cases, Council agenda
items have been withdrawn, or the problem has disappeared with time740 Time
has been a critical factor in some, but not all, modern conflicts; the Arab-Israeli
Six-Day War and the 1971 India-Pakistan conflict are two examples where military
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action was over within weeks.141 Even though the Council may be "organized ...
to function continuously,,,742 perhaps with the most modern telecommunications
facilities, the relatively rapid pace of events can outstrip deliberation, debate and
resolution negotiations and drafting.143
Whether the Council can consider a matter depends on discretion of UN Members (whether Council members or not), countries that are not UN Members, the
General Assembly, or the Secretary-General, in bringing matters involving international peace and security to the Council's attention. The Council can initiate its
own investigation, but that involves discretion before acting on a resolution.144
The Secretary-General could perhaps report through his or her inherent power as
head of the UN Secretariat.145 And while this list may seem impressive, there is
nothing to stop individual States from attempting to settle a dispute by means
other than Council action, perhaps by negotiations with agreement that the issue
not be presented to the Council, or referral to a regional organization, the latter of
which occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis.146
The implications of a veto may have influenced the relative strength of resolutions. For example, the Korean War resolutions were only recommendatory in nature.147 More recently, however, the Council has demonstrated the capacity to
approve decisions under Articles 25 and 48, at least where permanent members
concur with the action, must abstain/48 or choose to abstain?49 The latter has occurred occasionally in situations related to armed conflict or the potential for
armed conflict. 750
A more serious problem has been the language of resolutions. Obviously, if a
resolution recommends certain action, that course is optional with UN Members.
There have been many affecting the law of naval warfare.1 51 Equally obviously, if
the Council "decides" that a State "shall" take certain action, that resolution is
mandatory. There have been few of these.1 52 Is a resolution "calling upon" Members mandatory? Respectable authority has differed on the point,753 and the record
of compliance is mixed. For example, the United Kingdom complied when called
upon to interdict tankers during the Rhodesia transition,754 but the record is
equally clear that Iran largely ignored Council calls during the Tanker War, perhaps until forced to comply by outside pressures.155 (To be sure, Iran accepted Resolution 598 after prior Iraqi acceptance of it, with a resulting ceasefire?56 Iraq's
"acceptance" record of these resolutions was better/57 but "accepting" them connoted their nonmandatory nature to the belligerents. In the near term, immediately after passage of a call for action, about the only sure method is to observe what
States do with the call for action and whether they appear to respond out of a sense
oflegal obligation. This choice, like Council decisions that are clearly mandatory
under the Charter, is not an option for a military commander?58 A commander
must await the executive decision to comply with the call, and how Council calls
for action and decisions will be implemented, since they are frequently imprecise,
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and deliberately so, as the Council is addressing a congery of over 180 countries
with widely varying resources.
Since the UN's earliest days Council resolutions have been involved with
maritime and law of naval warfare issues.759 Although nearly all of these resolutions have not carried the binding authority of decisions under Articles 25 and 48,
they do have a sort of"soft law" weight, which when implemented over an undetermined amount of time, may ripen into custom, the oldest source of international
law.160 Moreover, to the extent that the Council can act in relative concert and in
confidence that there will be no veto threat, the future may see more strongly
worded resolutions that are nonmandatory in nature, or decisions that bind all UN
Members. The result in the future is that these resolutions, general as they often
are, may dictate the content of naval warfare in the case of Council decisions, or be
informed by it, much as self-defense considerations may be informed by the content of naval warfare.161

2. Making the Rules and Stating the Principles: The General Assembly
The Charter gives the General Assembly only recommendatory powers in the
international peace and security arena, and then only to the extent that the Council
is not seized of a matter.762 Two practices have developed: recommendations underthe Uniting For Peace (UFP) Resolution, and concurrent action with the Security Council.
a. The UFP Resolution. When the Soviet Union returned to the Council and began vetoing 763 resolutions connected with the UN Command in Korea's prosecuting that war, the United States led passage of the UFP Resolution, which provides
that if the Council,
because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security ...
where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression, the ... Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to
making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures,
inc1 uding, in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression, the use of armed
force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The Resolution also established a Collective Measures Committee (CMC) to report to the Assembly.1 64 On at least five occasions after the Korean War, the Council resolved to call emergency Assembly sessions, or refer claims to it. Egypt's
nationalizing the Suez Canal (1956), revolt in Hungary (1956), Lebanon (1958),
the Congo crisis (1960), and the India-Pakistan war (1971).165 Although it was argued that UFP was not legitimate under the Charter, most find for its legality; East
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and West have invoked it in referring disputes from the Council to the Assembly?66
UFP was employed in several cases. Assembly Resolution 498 found the PRC
had committed aggression during the Korean War?67 Resolution 500 recommended a weapons and strategic materials embargo directed at the PRC and North
Korea?68 Resolution 997, voted by the Assembly during Britain, France and Israel's 1956 Suez Canal intervention, did not determine that a threat to or breach of
the peace had occurred but did note that these States' forces had penetrated, or
were operating against, Egyptian territory. They were urged to withdraw forces
and cease hostilities?69
Castenada, Higgins and others have analyzed these situations, along with those in
Hungary and the Congo.770 Castenada argues for development of a new customary
law arising from acquiescence of UN Members?71 Whether these five examples of
conflict can amount to a new found custom is, of course, highly debatable.
Casten ada formulates this system of rules from the UFP experience; it is typical of
arguments for Assembly lawmaking:
1. The ... Council, having determined that there is a threat to the peace, a breach
of the peace, or an act of aggression, may recommend the adoption of enforcement measures, including the use of armed force, on behalf of the United Nations, and directed against states or de facto governments, without following
the procedures and observing the requirements established in Chapter VII of
the Ch~rter for ... armed force. This means that members can make available
to the Council armed forces in accordance with procedures different from the
special agreements contemplated in Article 43; that plans for the use of such
armed forces need not be drawn up with the assistance of the Military Staff
Committee, as provided in Article 46; and that the strategic direction of
armed forces made available for enforcement action need not necessarily be
the responsibility of the ... Committee, as set forth in Article 47.
2. The ... Assembly can recommend, when there is lack of unanimity among the
Permanent Members ..., and when there has arisen in the Assembly's opinion
a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the adoption of
enforcement measures, including ... armed force in the event of an armed attack or an act of aggression, on behalf of the United Nations and directed
against states or de facto governments, also without observing the procedures
and requirements of Chapter VII for ... armed force.
3. Both the ... Council and the ... Assembly may decide, without a previous determination that a threat to or breach of the peace or an act of aggression exists, to create a United Nations military force to carry out nonenforcement
functions, without complying with ... Chapter VII for the use of armed force;
and they may recommend-but may not legally require-that members contribute contingents to establish it. The functions of a United Nations Force
may range from mere observation and supervision to the undertaking of typically military operations, such as engaging in battle with armed groups for ...
destroying them as combat units, as occurred in the Congo.
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Up to the present [1969] there has not been a single instance in the practice ofthe
United Nations that could serve as a legal basis for a new rule authorizing the ...
Assembly to recommend the use of armed force, without the legal support of the
Uniting for Peace Resolution, even for nonenforcement purposes.
The legal effect of the new rule, per se, is the broadening of the competence of both the
Council and the Assembly to act in a manner different from that originally
contemplated in the Charter. The degree to which this competence was enlarged is
indicated by the three principles suggested above. It is possible to speak of a legal
effect because there has been a modification of a pre-existent legal situation,
although, from a different point of view, the change in the competence of the organs
constitutes not the effect but the very content of the new rule created by the practice
of the Organization.
The second effect is of a diverse nature. Actually, it is a question here of a legal
effect directly produced by the resolutions adopted by the ... Councilor ... Assembly
on the basis of the customary rule created by their practice, rather than a direct effect
of that rule as such. This effect consists in the temporary suspension of the Charter
obligation of members to refrain from the use of force against any state, in conformity
with Article 2(4). That certain Councilor Assembly recommendations concerning
the use offorce should have as an effect the suspension of the Charter obligation not
to use it, is a consequence of the new rule created by the practice of the organs}72

While this statement is useful, it is submitted that Castenada errs in two respects.
First, it remains clear after the 1990-91 Gulf War that the Council may also "decide" on the use of force and authorize its agent-the Coalition in the Gulf
War-to proceed. 773 Moreover, it is highly questionable whether the Assembly
may "decide"-in the sense of the Charter, Articles 25 and 48-on anything, such
that States would be compelled to obey its commands.774 If the Castanada view is
accepted, that States' acquiescence is enough to create a customary norm, that may
be true. 775 However, that is not what the Charter says, and any international agreements that conflict with the Charter are trumped by the latter.776 Treaties, of
course, have been a regular feature of peacekeeping operations, whether under
UFP authority or the Counci1.777
Moreover, most commentators and courts have said recommendatory resolutions can only restate or evidence customary law. Even Castenada has this view for
declaratory resolutions. 778 The Assembly has promoted many LOAC-related
norms through the years; some state rules oflaw, some do not (at least according to
some countries), and some are purely aspirational. 779

b. Concurrent Action with the Council. In several cases the Assembly and the
Council have issued resolutions during crises or conflicts.780 Where a Council decision 781 adopts a norm stated in an Assembly or Council recommendation, it becomes a binding rule oflaw. Where a nonbinding Council resolution adopts such a
norm, it is further evidence of customary law, unless, of course, the original
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resolution declared custom, in which case the Council resolution also restates a
customary rule. 782
c. AppraisalJor the Tanker War. The Council was seized of the Iran-Iraq war from
the beginning; therefore, the Assembly had no jurisdiction over the conflict.783
However, countries involved in a Council-seized conflict may try to bring matters
before the Assembly, which should reject consideration ofthem. 784
The Assembly did promote projects whose subject is applicable to the Tanker
War, notably the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)
which created the LOS Convention.785 The same procedure was followed for the
Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols, a product ofICRC conferences.786 The Council, by citing and incorporating by reference freedom of navigation, the law of armed conflict, and occasionally specific treaties, e.g., the 1925
Geneva Gas Protocol or the 1949 Geneva Conventions,787 thereby gave further evidence of these agreements or customary law as norms. Since no binding Article 25
or 48 decisions incorporated them, these bodies oflaw did not become mandatory
norms, but Council citation increased the strength of their applicability. Although
the issue is not free from doubt, Resolution 598 may have clarified the debate as to
the status of Article 40-based resolutions calling for action, which may be binding
if the views of the US Secretary of State and other foreign ministers are correct.788

3. The Constitutive Process ojDecisionmaking in the Charter Era.
Sub-Parts B.l and B.2 of this Chapter have sketched development of norms of
conduct by the Council and the Assembly. This Sub-Part examines the methodology ofimplementation of these norms by the Organization and by regional organizations, also contemplated by the Charter.
a. Implementation: Original Intent and Trends. The Charter contemplates that
UN Members will agree to make armed forces, assistance and facilities, including
rights of passage, available to the Council so that it can maintain international
peace and security.789 These agreements have not materialized.790 The Charter
also provides for a Military Staff Committee (MSC) to plan for applying armed
force when the Council directs. The MSC consists of permanent Council members' chiefs of staff and would have strategic direction of forces at Council disposa1.791 Owing to the Cold War and other factors such as the lack of Article 43
agreements, the MSC atrophied.7 92
Alternatives to the Charter system have been suggested 793 or implemented.
One was the "agency" principle, by which the Council has requested a State or a
group of States to take leadership and command of an operaton on the Council's
behal£ The United States had this role in Korea, the United Kingdom for Rhodesia, and a Coalition in the 1990-91 Gulf War. 794 UFP-based operations have used a
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Collective Measures Committee for data reporting and dissemination.1 95 Some
peacekeeping operations have been given to the Secretary-General for leadership.196 In interdiction/embargo operations for Rhodesia, South Africa, and Iraq
in the 1990-91 Gulf War, the Council appointed a Committee to review these processes.797
No peacekeeping forces were active in the Gulf area during the 1980-88 war;
UNIIMOG served after the ceasefire and until the 1990-91 GulfWar.1 98 The Secretary-General reported on the conflict, at Council direction, but did not administer
forces.1 99 Neither the Council nor the Assembly authorized forces' intervention
similar to the situation in Korea, Rhodesia or Kuwait. The Iran-Iraq conflict and
its Tanker War component were governed by traditional inter-State relations and
the law of self-defense.

b. RegionalArrangements Under the Charter. Article 52 permits regional arrangements or agencies to deal with matters relating to maintaining international peace
and security "appropriate for regional action." Members of these arrangements or
agencies should "make every effort to achieve pacific settlement oflocal disputes"
through these institutions before referring claims to the Council. The Council
must encourage developing pacific settlement of regional disputes through these
institutions, whether a matter is referred to the Council or a regional institution
first. 800 The Council can use these arrangements or agencies for enforcement under Council authority.801 It must be kept informed of action taken "or in contemplation" by regional institutions, as distinguished from post-attack reporting
required in self-defense situations. 802
What constitutes an Article 52 regional arrangement or agency has not been resolved; the Arab League,803 the OAS 804 and the Organization of African Unity
(OAU)80S qualify.806 Not all regional organizations are Article 52 dispute resolution agencies; those whose function is self-defense get authority from Article 51 's
inherent right ofcollective self-defense provision. 807 There has been use of Article
52 as an alternative to Councilor Assembly dispute resolution. For example, the
United States referred the Cuban Missile Crisis issue to the OAS, obtained a resolution denouncing introduction of the missiles, and proceeded with quarantine.
As Article 54 requires, the Council was notified. 808 A regional organization resolution was also used in the Grenada crisis. 809
Four organizations, one with Article 52 status (the Arab League),810 the GCC,
which may have that status,811 the WEU,812 and the ICO,813 which may also have
that status, were involved in the Tanker War. Although hampered from time to
time by internal dissension, the Arab League Summits' resolutions condemned
freedom of navigation violations and urged resolution of the conflict by the
parties. The Arab League governor-general appeared before the Council in connection with debate on Council Resolution 552, brought by the GCC States,
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complaining of attacks on freedom of navigation to and from their ports. 814 The
GCC played an active role in the war, evolving from an internal security organization to promoting joint action for mutual security.81S The WEU, concerned with
European security, was cover for several States' Gulf maritime operations. 816 The
ICO attempted to serve as a mediator, particularly through GCC support.817
Other regional organizations that could be said to have dispute resolution capability today, e.g., the European Community, 818 passed resolutions but were not involved because the Tanker War occurred outside their geographic competence. 819
Other governmental organizations not enjoying Article 52 status, e.g. the Group of
Seven, also passed resolutions in connection with the war.820 None of these made
law for the conflict, but their "soft law" status further evidences the strength of
claims they advanced, e.g., freedom of navigation in the Gulf.

c. The Work ofNongovernmental Organizations and the Tanker War. The principal nongovernmental organization contributing to the law of the Tanker War was
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), a Swiss corporation that
sponsored conferences leading to 1977 Protocols I and II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 821 The ICRC also sponsored conferences leading to adoption of the Conventional Weapons Convention and its protocols in 1980.822 The Security Council
cited to the law of armed conflict generally and to the Geneva Conventions specifically,823 the work of the ICRC was cited in a Council resolution. 824 Early in the war
Iran accepted and Iraq rejected a proposal to move, under the Red Cross or UN
flag, 70 ships caught in the Shatt by opening hostilities.82S The standards of
ICRC-sponsored treaties had impacted norms applicable to the war, regardless of
citation by the Council. 826
The International Transport Workers Federation (ITF), International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and the International Shipping Federation (ISF) expressed
concerns over attacks on merchant shipping, and these were transmitted to
belligerents by the UN Secretary-General. 827

Part C. Maritime Neutrality in the Charter Era 828
"There is nothing new about revising neutrality; it has undergone an almost
constant process of revision in detail," Jessup concluded in 1936.829 He also believed that
... nothing could be more fallacious than the attempt to test the application of
rules of neutrality by the principles oflogic. Since they are products of compromise
and of experience, logic has found practically no place in their development and
cannot properly be used in t~eir application.830

Over half a century into the Charter era, little would change these observations.
New considerations have appeared,831 including the Charter itself; the process of
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analyzing the law of neutrality defies a straightforward, positivist, black-letter approach. Indeed, principles of neutrality for maritime warfare have been seen to be
less rigid, from an historical perspective, than those for air or land warfare. 832
Some assert that neutrality is in "chronic obsolescence.,,833 A major reason, according to those who say that future applications of the law of neutrality will be
minimal, is the argument that the Charter has ended the rights and duties of the
old law of neutrality. 834 Another argument is that since the Charter has outlawed
war,835 therefore there can be no state of war, and therefore there is no need for a
law of neutrality. 836 (The latter position might be considered in light of the Pact of
Paris (1928), which outlawed aggressive war. 837 World War II began a decade
later.)
Many others, reflecting State practice and claims in the Charter era, have
maintained that the law of neutrality continues to exist. The San Remo Manual recognizes maritime neutrality.838 The 1992-96 International Law Association Conferences received reports from its Committee on Maritime Neutrality, and the
1998 ILA conference accepted the Committee's final report. 839 Individual researchers assert that neutrality remains a valid legal concept, albeit modified by
the impact of the Charter and other considerations. 840
Like the reports of Mark Twain's passing, accounts of the demise of neutrality
in the Charter era have been greatly exaggerated, as the ensuing analysis
demonstrates.
The law of neutrality before World War II and the Charter era has been traced in
detail by Jessup, his associates and others,841 more analysis is needlessly repetitive.
However, two groups' research during 1919-39 is worthy of note, particularly for
their collection and summary of State practice. They had considerable impact on
State practice as the war widened but before it became global in 1941 with entry of
the United States and other American countries into the war.

1. Neutrality, 1928-41, and in the Charter Era; "Non-Belligerency"
In 1928 the Pact of Paris was concluded. Subject to later agreements such as the
Charter, the Pact remains in force today.842 The understanding concerning the inherent right of of self-defense under the Pact applies in the Charter era and can be
claimed today, subject to principles of necessity, proportionality, and for anticipatory self-defense, a situation admitting of no other alternative. 843 Neutrality principles also carried forward into the Charter era, subject to modification by Charter
law and the usual processes of change in the law Jessup saw in 1936. 844
The Pact did not address the neutrality issue, although other agreements
contemporaneous with it stated the term without defining it,845 except for the Havana Convention on Maritime Neutrality, with eight American countries party,
including the United States,846 and the five-State 1938 Nordic Rules of Neutrality,847 not a formal treaty but published in the LNTS series. 848
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The ILA 1934 meeting approved the BudapestArticles oJInterpretation of the Pact
of Paris. They provide in part:
(1) A signatory State cannot, by denunciation or non-observance of the Pact, release itself from its obligations thereunder.
(2) A signatory State which threatens to resort to armed force for the solution of
an international dispute or conflict is guilty of a violation of the Pact.
(3) A signatory State which aids a violating State thereby itself violates the Pact.
(4) In the event of a violation of the Pact by a resort to armed force or war by one
signatory State against another, the other States may, without thereby committing a breach of the Pact or of any rule ofInternational Law, do all or any of the
following things:(a) Refuse to admit the exercise by the State violating the Pact of belligerent
rights, such as visit and search, blockade, etc.;
(b) Decline to observe towards the State violating the Pact the duties prescribed by International Law, apart from the Pact, for a neutral in relation to a belligerent;
(c) Supply the State attacked with financial or material assistance, including
munitions of war;
(d) Assist with armed forces the State attacked.
(5) The signatory States are not entitled to recognise as acquired de jure any territorial or other advantages acquired de facto by means of a violation of the Pact.
(6) A violating State is liable to pay compensation for all damage caused by a violation of the Pact to any signatory State or to its nationals.
(7) The Pact does not affect such humanitarian obligations as are contained in
general treaties ....849

Although some States 850 and commentators 851 said when the Articles were approved that no State had adopted them as policy, in 1941 the US Congress heard
former Secretary of State Stimson's testimony on the pending Lend-Lease Bill; he
interpreted the Articles as an authoritative statement of the law. 852 He echoed
views of Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Attorney General Robert H. Jackson
on the point, that since Axis nations had breached the Pact of Paris, the United
States could resort to self-defense.853 Besides self-defense, under theBudapestArticles States could adopt a status ofnonbelligerency, i.e., decline to observe neutrality
toward a Pact violator. States could supply a State that was a target ofa Pact violator
with "financial or material assistance, including munitions of war.,,854 (Put
differently, Pact parties could engage in reprisals involving force or other modalities or retorsions. In the Charter era, reprisals involving use of force by States not
party to a conflict are inadmissible. 855 In the pre-Charter era assisting victims of
aggression or armed attacks was styled as nonbelligerency, an intermediate step
between neutrality and belligerency.)
The Lend-Lease Bill was enacted. 856 Congress, by enacting Lend-Lease in this
context, can be said to have stated US practice at that time,857 and the BudapestArticles as part of that practice. It is submitted that when the Allies and other neutrals
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accepted Lend-Lease through bilateral agreements, they ratified and accepted this
practice.858 The 1940 UK-US destroyers-for-bases agreements 859 were also exatnpIes of the United States' assuming nonbelligerent status. 860 These, however, were
only bilateral arrangements, although the US general pro-Allied stance was then
apparent. 861
The United States was not the only country to assume a nonbelligerency posture during 1939-45. For example, Norway's November 1939 charter arrangement
for 1.5 million tons of tankers with Britain 862 favored the United Kingdom against
the Axis. Others officially or unofficially adopted policies tending to favor one side
or the other, sometimes before becoming belligerents (e.g., Italy, which supported
Germany, or American States participating in US Lend-Lease agreements before
declaring war)863 and in other cases staying out of the war but keeping nonbelligerent status (e.g., Spain).864 This World War II practice tends to add support for
recognizing nonbelligerency as an intermediate position, under international law,
between neutrality and belligerency.
The ILA was not the only group of scholars in the interwar years with a view
that there could be gradations or stages between belligerency and neutrality. The
1939 draft Harvard Aggression Convention differentiated among aggressors; defending and co-defending States, entitled to all rights of self-defense; and "supporting States," entitled to discriminate against an aggressor by other than armed
force. A supporting State was entitled to "rights which, if it were neutral, it would
have against a belligerent." An aggressor retained its duties to those entitled to
neutrality status. Other States would have had these rights under Articles 12 and

13:
A State which is not an aggressor, a defending State, a co-defending State, or a
supporting State, does not, in its relations with the aggressor, have the duties which,
if it were neutral, it would have to a belligerent, but, against the aggressor, it has the
rights which, if it were a neutral, it would have against a belligerent.
Subject to ... Article 7 and 8, a State which is not an aggressor, a defending State, a
co-defending State, or a supporting State, has, in its relations with a defending State, a
co-defending State or a supporting State, the duties which, if it were neutral, it would
have to a belligerent; and has against those States the rights which, ifit were a neutral,
it would have against a belligerent. 865

The Comment to the "supporting State" definition elaborates on the term in the
Draft Convention:
... "[S]upporting State" is used in a special way. A "supporting State" might give
to a defending State even greater assistance than was given by a "co-defending State"
but it would do so without use of armed force.
The action taken by a supporting State to assist a defending State would take the
form ofsome kind of discrimination against the aggressor or in favor of the defending
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State. The State may take such action and assume such status for a variety of reasons
but presumably its reasons will include a desire to deter, restrain or even perhaps to
punish an aggressor. The discriminatory action may take the form of economic or
financial embargoes directed against the aggressor. It might be restricted to a
withdrawal of diplomatic and consular representatives from that State or to
participation in the determination that the State violated its obligation not to resort
to force. It might not take the form of any measures directly against an aggressor but
might rather be in the form of aid-financial, economic or otherwise-to the
defending State.

Recitations of State and League of Nations practice demonstrates that there was
support among States, great and small, for the form of nonbelligerency not involving direct use offorce.866 In effect, the Draft Convention's definition ofsupporting
State comes close to the armed neutralities of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Centuries and the Napoleonic Wars when neutrals cooperated to get cargoes
through. 867 This was also almost precisely the circumstance of the United States in
the destroyers-bases deal,868 its convoy operations in the North Atlantic before entry into World War II,869 and Lend-Lease. 870 It was the US posture during the
Tanker War when it convoyed neutral merchantmen to and from Kuwait. 871 The
same was true for States other than belligerents that accompanied or escorted merchantmen flying flags of States other than the belligerents, regardless of who was
the aggressor during the Tanker War. 872 At least one commentator has stated that
the Budapest Articles principle of aid against an aggressor, or its correlative of supporting State action under the Draft Convention, applies in the Charter era. 873
Most recent commentators say there is no intermediate position between belligerency and neutrality, i.e., there is no legal foundation, or perhaps need, for
nonbelligerency. Unlike the Harvard Draft Convention view, nonbelligerents can
claim no rights from that status. 874 However, the problem may lie more in defining
neutrality, according to Tucker. If neutrality is defined as non-participation in
hostilities, i.e., as a belligerent or nonbelligerent, a non-participant neutral incurs
belligerent responses only when, and to the extent, favoritism is shown. Belligerents can respond by non-force reprisals or retorsions. 875 If it is assumed that the
United States and others connected with Gulf commerce in the Tanker War favored one belligerent over the other, (e.g., Iraq over Iran), Iran could impose proportional non-force reprisals after due notice and opportunity for correction
necessary in the situation. Iraq could do the same, and either could employ
retorsions too. 876 Iran could not, even under this theory of neutrality, move
straightway, without notice, to forcible response, e.g., attacks on and destruction of
neutral shipping. 877
Besides the US position before entry into World War II and its stance during the
Iran-Iraq war, nearly every conflict of reasonable duration during the Charter era
has involved situations of nonbelligerency in maritime warfare. This was true for
the Korean War,878 with its UN law overtones. It was also true for the Arab-Israeli
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conflicts. 879 The India-Pakistan conflicts were less clear on the point. 880 The
United States materially assisted the United Kingdom in the Falklands/Malvinas
war, supplying fuel and intelligence; the United States and other countries,
through economic sanctions, also indirectly assisted the United Kingdom. 881
Moreover, if the view is taken that negative preferences for one belligerent over another, e.g., cutting offarms supplies to one side as opposed to aiding one belligerent
while embargoing the other, amounts to nonbelligerency, during the Tanker War
many States had nonbelligerent status: France, most of the Arab States, and the
USSR. The United Kingdom, with its 1987 export credit agreement with Iraq despite its asserting even-handed strict neutrality, might be said to fall into this category.882
Regardless of the commentators' position, the record of armed conflicts since
World War II has been that if the confrontation is of any length, States may declare
and practice strict neutrality, declare neutrality and act as nonbelligerents, or do
nothing, perhaps ignoring (or being unaware of) the situation. 883 The law of neutrality has been applied in the Charter era, perhaps not consistently, and claims for
a right to act as a nonbelligerent, i.e., favoring one or more belligerents at the expense of others, persist.
Is nonbelligerency a violation of the law of neutrality, or a status without legal
standing between the traditional roles of neutrality and belligerency? The response today lies not in the traditional analyses, stretching back centuries, but in
the developing norms under the Charter. The old principles of neutrality have
been modified by the advent of the Charter. 884 The same is true for nonbelligerency, where an overlay of Charter law helps define these situations and can give
them legitimacy, not as an exception to traditional rules of neutrality, whether
stated in treaties or custom, but as application and interpretation ofthe Charter. 88S
Responses to aggressors can include proportional reprisals not involving use of
force and retorsions, and States that are not belligerents whose interests have been
damaged by belligerent action can invoke these, along with state of necessity. 886
These alternatives remain as options in the Charter era, and taking such actions
could demonstrate favoritism for one belligerent because of actions taken against
the other. In effect, the actor State would have the appearance of being a nonbelligerent by so acting.
Examples from recent conflicts illustrate the point. During the Falklands/
Malvinas War, States in Europe attempted to isolate Argentina economically,
most likely in violation of international obligations. These reprisal actions were
justified against the aggressor in that war. If actions of the United States and other
countries supplying economic assistance, intelligence and other information to
the United Kingdom would be deemed unlawful,887 those actions were also appropriate nonforce reprisals under Rio Pact mutual security for Argentina's violation
of territorial integrity. Governments' actions to convoy, escort or offer protection
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to neutral ships not carrying warfightingfwar-sustaining goods to belligerent ports
during the Tanker War 888 were retorsionary in nature. These were unfriendly acts
directed toward a belligerent thought to have violated international law.
In essence, the principles oflaw applicable to the intermediate status between
belligerency and neutrality need not necessarily depend on development of a customary practice recogniied as law however the trend may seem to have been since
1939 and continuing into the Charter era, or upon resolution of the debate among
the commentators. The Charter-governed norms apply to fill the void to permit
non-force reprisals and retorsions by neutrals that might have evoked claims of
nonbelligerency before 1945, neutrals that retain an inherent right of self-defense.
Moreover, principles of treaty-based informal self-defense arrangements, which
also continue in the Charter era, permit responses by States not party to a conflict
involving use of force, provided other criteria, e.g., necessity and proportionality,
are met.889 One problem with informal self-defense arrangements, like the problem of aid to a country which is a target of aggression, is the stance the purported
aggressor may take. If the purported aggressor says, rightly or wrongly, that the
target is the aggressor, then the aiding State may subject itself to claims, and worse,
of aiding the aggressor. Another problem with relatively clandestine material aid,
or with informal self-defense, is notice. Although security treaties sometimes are
not published, many are, and all can see who is aligned with whom. This is not the
case with clandestine aid to a target or informal collective self-defense agreements.
These kinds of transactions carry with them the same kinds of risks of misinterpretation and accusations when States act pursuant to them without notifying
other States of the reasons for their actions. States so acting must take these factors
into account when assisting target States pursuant to these modalities.

2. The Law ofNeutrality in the Context of UN Action Under the Charter
Sub-Part C.1 has demonstrated that neutrality, primarily as practiced in the
Nineteenth Century, has been modified in the Charter era, although the general
concept of neutrality remains. The further question is the impact that UN actions,
particularly by the Security Council, may have on this corpus oflaw. As recited earlier, decision making options under the Charter, and practice under the Charter,
demonstrate that there has been and will be ample room for claims of neutrality or
nonbelligerency.
First, although the Council may make legally-binding decisions under Articles
25 and 48 of the Charter, and therefore may obligate UN Members under Articles
41-42 to take action that might be inconsistent with traditional neutrality principles, the Council also may make nonbinding "call[s] upon" Members under Articles 40-41. It also may make nonbinding recommendations under Articles 39-40.
These recommendations have no more force of law, unless they restate custom,
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general principles or treaty-based norms, than General Assembly recommendations under Articles 10-11, 13 and 14. 890
Thus, Council decisions may compel a State to behave inconsistently with traditional neutrality practice, either in requiring what would otherwise be belligerent acts or in restricting rights traditionally enjoyed by neutrals. 891 Article 50,
invoked by the Council for States affected by the Council-directed embargo ofIraq
during the 1990-91 Gulf War,892 allows it to consult with States finding themselves
with "special economic problems" arising from carrying out Council-decided preventive or security measures. Thus even if Jordan and like-status States would
have lost some or all of their rights and duties as neutrals through initial Council
decision making in that war, an Article 50 reprieve could have restored some or all
of these rights and duties. Council action under Article 50 could result in greater
rights, or lesser duties, than under the traditional law of neutrality.
Second, Council decisions when first taken may include exemptions that
would, in effect, allow reversion to traditional neutrality law. For example, sea and
air embargoes against Iraq in the 1990-91 war and against the former Yugoslavia
beginning in1991 had exemptions for medical supplies, humanitarian supplies,
and foodstuffs notified to the Council's Sanctions Committee, which includes representatives from all Council members. 893 To that extent, and except when otherwise controlled by other effects of Council decisions-e.g., the Committee-the
traditional law of neutrality would apply to such shipments. This exception has
been most apparent when the Council has decided to embargo only a single commodity-e.g., petroleum, weapons or military equipment 894_followed by recommendations on, calls for, or decisions on, enforcement. In that situation the law of
the resolution would apply to selected commodities, while neutrality rules would
be in force as to other goods if armed conflict is involved. Thus far that situation
has not arisen. The classic case was Rhodesia (1965) which did not involve international armed conflict, and only selective enforcement as to one commodity, petroleum. 895 As to commodities not stated in a selective Council decision, neutrality
principles would apply. If Article 42 measures approve use of force for some circumstances but not for others, and use of force is appropriate in those other circumstances, the law of neutrality will apply in those circumstances. 896 For
example, if the Council decides on an air-land campaign against an aggressor, with
no decision on maritime aspects of the crisis, the maritime law of neutrality applies
to maritime aspects of the situation to the extent that the Council decision's impact
does not overlap into maritime issues. An example might be air flights over the
seas. If an air-land related resolution is in force, it would apply to ocean overflights
to and from the affected State, except as to purely maritime-oriented flights, e.g.,
helicopter resupply from ship to ship.
The third point is the relative infrequency of application of mandatory Council
decisions. Of the hundreds of crises since 1945 that have involved a potential for
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armed conflict or actual conflict and which could be said to risk a "threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,,,897 mandatory Council decisions
have governed only a handful. 898 In terms of the potential for or actual warfare at
sea, six crises have produced Council decisions: Rhodesia (1965), the Gulf War
(1990-91), the disintegration of Yugoslavia (1991), Angola (1992), Liberia (1992)
and Haiti (1993).899 Even the Korean War evoked only Council calls or recommendations for action before the USSR vetoes, and thereafter General Assembly
recommendations under the UFP Resolution. 900 To be sure, some calls for action
and recommendations were well-supported,901 but they did not carry the force of
decisional law. When the Council approves other than decisions, resulting resolutions, although confessedly highly persuasive and authoritatively stated from political and policy perspectives, are nonetheless recommendatory as a matter oflaw.
In the latter case-the overwhelming bulk of resolutions the Council has voted to
date-there has been and will be full opportunity for the law of neutrality to operate. Widespread compliance with calls for action or recommendations could eventually mature into custom, but it is doubtful whether State practice under them
would be of sufficient duration,902 assuming States accept the action as law. (Sanctions practice against Iraq and the former Yugoslavia may be candidates for congealment into custom, however.) In any event, neutrality principles would exist
between the precipitating event, e.g., breach of the peace, and Council action. 903
Even if the Council decides on action, the enforcement mechanism has not been
the Military Staff Committee and special forces the Charter contemplates.904
Rather, it has often used an agency principle, choosing a State or group of States to
respond to the crisis, with one nation perhaps chosen for a leadership role-the
United States for Korea, the United Kingdom for Rhodesia, and a coalition for the
1990-91 GulfWar. 90S In these situations agent State(s) might be involved in enforcing the law of neutrality, even though there are overarching Council resolutions. Such was the case for Korea, where the US-declared blockade involved
observing neutral vessel rights to visit nearby USSR ports and a right of USSR warships to proceed to North Korean ports. 906 In recently-ordered embargo operations, the Council has not designated a leader, resulting in confusion.907
The Security Council's Tanker War resolutions fell into the first and third categories ofexceptions, i.e., no State including the belligerents was obligated to obey a
Council resolution, except through calls for action, demands, or recommendations. Thus the principles of neutrality had full potential play for that war. Other
conflicts, particularly the ongoing situation that began with the Gulf War of
1990-91 and disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, demonstrate that gaps in
Council decisions, or its methodology of taking action, leave copious opportunities for applying neutrality principles. These principles may well not be the same
as those before the Charter era, since actions in individual and collective selfdefense must be factored in, but neutrality as a concept continues to exist.
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Moreover, the Council appears to have approved sub silentio the concepts of neutrality and perhaps nonbelligerency as well. International agreements concluded
since 1945, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the most widely accepted
multilateral treaties of any,908 have continued to use the terms "neutral" and, more
rarely, "nonbelligerent.,,909 These conventions were cited by the Council during
the Tanker War, and again during the 1990-91 GulfWar. 910 The Council referred
to "states not party to the hostilities" in Tanker War Resolution 552.911 Furthermore, there is nothing in practice under the Charter to indicate that earlier conventions dealing with neutrality are invalid under the Charter. 912 To the extent
that earlier treaties have crystallized into custom,913 they exist in that mode as a
valid source oflaw. 914

3. Appraisal o/Neutrality in the Charter Era
Undeniably neutrality as a general concept has as much vitality today as in the
pre-Charter era. The claim, that there is a customary right to assert an intermediate
status of nonbelligerency between traditional neutrality and belligerency, may
have been strengthened since 1945. The precedents in some cases are almost identical with those in the last two centuries. Even if nonbelligerency cannnot be asserted as a customary norm, the overlay of principles of retorsion, reprisals not
involving use of force, and state of necessity, apply to support actions at variance
with a practice of strict neutrality in the traditional sense. Because of options under the Charter for nonbinding resolutions by the Security Council and perforce
the General Assembly, the potential for exceptions even with a binding Council
decision, and the relative scarcity of Article 25/48 Council decisions, the opportunity for claims of neutrality-perhaps modified by the new nonbelligerency of the
Charter era-remains large. "Far from being moribund, these traditional rights
[of neutrality and self-defense] apply logically in conditions oflimited wars"-the
type of conflicts that have beset the planet since 1945-"even more rigorously than
in conditions of total war.',91S
Part D. Sources of the Law, Principles of the Law of Treaties and
Treaty Succession
This Chapter has integrated Charter interpretation principles, notably the supremacy of the Charter over treaties,916 the problem of custom or general principles oflaw contrary to the Charter,917 and the possibility that parts of the Charter
may restate jus cogens norms, however that concept may be defined. 918 This Part
examines principles of the law of treaties and treaty succession, with a closer review of the effect of war on treaties generally, and the relationship between the
LOS Convention and the law of armed conflict.
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1. Principles of the Law of Treaties and Treaty Succession
Principles of treaty interpretation,919 treaty succession,920 and acquiescence in
or objection to custom 921 have been noted. The possibility of coercion, e.g., threat
oruse offorce contrary to Article 2(4) of the Charter, to which might be added various forms of error or corruption,922 has been cited.923 (If a treaty is negotiated in
connection with a State's aggression in violation of the Charter, i.e., an armistice or
surrender by the aggressor, coercion principles do not apply.924 Economic coercion, e.g. sanctions imposed as nonforce reprisal or retorsion, does not invalidate a
treaty either. 925 If the Security Council decides on sanctions, or calls for them,
Charter law also trumps a target State's economic coercion claims.)926
Other assertions of the inapplicability of treaties can arise because of claims of
material breach,927 impossibility ofperformance,928 or fundamental change of circumstances.929 Desuetude 930 and state of necessity 931 may vitiate a treaty. In the
view of some, unequal treaties 932 can also negate a treaty's effectiveness.
A treaty may be subject to severability. Part ofit may remain in force, part may
be suspended, part may be terminated, all may be suspended, or all may be terminated, depending on the nature of the treaty's terms. 933
Against these must be balanced the principle of pacta sunt servanda-treaties
should be observed. 934 Moreover, even though a treaty may not be in force, perhaps because a State is not a party to it, it may restate a customary rule or a general
principle oflaw.935 These analyses must be considered in addition to the factoral
approach for sources oflaw. 936 Whether these doctrines, e.g., fundamental change
of circumstances, apply to a given situation, is determined in the United States by
the executive and not the courts. 937 In general, a military commander should refer
these matters to an operational law specialist, who can check with higher authority; however, commanders should be aware of these doctrines' implications.
2. War and Termination or Suspension of Treaty Obligations
The Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties takes no position on the effect of
war on treaties;938 the issue is left to customary rules. 939 War might possibly raise a
claim of fundamental change of circumstances,940 or perhaps other bases, e.g., impossibility of performance.
Treaties establishing an international organization, such as the United Nations, are not affected by conflicts of the parties.941 States may suspend a treaty's
operation when they exercise the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter.942 If complying with a Council resolution
dealing with action on threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression conflicts with a treaty or a treaty requirement, States may suspend or end the
treaty's operation to the extent treaty performance is incompatible with the resolution. 943 The Institut de Droit International has stated that an aggressor shall not
terminate or suspend operation of a treaty if it would benefit thereby.944
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There is no general rule as to when or which treaties continue in operation during armed conflict.945 A treaty may be subject to severability in this context, i.e., all
of it may remain in force, part may be suspended, part may be terminated, all may
be suspended, or all may be terminated. 946 Treaties may provide for continued operation during war; the Chicago Convention explicitly says so.947 Because of their
nature or purpose, some treaties are regarded as operative during armed conflict,
those governing humanitarian law or neutrality being prime examples. 948 In other
cases, e.g., the Treaty of Rome or NAFTA, a treaty may be suspended during armed
conflict or when a State's vital national interests are at stake. 949 A treaty may declare it does not apply during war. 950 As noted above, these principles may well be
subject to the Charter's clause paramountcy.951

3. The LOS Conventions and the Law ofArmed Conflict:
((Other Rules" Clauses 952
The 1958 and 1982 LOS Conventions 953 include clauses, sometimes overlooked in analysis or commentary, stating the rights under these treaties are subject to "other rules of international law,,954 as well as terms in the particular
convention. For example, LOS Convention, Article 87(1), which declares high
seas freedoms, adds that "Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of international law." The
overwhelming majority ofcommentators-including the International Law Commission, a UN General Assembly agency of international law experts 955-has
stated that the Conventions' other rules clauses refer to the law of armed conflict,956 a component of which is the law of naval warfare. Provisions such as Article 88 of the 1982 Convention state a truism, i.e., the high seas are reserved for
peaceful purposes.957 However, high seas usage can be subject to the LOAC, when
Article 87(1)'s other rules clause is read with Article 88. As in the case of the 1958
Conventions,
That provision does not preclude ... use of the high seas by naval forces. Theiruse
for aggressive purposes, which would ... violat[ e] ... Article 2(4) ofthe Charter ... , is
forbidden as well by Article 88 [of the 1982 Convention]. See also LOS Convention,
Article 301, requiring parties, in exercising their rights and p[er]forming their duties
under the Convention, to refrain from any threat or use offorce in violation of the
Charter.958
This analysis is buttressed by the Charter's trumping clause; no treaty, including
the LOS conventions, can supersede the Charter. 959 The peaceful purposes language in Article 88 and other Convention provisions cannot override Charter
norms, such as those in Article 2(4), but also those in Article 51, i.e., the inherent
right of individual and collective self-defense.960 Of course, naval forces of States
not involved in armed conflict may use the oceans for military purposes, although
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these forces may be restricted in some maritime zones, e.g., the territorial sea.961
The other rules clauses in the LOS conventions come into force for States engaged
in armed conflict.
To the extent that the LOS conventions recite customary norms-and such is
the case for the High Seas Convention 962 and the LOS Convention's navigational
articles 963-the other rules clauses are part ofcustom and are therefore in force for
countries not party to one orthe other of the Conventions. For those States party to
the 1958 Conventions or LOS Convention, the customary status of the other rules
clause is doubly in force. 964 The LOS conventions may inform, i.e., give content to
gaps in the LOAC, much as the law of self-defense may be informed by the LOAC.
The law of the sea also can inform the content of Charter law, e.g., Security Council
resolutions. 965
The conclusion is inescapable that the 1958 Conventions' other rules clauses,
carried forward into the 1982 Convention, means that these treaties' terms are subject to the law of armed conflict, of which the law of naval warfare is a part. Since
the High Seas Convention, parts of the other 1958 Conventions and the 1982 Convention's navigational articles are part of customary law,966 the other rules clause
is also part of customary law governing oceans law during armed conflict. Moreover, the other rules clauses can also inform, i.e., give content to, Charter law, e.g.,
Council resolutions and the law of self-defense. 967

Part E. Conclusions
The UN Charter has been invoked in many armed conflicts since the Charter
was signed in 1945. In some ways this has changed options available to States. Under the majority view, a State cannot use reprisals involving use of force during
time of peace. 968 The doctrine of necessity, i.e., a State may take what action it
deems necessary for self-preservation, may be of questionable validity today.969
Article 103 of the Charter declares that all treaties are subject to it; whether customary law is equally subject to the Charter is open to question. 970 The Charter
condemns armed attacks and aggression, and Article 51 permits self-defense
against armed attacks and aggression armee, in the French text. 971 This permits responses for attacks on merchant ships at sea, including those sailing independently, as most do. 972 The Charter also permits the Security Council to make
binding decisions that have the force of treaty law for UN Members. 973 The Council and the General Assembly may also call upon States for action, or recommend
it; these resolutions have no intrinsic force but may restate law, and practice under
them may develop into custom.974
Article 51 preserves the inherent right ofindividual and collective self-defense;
these options have the same content and scope today as they did before World War
11. 975 States may respond in individual or collective anticipatory self-defense, so
long as the response is necessary, proportional and admitting of no other option, as
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perceived by the decisionmaker at the time of response. 976 States may also react,
individually or collectively, in self-defense to attack or aggression, i.e., after the attack or aggression has occurred, so long as the response is necessary and proportional. 977 States also may respond with retorsions, i.e., action that is unfriendly but
lawful, or they may reply with reprisals not involving use of force. 978 Rather than
requesting Security Council action, States may also employ regional organizations
to maintain international peace and security.979
Besides Charter standards, an independent, customary norm of the right to
self-defense exists alongside Article 51. 980 The right to self-defense may havejus
cogens status today.981 Collective self-defense may be asserted through bilateral or
multilateral treaties, but nothing in the Charter forbids more informal arrangements. 982 If Article 51 supersedes, through Article 103, treaty norms, e.g. those in
the law of armed conflict, any Article 51 response should receive its content from
the LOAC. 983 By parity of reasoning, any self-defense claims based on custom and
not on Article 51 as part of a treaty, i.e., the UN Charter, should also receive their
content based on the LOAC.984
Besides the appealing symmetry oflogic behind this approach, there are practical policy reasons for following law of armed conflict standards in any self-defense
claim. These are illustrated by the Tanker War.
First, both Iran and Iraq claimed the other was guilty of aggression and that
therefore the response was in self-defense. Even today, despite the opinion of some
States through their reactions that Iran was the aggressor, the issue remains unresolved, and may remain unresolved for a long time. However, the peripheral legal
consequences flowing from the initial acts by these States in 1980-e.g., attacks on
merchant ships-had impact on third States, who had only one known standard to
observe, i.e., the LOAC. Ultimately, only one State, Iran or Iraq, was guilty of aggression, and only one State, Iran or Iraq, could legitimately claim self-defense.
The aggressor was bound by LOAC standards. 985 Since the issue was and is in
doubt, the only standard for measuring self-defense was the LOAC. This was how
the United States behaved with respect to destruction ofIranAjr and the oil platforms and in convoy operations. The IranAjr crew was repatriated, following humanitarian law standards; oil platforms occupants were warned and given an
opportunity to leave, parallelling Hague IX.986
Second, this approach is congruent with the longstanding rule, in place long before the Charter, that humanitarian law treaties or those governing neutrality remain in effect during war. 987 As a theoretical matter, given Charter supremacy
under Article 103, a State could act under Article 51 independently of these norms.
The Security Council held the view that these standards should be observed, regardless of who had a legitimate self-defense claim, in its resolutions condemning
attacks on civilian centers, merchant ships and in citing the Geneva Conventions
and the Geneva Gas Protocol.988 Any self-defense claim should be conditioned by
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LOAC standards and humanitarian law standards in particular, whether that
self-defense claim is based on Article 51 as treaty law or whether it is grounded in
custom. The policy, public relations and practical considerations are obvious; that
is what States and people expect today, regardless of the niceties oflegal analysis.
Third, observing LOAC treaty norms in the context of Article 51, treaty-based
self-defense claims is consistent with the policy ofpacta sunt servanda, itself a policy
of the Charter, Article 2(2).989
The law of neutrality remains in full force and vigor in the Charter era, albeit
perhaps conditioned by Charter law in given situations. For example, a Security
Council decision could alter traditional contraband rules. 990 Practice of States
since World War II calls to mind the historic claims for the intermediate state of
nonbelligerency, between neutrality and belligerency, although whether this has
ripened into custom is an open question. It could be said that this practice amounts
in some cases to informal collective self-defense, which is permitted under the
Charter. In other situations a debate remains as to whether international law recognizes an intermediate status between belligerency and neutrality. Most countries, including the United States, say that there is no intermediate stage of
non-belligerency.991
Charter considerations apart, decisionmakers must continue to take into account traditional principles of sources oflaw, treaty interpretation including the
impact of war, and treaty succession.992 The LOS conventions' other rules clauses
mean that the conventions are subject to the law of armed conflict. 993
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ILM 529 (1985) (OAS Charter); North Atlantic Treaty, n.II.437, art. 1,63 StaL 2242, 34 UNTS 244; Treaty on
Friendship, Co-operation & Mutual Assistance, May 14, 1955, arts. 3-4,219 UNTS 3, 28 (Warsaw Pact), abrogated by
Protocol,july 1, 1991; cf. ~OWMAN & HARRIS 196 (11th Cum. Supp. 1995). See also RUSSELL & MUTHER, n. 13,657-59.
Not all countries, including the United States, are party to the 1985 OAS Protocol. BOWMAN & HARRIS 177 (11 th Cum.
Supp. 1995). For an OAS Charter composite text, see 331LM 985 (1995).
48. GOODRICH Cl al. 42-43; see also nn.II.437-45 and accompanying te.,t.
49. S.C. Res. 479 (1980), in WELLENS 449 (calling on Iran, Iraq to refrain from any further use offorce and to settle
their dispute by peaceful means and in conformity with principles of justice and international law); see also, e.g., these
resolutions in the Arab-Israel conflicts, S.C. Res. 44 (1948), 344 (1973), 350 (1974), in id. 633, 682, 685; the
India-Pakistan conflicts, S.C. Res. 211,215 (1965), in id. 428,430; the Falklands-Malvinas war, S.C. Res. 502 (1982), in
Id. 594; Walker, Slalc Practice 133-38, 143-45, 153-54.
50. GOODRICH el al. 43.
51. UN Charter, art. 2(4), incorporating by reference id., arL 1. For analysis of Article 2(4)'s antecedents and the
drafting of Article 2(4), see BOWEIT, SELF-DEFENCE ch. 2; BROWNLIE, USE OF FORCE 3-116; GOODRICH el al. 44-45;
RUSSELt. & MUTHER,n.13, 110-12, 161-63,456-57,672-75; SIMMA 109-11; David K. Linnan,Self-Defense, Neccssityand
U.N. Colleclive Security: Uniled Slales and Olher Views, 1991 DUKEj. COMPo & INTI. L. 57, 58-68.
52. BOWEIT, SELF-DEFENCE 31-32; BROWNLIE, USE OF FORCE 113; GOODRICHel al. 45-46; McDOUGAL & FELICIANO
232-41; STONE 262-63; Gamal Moursi Badr, The Exculpalory Effect ofSelf-Defense in Slale Responsibility, 10 GA. J. INrt.
& COMPo L.l, 10-14(1980); Linnan,Self-Defense, n. 51,68-69; Claude Humphrey Meredith Waldock, TheRegulalionof
Force by Individual Slales in Internalional Law, 81 RCAD1496-99 (1952). See also Addendum 10 Ihe Eighlh Report on Slate
Responsibil,ty, UN Doc. NCN.4/318/ADD. 5-7, in 2(1) Y.B. INrI. L. CO.'IM'N 13, 51-70 (1980), collecting other
commentators' views.

53. See nn. 158-630 and accompanying te.,t.
54. BowcTr, SELF-DEFENCE 29; BROWNLIE, USE OF FORCE 113; PHlLlPC. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 135,
168 (1956); McNhlR 216-18; Grigorii I. Tunkin, Co-Exislence and International Law, 95 RCADI 1,63-66 (1959).
Nicaragua Case, 1986 ICJ 98-102, might be consuued to go further, i.e., to elevate it to jus cogens status, as Tunkin,
Inlernallonal Law In lhe Imernational Syslem, 147 RCADI 98 (1975) seems to do.
55. GOODRtCH el al. 48-49 present the issue.
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56. BOWElT, SELF·DEFENCE ch. 6 (discounting including "economic aggression" within the definition);
GOODRICHel al. 48; ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLmCAL ORGANS OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 176 (1963); McDoUGAL & FELICIANO 193-96.

57. E.g., OAS Charter, n. 47,arts.16-17,2 UST2394, 119 UNTS 56,asamended byProtocol,n.47,arL 5,21 UST
622 (separate provisions denouncing economic or political coercion and condemning forcible occupation of
territory).
58. ELIAS, n.l 0,170-76; SINCLAIR 177-81; Richard D. Kearney & Robert E. Dalton, The Trealyon Trealies, 64 AJIL
495,532-35 (1970); bulsee LUNG-FONGCHEN, STATE SUCCESSION RELATING TO UNEQUAL TREATIES 42-49 (1974) (arguing
for including economic or political pressure as grounds for treaty invalidiry). Some States have tried to reinsert
economic coercion by reservation or declaration; this has been opposed vigorously. SINCLAIR 65-68.
59. Compare Vienna Convention, art. 52, with Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties Between States &
International Organizations, Mar. 20, 1986, art. 52,25 ILM 543, 572 (1986) (voiding treaties procured by force or
threat offorce in violation ofthe Charter's international law principles). The latter treaty is not in force bu t may restate
customary law in some respects. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 11-13; 1 OPPENHEIM §§ 9 at 28, 10 at 33.

60. GOODRICH el al. 49-50; McDOUGAL & FELICIANO 194-95 nn.165-69.
61. See n. 69 and accompanying text; Jordan J. Paust & Albert Blaustein, The Arab Oil Weapon-A Threat to

Inlernational Peace, 68 AJIL 410 (1974) seem to have a contrary view.
62. Definition of Aggression, 13 ILM 710 (1974); see also 2 BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL
AGGRESSION 1-53 (1976); RlFAAT, n. 23, ch.15; STONE, CONFLICT, n. 23; BengrBroms, The Definition ofAggression, 154
RCADI 299, 315-87 (1978).
63. Charter of Economic Rights & Duties, G.A. Res. 3281 (1974), in 69 AJIL 484 (1974) (also referred to as New
International Economic Order or NIEO).
64. President Harry S. Truman, U.S. Participation in the U.N.: Report to Congress for the Year 1950, at 107
(1950), in 5 WHtTEMAN 740. See also GOODRICH el al. 44-45; 298-99, citing RUSSELL & MUTHER, n. 13,670-72.
65. Compare Definition of Aggression, n. 62, arL 1, 13 ILM 712, wilh UN Charter, arL 2(4). "State" includes
groups of States and is used without prejudice to recognition issues or whether a State is a UN Member. Explanalcny
Note, 13 ILM 713.

66. Definition of AggreSSion, n. 62, arL 2, 13 ILM 713.

67. la., arL 3, 13 ILM 713-14.
68. /d., arL 4, 13 ILM 714.

69. la., arL 5(1), 13 ILM 714. Id., arL 7, 13 ILM at 714, says nothing in the Definition prejudices the right to
self-determination, freedom and independence in the Friendly Relations Declaration. The latter does state, in/eralia:
"No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State ••.
to obtain from it the subordination ofthe exercise ofits sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages ofany kind."
Friendly Relations Declaration, 9 ILM 1295 (1970). Although id. 113,9 ILM 1297, declares that "The principles of the
Charter ••• embodied in this Declaration constitute basic principles of international law ••. ," whether economic
coercion is a Charter principle is open to question particularly when it had been rejected by the Vienna Convention
negotiators and by subsequent practice under that Convention. See n. 59 and accompanying texL Law-stating
resolutions,e.g., Friendly Relations, are no more than evidence of a source ofinternational law. Assembly resolutions
are not binding in and of themselves. UN Charter, arts. 10-11, 14; BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 14, 698-99;
GOODRICH el al. 125-27, 144; 1 OPPENHEIM § 16; REsrATEMENT (THIRD) § 103(2Xd) & r.n.2; StMMA 236-40.
70. Compare NIEO, n. 63, art. 32, 69 AJIL 493, wilh Friendly Relations Declaration, 9 ILM 1295.
71. Texas Overseas Petrol. v. Libyan Arab Repub., 17 ILM 1,28-31 (Arb. 1978).

72. See n. 60 and accompanying text.
73. Charter practice supports either argumenL HtGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT, n. 56,207-08.
74. Corfu Channel (UK v. Alb.), 1949 ICJ 3, 36.
75. S.C. Res. 242 (1967), in WELLENS 669; see also Walker, Slale Practice 133-38.
76. S.C. Res. 540 (1983), in WELLENS 451; S.C. Res. 552 (1984), in WELLENS 473 (also calling on States to respect
territorial integrity of States not party to conflict); see also nn. II.216-18, 250-59 and accompanying text.
77. S.C. Res. 221, 11114-5 (1966), in WELLENS 127; see also Walker, Slale Practice 142-43.
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78. Definition of Aggression, n. 62, arts. 1,3,13 ILM 713-14, is largely concerned with aggression against land
territory, but the catchall art. 4, id. at 714, covers floating territorial jurisdiction situations. For discussion of the
"floating territorial" principle, see REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 402, cmL h & r.n.4; 502(2), cmt. d & r.n.3.

79. See n. 20 and accompanying texL
80. Set nn. 96-97 and accompanying te.XL
81. UN Charter, art. 51, 59 StaL 1031,1076. (English, French language versions; emphasis added).

82. See nn. 207-88 and accompanying texL
83. Sohn, The lnternarional Court, n. 11,872-73. Linnan, Self-Defense, n. 51,69 n.56, characterizes the language
variance as "slightly differenL" Aggression can connote actions that do not involve force or the threat of the use of
force, while "armed attack" has only one meaning.
84. UN Charter, arL HI.
85. GOODRICH er al. 651; SU.IMA 32-33, 1197-98 differs from this position.
86. GOODRICH er 01. 343.
87. Linnan, Self-Defense, n. 51, 79·84; bur see SIM]'IA 30. The Convention can only be a guide, since it does not
apply to treaties, i.e., the Charter, ratified before the Convention went into force. Vienna Convention, arL 4. The same
is true for Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties Between States & International Organizations, n. 59, art. 4, 25 ILM
548.
88. Vienna Convention, arts. 31-32.
89. SINCLAIR H4-15, listing three schools ofthoughL
90. Jimenez de Arechaga, n. 10,42.

91. E.g., MyRES S. McDOUGAL er 01., INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1967); bur see
Gerald Fitzmaurice, Vae Vicris, or Woe ro rke Negoriarors, 65 AJIL 358 (1971). SIMMA 35 says that "The interests and
intentions of the founders remain secondary. Instead, the organizational purpose and the interests of the actual
members gain the constitutive and decisive legal power and are the primary means for the solution of textual
divergences."
92. Jimenez de Arechaga, n. 10,43.

93. ld. 43-44.
94. See nn. 207·88 and accompanying texL
95. Vienna Convention, arts. 31(3)(b), 31(3)(c).
96. Nicaragua Case, 1986 ICJ 102·03.

97. Compare UN Charter, arL 1(1),59 StaL 1068, wirh id., art. 51, 59 Stat. 1076 (French version).
98. "State" can mean a group of States and States that are not UN Members. Definition of Aggression, n. 62 arL 1
& explan. note,13 ILM 713. For analysis of the Resolution, see general(y DINSTEIN ch. 5; 1-2 FERENCZ,DEFINING,n. 62;
RtFMT, n. 23; STONE, CoNFLlCf, n. 23; Broms, The Dejinirion, n. 62, 299.
99. Some Nuremberg judgments characterized the threat offorce as an act ofaggression. 2 FERENCZ, n. 62, 27-30,
citing inrer alia Case H, United States v. von Weizsaeker (Ministries Case), 14 Tr. War Crimes Before Nuremberg
Milit. Trib. Under Control Council L. No. 10, at 314, 332; Broms, The Dejinirion, n. 62, 341-44.
100. Definition ofAggression, n. 62, arL 2, 13 ILM 713; see also 2 FERENcz,n. 62, 31-33; Broms, TheDejinirion, n. 62,
344-47 (prima facie culpability rule a compromise).
101. Definition of Aggression, n. 62, arL 3,13 ILM at 713. Some reprinted versions of arL 3 omit art. 3(d); compare

id. wirh versions in 69 AJIL 482 (1975) and RtFMT, n. 23, 324; see also n. 23 and accompanying text.
102. Nicaragua Case,1986 ICJ 103, citing Definition of Aggression, art. 3(g), 13 ILM 713; DINSTEIN 130 (citing no
authority but saying arL 3 is codified custom); Broms, TheDejinirion, n. 62, 385-88, writing earlier, did not say Article 3
restates custom. Broms chaired the UN committee that drafted the Definition. 2 FERENCZ, n. 62, 50-53, does not
suggest that Article 3 has passed into customary law. Definition critics argue that it does not state custom. See, e.g.,
STONE, CoNFLlCf, n. 23, ch. 9. Draft Code of Crimes Against Peace and Security of Mankind, art. 12, adopted
Definition principles in 1988, butReport ofrkelnrernarionalLaw Commission on rhe Work ofiEs FortierhSession, UN Doc.
N43/l0 (1988), in 1988 Y.B. INrLL. CO]'IM'N 1,71-73(1990), saysinreralia that Article 3 was "an instrument intended
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to serve as a guide" to the Security CounciL There was no agreement on what might be included in a penal code. It may
be, therefore, that Dinstein may be wide of the mark in including all of Definition, arL 3, as custom. ;'.lany provisions
undoubtedly are. For commentary on the Nicaragua Case and its impact On the LOAC, see W. MtCHAEL REtS~L\N &
JAMES E. BAKER, REGULATING CoVERT ACfION 78-98 (1992).
103. Definition ofAggression, n. 62, art. 4,13 ILM 714. DINSTEIN 19S-96 notes use of "armed attack" in the Hostage
Case, n. Il.12, 1980 ICJ 29, 42; see also Nicaragua Case, 1986 ill. 292 (Schwebel, J., dissenting). Unless the language,
"invasion or attack ... of the territory of another State, or any military occupation," in Definition of Aggression, arL
3(a), 13 ILM 713, or the e."{pression in id., art. 3(d), 13 ILM 713, concerning "attack ... on the land ... forces ... of
another State" (US Marines were among the US nationals held) includes this situation, assault on the US embassy, was
a nonenumerated act of aggression contemplated by ill., arL 4, 13 ILM 714. R1FAAT, n. 23, 267, doubts whether the
Council, charged by the Definition with defining acts of aggression, could denounce acts not involving use of force
under the Definition, since Art. 1 is restricted to acts involving the use of force. It is submitted that the Council may
also act on situations not involving use offorce that are threats to the peace or breaches of the peace under the Charter.
See UN Charter, arts. 2S, 31-42,48, SO, 103; STONE, CONFLICf, n. 23,144;see also nn.10,651-62 and accompanying text.
104. The drafters meant to include this at Japan's insistence. Broms, The Definition, n. 62, 350-51, 365.
105. However, unless they have surrendered, enemy warships may be attacked on the high seas and in territorial
waters oftheir flag State, belligerent allies or the enemy. See Definition ofAggression, arL 3(d), 13 ILM 713 ("attack ...
on the ... sea ... forces"), supporting the view that neutral warships may not be attacked in territorial waters; see also
Parts IV.B.1, IV.B.4, IV.CA, IV.D.1, IV.D.3, IV.D.5, V.C.l, V.J.3, which inter alia recite the principle that a neutral
warship has a right of self-defense if attacked in neutral waters or on the high seas.
106. However, unless they have surrendered, enemy warships may be attacked on the high seas and in territorial
waters of their flag State, belligerent allies or the enemy. See Parts IV.B.1, IV.B.4, IV.CA, IV.D.l, IV.D.3, IV.D.5,
V.C.1, V.J.3, which inter alia recite the principle that a neutral warship has a right of self-defense if attacked in neutral
waters or on the high seas.
107. DINSTEIN 197-98, citing Broms, 17ze Definition, n. 62, 351.
108. DINSTEIN 198, citing W.J. Fenrick, Legal limits on the Use of Force by Canadian IV'arships Engag..d in Lau.
Enforcement, 18 CYBIL 113, 125-45 (1980). Dinstein adds that a US self-defense claim in the Mayaguez seizure was
misplaced, citingJ ordanJ. Paus£, The Seizure and Recuveryofthe Mayaguez, 85 YALE L.J. 774, 791, 800 (1976). But sec n.
137 and accompanying text..
109. Compare DIN STEIN 197-98 with Broms, 17ze Definition, n. 62, 3S0-51, 36S.
110. R1FAAT, n. 23, 272; STONE, CONFLlCf, n. 23, 166;seealso LOS Convention, art. 111; High Seas Convention, arL
23; 1 BROWN 135-38,258-59; 3 Nordquist 1111 111.1-111.9(i); 2 O'CoNNELL, LAw OHHE SEA 1075-93 (hot pursuit).
111. UN GAOR, 6th Comm., 1477th mtg., UN Doc. A.C.G.SR.1477, at 71 (1974) (remarks of Mr. Steel, UK
delegate); see also STONE, CONFLICf, n. 23, 117.
112. Compare DINSTEIN 198; Paust, n. 108,795,800, asserting US self-defense measures after Mayaguez's seizure
were not justified. DINSTEIN 184 seems to contradict himself by saying, "At times, an armed attack {i.e., an act of
aggression] occurs beyond the boundaries ofall States [as when a] ... battleship sinks a vessel [type unspecified] on the
high seas."In 1965 Burundi characterized unjustified boardingandseizingofshipsasaggression. UN Doc. NAG.914,
at3 (1965), cited in BENGT BROMS. THEDEANITION OF AGGRESSION IN THE UNITED NATIONS 83 (1968).Scealso n. 108.
113. DINSTEIN 129; R1FAAT, n. 23, 270.
114. Besides liners, which are protected under customary law, so long as they are not carrying warfighting or
war-sustaining goods or persons, e.g., troops, these classes ofmerchant ships, even ifflying an enemy flag, are likewise
protected: hospital ships; small craft used for coastal rescue operations and other medical transports; cartel ships;
vessels on humanitarian missions; ships carrying cultural property under special protection; scientific research or
environmental protection vessels; coastal traders; coastal fishing ships; vessels designed or adapted exclusively for
response to pollution incidents in the marine environment; ships that have surrendered; life rafts and life boats. They
may lose protection if not used in their normal role, do not submit to identification and inspection when required,
intentionally hamper combatant movements or do not obey orders to stop or move out of the way when required.
NWP I-14M Annotated 11 8.2.3; NWP 9A Annotated 11 8.2.3; SAN REMOMANUAL 1111 47-48; see also Parts V.B.1, V.C.1,
V.J.2, V.J.3.
115. For an example of how worldwide communications route and reroute merchant ships as they sail
independently,see Dominant Navig. Ltd. v. Alpine Shipping Co., 1982 AMC 1241 (Bauer, Arnold & Berg, arbs.).
116. Definition of Aggression, n. 62, arts. 2,4,13 ILM 713-14.
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117. Id., arts. 2, 3(c), 13 ILM 713.
118. NWP I-14M Annotated 11117.7.4, 7.10; NWP 9A Annotated 11117.7.4,7.9; SANREMoMANUAL 1111146(1), 151.
119. For analysis of blockade, see Parts V.E., V.J.3.
120. Definition of Aggression, n. 62, arL 4, 13 ILM 714.

121. E.g., Convention for Definition ofAggression, July 3, 1933,arL2(3), 147 LNTS 67, 71-73 ("the aggressor in an
international conflict shall ••. be ••• the first to .•. attack ••• the ••• vessels or aircraft of another State"), which Iran
ratified; Convention for Definition of Aggression, July 4, 1933, an. 2(3), 148 id. 211,215 (same); Convention for
Definition of Aggression, July 5, 1933, Lith.-USSR, art. 2(3), 148 id. 79,83 (same); Balkan Entente, Feb. 9, 1934,
Protocol-Anne;", 153id. 153, 157;seealso BROMS, THEDEFINmoN,n.112,26-27; RIFAAT, n. 23,91-93; ANN VAN WYNEN
THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, THE CONCEPT OF AGGRESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 19-20 (1972); Broms, TheDejinition, n.
62,312-14.
122. See, e.g., Treaty of Non-Aggression & Pacific SettlememofDisputes,Jan. 21,1932, Fin.-USSR, arL 1(2), 157
LNTS 393,396·97 (general policy statement). League of Nations Covenant, art. 10, denounced aggression generally
without defining it, as does Saavedra Lamas Treaty, Oct. 10, 1933,49 Stat. 3363, 3375, 163 LNTS 393,405; see also
BROMS, THEDEFINlTION, n.112, 23-25; RIFAAT, n. 23,91-93; Broms, The Dejinition, n. 62, 312-14, for analysis of these
and similar agreements.
123. Compare Saadabad Pact, July 8, 1937, arL 4, 190 LNTS 21, 25 ("The following shall be deemed acts of
aggression: ••• attack ••• on ••• vessels or aircraft of another State"), to which Iran and Iraq were original parties, with
Convention for Definition of Aggression, July 3, 1933, arL 2(3), 0.107, to which Iran was an original party; see also
BROMS, THEDEFINmON, n.112, 27; RIFAAT, n. 23, 91-92, 94-95.
124. STONE 34, quoting 5 League of Nations Records of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of
Armaments, Ser. D, at 31 (1933); compare Definition of Aggression, n. 62, ans. 3-4, 13 ILM 713-14. The 1933 USSR
proposal was reintroduced during the UN study and is part of the Definition of Aggression preparatory works.
McDOUGAL & FELICIANO 144, 168; STONE 46-47,111, 115; STONE, CoNFLICT, n. 23,passim; THOMAS & THOMAS, THE
CONCEPT, n. 121,34.
125. Vienna Convention, arL 31(1); REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 325(1) & cmts. a, b; SINCLAtR 119-26.

126. See generally A.N. Yiannopoulos, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Arrest ofState-Owned Ships: Needfor an
Admiralty Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 57 TULANE L. REv. 1274, 1286, 1289-90 (1983).
127. Letter of US Department of State Acting Legal Adviser Jack B. Tate to Acting Attorney General Philip B.
Perlman, May 19, 1952,26 Bulletin 984, 985 (1952) (Tate Letter).

128. Id•• In 1920 the US Congress passed the Suits in Admiralry Act, 46 USC §§ 741-52 (1994), allowing suits
against the government for claims arising out of US owned or operated commercial vessels; the Public Vessels Act, id.
§§ 781-90 (1994), allowing claims for damage done by Navy or Coast Guard ships,followed in 1925. Congress enacted
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,28 id. §§ 1330, 1332{a), 1391(1), 1441(d), 1602-11 (1994), declaring immunities
offoreign government-owned ships and superseding case law and the Tate Letter, in 1976; the Act has been amended
since then. See generally SCHOENBAUM §§ 17-1,17-3.
129. Sce n. 115 and accompanying te.xt.
130. Harvard Draft Convention on Aggression, 33 AJIL SUPP. 819, 827 n.l (1939).

131. Id., arL l(c), 33 AJIL SUPP. 827 (defining aggression without elaborating examples); id., arL l(h), 33 AJIL
SUPP. 827 (defining vessel to include aircraft). Although the Comment to arL l{h) is unenlightening, arL l{cl's citing
of some of the agreements, nn. 121-22, shows the Harvard drafters were aware of the distinction and chose a broad
"vessel" definition to include merchantmen. Draft Convention internal evidence supports this view. See, e.g., aIL 2,
Comment, 33 AJIL SUPP. 886 ("hostility" to warships); arL 3, Comment, id. 886-87 ("warship" capture of "vessel");
arL 10, Comment, id. 902 (capture of "ship," further reference to "battleships").
132. Act ofChapultepec, Mar. 6, 1945, Part 1(3), 60 Stat. 1831, 1839; Rio Treaty, n.47, arL 9, 62 id. 1702,21 UNTS
99; but sce, c.g., Treaty of Brotherhood & Alliance, Apr. 14, 1947, Iraq-Transjordan, arL 5,23 UNTS 147,156-58,
appearing to take the prewar USSR position; see also nn. 121-22 and accompanying te.XL

133. Sce nn. 121-23 and accompanying texL
134. Vienna Convention, arts. 34-38; BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW H-15, 622-25; 1 OPPENHElM §§ 10, at28; H,
al 32-36; 583; 589; 626-27; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 102(3) & cmts. f, i; 324; SINCLAIR 98-106.
135. Walker, State Practice 137.
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136. O'CoNNELL, INFLUENCE OF LAW 86-87, 87-86; 2 O'CoNNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 1099.
137. 1975 DIGEST 13-15, 423-26, 766, 777-83, 879-86; Thomas E. Behuniak, The Sei....ure and Recrroery of the s.s.
Mayague....:A LegalAnalysis ofUnited States Claims, 82 MIL. L. REv. 41 (1978),83 id. 59 (1979); Christopher Greenwood,
Comments in DEKKER & POST 212, 214; Eleanor McDowell, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 69 AJIL 861-63, 874-79 (1975); U.s. Recrroers Merchant Ship Seized by Cambodian Navy, 72 Bulletin
719 (1975); Walker, State Practice 146. Greenwood 214, analogizes The Red Crusader (Den. v. UK), 35 ILR 485
(Comm'n of Enquiry, 1982) in the same category as the Mayague...- seizure. The Crusader case facts are different,
however, in that the UK flag trawler was fired on,hitand visited, and crewmen were detained briefly,on grounds ofits
fishing on the Danish side of a Denmark-UK treaty line, for which Denmark conceded liability. Denmark withdrew
charges of interference by H.M.S. Troubridge in the Danish warship's returning Crusader crew to their trawler; the
Commission ofEnquiry found that the Royal Navy made every effort to avoid recourse to violence between the Danish
ship and the trawler, such "attitude and conduct [being] impeccable." 35 ILR 500. There was no self-defense claim,
but as Greenwood notes, the incident is some evidence to support a view that States may use force to defend individual
merchantmen-even single small fishing ships-flying their flag.
138. US interests beneficially owned Hercules, a tanker. The Supreme Court ofthe United States reversed Amerada

Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 423-24 (2d Cir. 1987) on sovereign immunity grounds. 488
US 428 (1989). See also Walker, State Practice 153-55. Although cases have secondary source or evidentiary status for
deriving international law, they can restate or reinforce customary norms. ICJ Statute, arts. 38(1), 59; BROWNLIE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 19-24; 1 OPPENHEIM § 13; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 103.
139. Richard R. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RCADI 25, 99-101 (1970).
140. ICJ Statute, art. 38(1); BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 24-25; 1 OPPENHEIM 1114; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 11103.
141. STONE 34, quoting 5 League of Nations, n. 124; see also n. 122 and accompanying text.
142. STONE 211, quoting draft Act Relating to the Definition of the Aggressor, 1933.

143. See nn. 130-31 and accompanying text.
144. BowETT, SELF-DEFENCE, ch. 11; BROWNLIE, USE OF FORCE, chs. 19-22; McDOUGAL & FELICIANO 61·62, 143-216,
NICHOLAS NYIRI, THE UNITED NATIONS' SEARCH FOR A DEI-1NITION OF AGGRESSION (1989); THOMAS & THOMAS, THE
CONCEPT, n. 121; S.M. Schwebel,Aggression, Intervention and Self-Defence in Modern International Law, 136 RCADI 411
(1972) were concerned with broader policy perspectives and not narrow definitional issues.

145. Butsee DINSTEIN 197-98 citing inter alia Broms, TheDejinition, n. 62, 351; see also n. 95 and accompanyingtexL
146. E.g., THOMAS & THOMAS, n. 121, 15, recall that under the last century's defensive alliances, "any first attack
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312. See nn. 284-85 and accompanying text.
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315. See nn. 802-20 and accompanying te.xt.
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324. Lane C. Kendall, U.S. Merchant Shipping and Vietnam, in UHLIG, n. 321,482,491,499-500.
325. O'CoNNELL, THE INFLUENCE 110; Fenrick, Military Objective, n. II.202, 256.
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THE CONCEPT, n. 120,61-65; George Bunn, International Law and the Use ofForce in Peacetime: Do U.S. Ships H<n'c to
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Panel, n. II.84, 162; Tucker, The Interpretation, n. 189,29-30; see also Tucker, Reprisals and Self-Defense, 66 AJIL 586
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UN Charter, art. 42, lists blockade as an option the Security Council may choose if nonforce alternatives are
inadequate, an inference being that blockade is not open to UN Members unless in self-defense or with Council
approval. Blockade was consistently in the USSR drafts enumerating acts of aggression. JUUUS STONE, AGGRESSION
AND WORLD ORDER 34-35, 46-77 (1958); STONE, CONFLICT, n. 23, chs. 2-3.

373. Sce nn. 358-361 and accompanying te.XL
374. DIN STEIN 190, citing Joyner & Grimaldi, n. 11, 659-60.
375. DINSTEIN 190.

376. Id. 190-91. STONE, CoNFUCT, n. 23, 58, 199 n.3; Rosalyn Higgins, TheAttitude of Western States Toward Legal
Aspects ofthe Usc ofForce, in CASSESSE, n. 208,435,443, characterize Israel's action as anticipatory self-defense.
377. DINSTEIN 191; sce also BEN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPUED BY INTERNATIONAL CoURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 90 (1983); nn. 617-30 and accompanying te.xt.

378. Compare S.C. Res. 487 (1981), in WELLENS 441, with DINSTEIN 47,186-87_
379. See also nn. 242-43 and accompanying te.XL
380. Sec n. 243 and accompanying te.XL
381. Sec nn. 243, 248 and accompanying texL
382. Sec nn. 259-64 and accompanying te.XL
383. Sec nn. 11.338-41 and accompanying te.XL
384. The same is true for some missile attacks. Eilat sank after two waves of them, and Stark survived two Rxocet
missiles; Sheffield may have been lost more due to her construction than the missiles. See nn. 11.338-42, 111.243, 259-64.

385. Cj. Philip C. Jessup, Should International Law Recognize an Intermediate Status Between Peace and War?, 48
AJIL 98 (1954); Myres S. McDougal, Peace and War: Factual Continuum with Multiple Legal Consequences, 49 id. 63
(1955); See also James Russell Lowell, The Present Crisis (1844), in 1 JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL, POETICAL WORKS 185, 190
(1890).
386. Horace B. Robertson, Modern Technology and the Law ofArmed Conflict at Sea, in Robertson 362; Robertson,
New Technologies and Anned Conflicts at Sea, 14 SYRACUSEJ. IN1"L L. 699 (1988) argues persuasively that it is futile to
legislate weapons control through treaties because treaties will nearly always be irrelevant before the ink is dry.
387. Custom, although perhaps uncertain in parameters, has inherent flexibility and is likely to be a dominant
future source oflaw. W. Michael Reisman, The Cult ofCustom in theLate 20th Century, 17 CAl.. W. INT'L L.J.133 (1987);
see also THEODORMERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 3-10 (1989). The law of naval
warfare is mostly custom-based. SAN RaIO MANUAL 61-62. Moreover, custom is not subject to treaty rules of
construction,e.g., breach, fundamental change ofcircumstances, impossibility,ete. Sec nn. 927-29 and accompanying
te.xt.

388. See nn. 357-65 and accompanying te.XL
389. /d.
390. See nn. 485-96, 521-28 and accompanying text.
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391. US UN Acting Permanent Representative Herbert S. Okun letter to President of UN Security Council, Apr.
14, 1986, UN Doc S/18016/Rev. 1 (1986), quoted in 80 AJIL 632 (1986); Feature: U.S. Exercises Right ofSelf-Defense
Against Libyan Terrorism, 86 Bulletin 1-23 Gune 1986); Geoffrey M. Levitt, Intervention to Combat Terrorism and Drug
Trafficking, in DAMROSCH & SCHEFFER, n. 358, 224, 226-27, 230. Commentators differed on the legality of the strikes, as
they had on the Vietnam War. Mullerson & Scheffer, nn. 358,99.
392. Although specific events are cited, refer to Part I1.B for the full factual context.

393. See n. 11.88 and accompanying text.
394. S.C. Res. 479 (1980), in WELLENS 449; see also n. 11.96 and accompanying text.
395. UN Charter, arts. 25,48; see also n. 652 and accompanying text.
396. For analysis ofwar zones, defensive sea zones and similar ocean areas in terms ofarea, duration, notice, etc., see
Part V.F; see also nn. 11.89, 103-04, 109-10, 141-42, 199-201, 240, 255, 288, 301,411,420,447,520 and accompanying
text.
397. LOS Convention, art. 2; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 1; see also Parts IV.B.4 and V.D.3 for analysis in the
LOS context.

398. See n. 309 and accompanying text.
399. See nn. 11.21-27 and accompanying text.
400. See nn. 11.31, 111.309 and accompanying text.
401. Arab Joint Defence Treaty, n. 11.31, art. 2, 157 BFSP 669-70,49 AJIL SUPP. 51; see also nn. 309,400 and
accompanying text.
402. UN Charter, arts. 2(4),51; Definition ofAggression, art. 3(f), 13 ILM 714; no. 50-157 and accompanying text.

403. See nn. 591-616 and accompanying text.
404. See nn. 485-585 and accompanying text.

405. !d.
406. See nn. 11.21-27, 84,159-72,186-87,192,208-09, 218,248, 251-59,262-63,290-94, 315, 330,415,478, 508, 532,
543-45 and accompanying text.
407. See nn. 308-36 and accompanying text.
408. See n. II. 80 and accompanying text.
409. See nn. 308-36 and accompanying text.
410. See nn. 11.103, 201 and accompanying text.
411. Definition of Aggression, art. 3(d), 13 ILM 713; see also nn. 98-152 and accompanying text.
412. Definition of Aggression, art. 4, 13 lUi 714; see also nn.l03, 116, 120 and accompanying texL

413. See Parts V.C.3, V.C.5, V.J.3.
414. Iraq's navy was bottled up in the Shalt ai-Arab for the duration of the war; hernew frigates sat out the war in
Italy, where they had been built. See n. 11.130 and accompanying text. Iraq could not conduct traditional maritime
visit and search operations. Iran had a navy that was significant in size for Gulf operations. Both belligerents had
land-based air attack capability.

415. See n. 11.177 and accompanying text.
416. See n. 11.177 and accompanying text.
417. See Parts V.B.-V.D and V.J.2-4.
418. UN Charter, art. 103; S.C. Res. 514, 522 (1982), 540 (1983), in WELLENS 450-51; see also nn. 11.189, 216-17, III.
10 and accompanying text.
419. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; S.C. Res.479(1980), 552(1984), 582,588 (1986),598 (1987),612, 619-20(1988),631,
642 (1989), 651, 671, 676 (1990), 685 (1991), in WELLENS 449-50, 452-60, 473-74; see also nn. 11.96, 258, 300, 308, 377,
455,486,487, III. 10 and accompanying texL
420. The United States published the warnings within days after releasing its report on the US Marine
headquarters building bombing at Beiruit International Airport in 1983. See nn. 11.224-27 and accompanying text.
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421. See n. II.229 and accompanying text. The United Kingdom had declared a similar defensive bubble during
the Falklands/Malvinas War. See nn. 259-64 and accompanying text.
422. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see nn. 10, 158-288 and accompanying texL

423. See PartS V.F.1.b-V.F.l.c, V.F.5, V.J.6.
424. See n. 11.360 and accompanying text.
425. See nn. 11.295, 361 and accompanying te.XL
426. Sec n. 11.298 and accompanying text.
427. Sec nn. II.296-97 and accompanying te.XL
428. Sec n. II.299 and accompanying text.
429. Sec n. 11.306 and accompanying text.
430. This was the UK and apparently the French view. Other States, including the United States, saw the Tanker
War as a traditional war, to which LOAC principles applied. See n. 11.84 and accompanying texL
431. UN Charter, arL 103; see also n. 10 and accompanying te.xt.
432. Nyon Arrangement, 11111, 4-7, and Nyon Supplementary Agreement, 11112-3, which also addressed attacks on
merchantmen by submarines and surface ships, applied only to the Mediterranean Sea during the Spanish Civil War.
The Nyon treaties permitted attacks on ships that attacked or might attack neutral merchant vessels and said nothing
about the attacking ship's duties, referring to the London Protocol for standards. To that extent the Nyon treaties
might be said to repeat whatever customary norms are in the London Protocol.
433. London Protocol, art. 22; see also Parts V.C.1, V.C.5, V.J.3 for analysis of the Protocol in the law of naval
warfare conte.xt.
434. TIF 429-30; SCHINDLER & TOMAN 885.
435. Turkey acceded to the Protocol in 1937, SCHINDLER & TOMAN 885, long after the predecessor State, the
Ottoman Empire, had been stripped ofits Gulf territories through the League of Nations mandate system. The law of
treaty succession could not apply to the GCC States; when Turkey became a Protocol party, these countries were not
part of Turkey.
436. UN Charter, arL 103; see also n. 10 and accompanying text.

437. Sec n. 205 and accompanying te.xt.
438. The SAN REMOl\1ANUALdoes not consider the Charter supremacy issue, noting some participants challenged a
view that the Charter applies during armed conflict, arguing that jus ad bellum rules apply only until outbreak of an
armed conflicL "Once a State became engaged in armed conflict, it was argued, that State was subject only to the
[LOAC.] This is because the [LOAC] contains its own principles of necessity and proportionality," citing NWP 9A,
Annotated \15.2. SAN RaIO l\1ANUAL 114, Commentary 4.3. All MANUAL participants accepted that "the fact that an act
may be a necessary and proportionate measure ... cannot justify it if it involves a violation of the laws of armed
conflict." Id. 114, Commentaries 4.2(b),4.3. Ifthis means a Charter-based norm can be superseded bya norm based on a
treaty governing the LOAC, however laudatory and beneficial to humanitarian standards the intention might be, the
Commentary appears not to have taken UN Charter, art. 103 into account. If SAN RaIO MANUAL, II 4, Commentaries
4.2(b),4.3 mean the LOAC recited in treaties should be the same as a norm developed under UN Charter, arL 51,much
as necessity and proportionality are customary limitations on the inherent right of self-defense, nn. 485-585 and
accompanying te.xt, the MANUAL is correct on the poinL Whether the Charter as a treaty can supersede custom is
debatable, and to that e.xtent thel\1ANuALis also correcLSee n. 10 and accompanyingte.xt. If, on the other hand, Article
51 restates ajus cogens norm, n. 205 and accompanying te.xt, then LOAC norms can inform but cannot supersede it. See
n. 10 and accompanying te.XL
439. Commentators continue to debate the poinL Compare, e.g., MALLISON 106-23 (Protocol still a valid principle);
Dieter Fleck, Comments on Howard S. Lcvie's Paper: Submarine lV'aifare: WIth Emphasis on the 1936 London ProlOco~ in
Grunawalt 78, 83-84(same); Howard S. Levie, Submarine lV'aifare: lV'ithEmphasison the 1936LondonProtocol, in id. 28,
59 (same, but States will find reasons to justify noncompliance); Sally V. Mallison & W. Thomas Mallison, The Na1Jal
Practices of Belligerents in lV'orld lV'ar II: Legal Criteria and Developments, in id. 87,99-102 (Protocol still valid law,
enhanced by Fourth Convention, arL 18[1] duty to search for survivors after battle at sea); Edwin I. Nowogugu,
Commentary, in LAWOI'NAVAL WARFARE353,363-64(Protocolstill valid law); HoraceB. Robertson, Jr., U.S. Policy on
Targcting Enemy Merchant Shipping: Bridging the Gap Between Conventional Law and Practice, in Grunawalt 338, 343,
352-53 (same, but inapplicable in mostcircumstances)with, e.g., STONE (Protocol violated in World War II, apparently
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no longer the law); TUCKER 63-73 (same); W.J. Fenrick, Commenls on Sally V. and W. Thomas Mallison's Paper: The
NtrVal Practices of BelligerenlS in World War II: Legal Crileria and Developmenls, in Grunawalt 110, 116-18 (Protocol
unworkable but should be incorporated in new principle ofallowing attacks on neutral merchantmen if pan of enemy
war effort); Alex Kerr, Internalional Law and the Fulure of Submarine Warfare, 81 PROCEEDINGS 1110 (Oct. 1955)
(Protocol defunct); O'Connell, Internalional Law, n. 252, 52 (Protocol no longer effective); James Service, Targcltng
RealiIies: Plaljonns, Weapons Systems and Capabililies, in Grunawalt 231, 238-40 (modem weapons systems make literal
Protocol compliance unworkable; if observed, Protocol would in effect prolong a war). NWP 9A Annotated 118.2.2.2,
at 8-10, 8-12 says the Protocol continues to apply to surface ships but must be interpreted in light of current
technology, and enemy merchantmen may be attacked and destroyed with or without warning if"integrated into the
enemy's war-fightingfwar-sustaining effort and compliance with the ... Protocol would, under thecircumstances ... ,
subject the surface warship to imminent danger or otherwise preclude mission accomplishment." Id. 118.3.1 applies
these principles to submarine attacks, but id. 118.4 does not as to air attacks. Id. 11'117.5.1-7.5.2 say neutral ships acquire
enemy character if they take direct part in hostilities on an enemy's side or operate direcdy under enemy control,
orders, charter, employment or direction. See also NWP I-14M Annotated '11'117.5.1-7.5.2, 8.2.2.2, 8.3.1,8.4; Parts V.D,
V.J.4.

440. See Nicaragua Case, 1986 ICJ at 92-93. UN Charter, an. 2(6) requires the United Nations to "ensure that
states ... not Members ... act in accordance with [the] Principles [of the Charter] so far as may be necessary for the
maintenance ofinternational peace and security." Although the Security Council and the General Assembly have not
referred to Article 2(6), their resolutions have declared law applicable to all States. Most commentators say Article 2(6)
does not bind non-Members to Chaner law. Vienna Convention, art. 38; GOODRICH el al. 58-60; SIMMA 134-39; conlTa,
KELSEN, THE LAW, n.189, 107. Article 2(6) is almost a dead letter today, since nearly all countries, Switzerland being a
notable exception, are UN Members. However, the Nicaragua Case recognition of the possibility of an independent,
parallel custom means that, unless Article 51 is given jus cogens status, there may be a different customary norm
competing with, and perhaps offsetting, the Charter-based norm. Ifthe independent norm hasjus cogens status, it may
negate the Charter norm. See n. 10 and accompanying text.
441. SAN REMO MANUAL '11'11 60(g), 67(1); compare NWP I-14M Annotated '11'11 8.2.2.2, at 8-10, 8-12; NWP 9A
Annotated'll'll 8.2.2.2, at 8-10, 8-12.
442. SAN REMO MANUAL '11'11 61, 68, referring to id. '11'11 38-46; compare NWP I-14M Annotated 11 8.1.1; NWP 9A
Annotated'll 8.1.1.
443. SAN REz,\O .MANUAL '11'1147-52.

444. !d. 'II'II60(c), 60(g), 67(d); compare NWP I-14M Annotated '11'117.5.1-7.5.2; 8.2.2.2, at 8-12; NWP 9AAnnotated,
'11'117.5.1-7.5.2; 8.2.2.2, at 8-12.
445. Protocol I, preamble; SAN REz,1O MANUAL, 'II 6 & Commentary 6.l.The United States and other Gulf naval
powers had the view that the Tanker War was a war in the traditional sense and that the LOAC, of which the law of
naval warfare is a pan, applied. See n. 11.84 and accompanying text. Chapter III concentrates on Charter principles;
ChapterVaddresses LOAC principles. See Parts V.A.-V.D., V.F.2, V.F.5, V.G, V.J.I-V.J.4, V.J.6-V.J.7 for analysis of
these attacks.

446. Cf. nn. 11.97, 192 and accompanying text.
447. See nn. 11.97, 192-93 and accompanying text.
448. See, e.g., nn. II.295, 344, 346-49, 350, 359, 361 and accompanying text.
449. See n. II.146 and accompanying text.

450. See nn. 207-88, 308-36 and accompanying text.
451. See, e.g., nn. II.384, 437-40, 442, 454-56 and accompanying te.xt.
452. See 11.368-70 and accompanying text.
453. See n. 11.430 and accompanying text.
454. See nn. II.393-399 and accompanying text.
455. See n. 11.469 and accompanying text.
456. See n. 391 and accompanying text.
457. See nn. II.394-96, 469 and accompanying text.
458. See n. II.449 and accompanying text.
459. See n. 11.447 and accompanying text.
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460. Sec nn. 308-36 and accompanying te.XL
461. See n. 11.412 and accompanying te.xt.
462. Sec nn. 308-36 and accompanying te.XL
463. See n. 11.386 and accompanying te.XL

464. Sec nn. 308-36 and accompanying texL
465. See nn. 11.391-92 and accompanying te.XL
466. Sec n. 11.393-95 and accompanying te.XL
467. Sec n. 1I.430and accompanying te.XL
468. See n. 11.363 and accompanying te.XL
469. See nn. 11.338-40 and accompanying texL
470. Sec nn. II.367 (warning shots), 11.410 and accompanying text.
471. Sec nn. II.364, 373, 391, 400, 406, 410-13, 434, 446, 463-64, 468-70, 472, 520 and accompanying texL
472. Sec nn. II.459-68 and accompanying texL
473. Sec nn. II.339, 468 and accompanying te.XL
474. See, e.g., n. IIAlO and accompanying te.XL
475. Necessity, proportionality and other qualifications ofthe right to self-defense are analyzed at nn. 485-590 and
accompanying te.XL

476. Sec Parts V.A.-V.D., V.F.2, V.F.5, V.G, V.J.l-V.JA, V.J.6-V.J.7
477. UN Charter, art. 2(1); S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 10, at 4, 18; see also n. 30 and
accompanying te.XL

478. See nn. 272-76, 282, 292 and accompanying te.XL
479. See nn. 485-590 and accompanying te.XL
480. ld.
481. ld.
482. Sec nn. II.437-42, 454-56 and accompanying texL
483. See nn. II.437-41 and accompanying texL

484. See nn. II. 446-53 and accompanying te.XL
485. Sec n. 357 and accompanying texL
486. Legality of Threat of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 (1) ICJ 226,245; Nicaragua Case, 1986 ICJ 94; NWP I-14M
Annotated, 114.3.2; NWP9A Annotated 114.3.2; REsTATE1>IENT{THlRD) § 905(1)(a) &cmL c, r.n. 3; SAN REMOMANUAL
113 & Commentary 3.3. NWP I-14M Annotated 114.3.2.1 departs from NWP 9A Annotated, stating that in today's
world of modem lethal weapon systems, the Caroline Case formula for necessity, n. 357 and accompanying text, is too
restrictive. Commentators have criticized the Caroline Case formula as outmoded. See, e.g., McDOUGAL & FELICtANO
217-18; Lowe, The Commander's, n. 318, 127-30; Mallison & Mallison, Naval, n. 261, 263; Abraham D. Sofaer,
Terrorism, The Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL.. L. REv. 89 (I989). Others continue to espouse this aspect of
anticipatory self-defense, however. See generally nn. 356-57 and accompanying texL For this reason, and because NWP
I-14M Annotated was not published until after the Tanker War, analysis proceeds on the basis that the Caroline Case
formulation of necessity was part of anticipatory self-defense requirements for the conflicL
487. SAN RE1>IO MANUAL 114.

488. See nn. 591-616 and accompanying texL

489. See nn. 646-49 and accompanying te.XL
490. Many States protested belligerents' actions during the Tanker War, and the belligerents protested actions by
their opponent or third States. See, e.g., nn. II.I77, 225, 234, 333, 379, 432-33, 492 and accompanying te.XL

491. E.g., the United States settled with Iraq for the Stark claims and with Iran for the Airbus tragedy. See nn.
II.339, 468 and accompanying texL
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492. The United States invoked ICJ jurisdiction to resolve the Iran hostage situation, Hostage Case, n. II.12, and
Iran claimed against the United States for the Rostum attack and the Airbus tragedy, the latter being settled. See nn.
II.395, 432-34, 468 and accompanying text.

493. E.g., a State could keep a "ledger [for] an aggression ofpin-prick attacks" and respond proportionally to all in
the future. DINSTEIN 226; Roberto Ago,Addendum to EighthRepon on State Responsibility, UN Doc. NCN.4/318 & Add.
1-41979(2)(1) Y.B. INT'L L. COMAI.13, 69-70 (1981). Responding with force in self-defense that seems disproportionate
to the latest prick carries a risk that a target of the response or others may argue the response is disproportionate and
therefore an aggressive armed attack by the pricked State. DINSTEIN 225. "Genuine on-the-spot reaction [closes] the
incident." !d. 214. This is wiser than accumulating them for future action, as Israel appears to have announced for
SCUD attacks on it during the 1990-91 Gulf War. Whether a State collects such hurts for future action, or whether it
approves immediate response, notice must be given clearly to the other State and the general international community
to avoid counterclams of aggression, etc. If a response could be construed to apply to more than one prick, and is
intended for a particular harm, that too should be underscored. The United States did this in theSea Isle City response.
See nn. II.394-98 and accompanying text.
494. E.g., the 1979-80 hostage situation involved several strategies: judicial and military (i.e., the aborted Tehran
raid), Hostage Case, n. II.12, 1980 ICJ 3; diplomacy and claims resolution through arbitration, Declarations ofAlgeria
Concerning Commitments and Settlement of Claims by the United States and Iran with Respect to Resolution of the
Crisis Arising Out of Detention of 52 U.S. Nationals in Iran, with Undertakings & Escrow Agreement,Jan.19, 1981,
TIAS - - , in 20 ILM 224 (1991); economic,cf. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 US 654 (1981). Dames also shows that
strategies may be carried out in different arenas. The case was litigated in the US national courts, as distinguished
from judicial strategies in the ICJ Hostage Case, and by different levels of participants, i.e., private litigants invoking
US courts' jurisdiction to attach Iranian assets, some in private hands and some State-owned. States were parties in the
Hostage Case. Cf. ICJ Statute, art. 34.
495. Oscar Schachter, 17Ie Right o/States to Use Anned Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620, 1635 (1984); see also DINSTEIN
202-03 who,id. 244-45, would inject a "beyond reasonable doubt" standard for armed bands crossing a border, perhaps
reflecting Definition of Aggression, n. 62, art. 3(g), 13 ILM 714, cautionary language. Even if a heightened standard is
appropriate to counter such aggression, it is not a requirement for responding to other acts of aggression.
496. SAN REAIO MANUAL 11 3, Commentary 3.3.

497. !d. 114, Commentary 4.3.
498. Cf. id., citing NWP 9A Annotated 11 5.2, restating LOAC standards. See also id. 11 S6.2.5.2, which says US
military tribunals have applied the same rules for a military necessity defense to individuals and nations. Military
necessity allows measures necessary to compel an enemy's submission but does not permit destruction oflife and
property beyond the necessities of war. See 3 HYDE § 655; McDOUGAL & FELICIANO 72, 528; NWP I-14M Annotated 11
5.2; STONE 352.
499. UN Charter, art. 103; see also n. 10 and accompanying text, particularly as to the potential role of customary
norms in superseding the Charter.

500. See n. 205 and accompanying text.
501. BROWNLIE, USE OF FORCE 305; DIN STEIN 214; see also Nyon Arrangement; Nyon Supplementary Agreement.

502. See nn. II.348, 350-52, 359, 361-62, 382, 393, 435, 437, 446-53, 471, 494, 498 and accompanying texL
503. These acts might violate incidents at sea agreements (INCSEA), however, and give rise to a diplomatic claim.

See nn. IV. 19, IV.22 and accompanying text.
504. DINSTEIN 190; see also nn. 374-77 and accompanying text.

505. See n. 378 and accompanying text.
506. See Bunn, n. 358, 69-70.
507. See STONE 352-53.
508. See nn. II.74-80 and accompanying texL
509. See nn. II.143, 178-79,201-03,215,234-40,248·60,263,269,272-74, 288-89, 295, 300, 312, 323·24, 337, 343,
362, 364, 373, 376, 378, 386, 93-94, 400, 403, 406, 412-13, 420-21, 429, 434, 446-53, 463-64, 470, 520·21 and
accompanying texL

510. See n. 493 and accompanying text.
511. See nn. 617-30 and accompanying texL
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512. McDoUGAL & FELICIANO 230.
513. Nicaragua Case, 1986IC] 94; McDoUGAL & FELICIANO 23141, citing inter alia T.]. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES
OI'INTERNATIONALLAW 118 (2d ed.1897); I]OHN WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 300(1904); NWP I-14M Annotated
\I 5.2; NWP 9A Annotated \I 5.2; SAN REi.IO Jl.1ANUAL '11'11 3, Commentary 3.3; 4, Commentary 4.3; Georg
Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental Principles of International Law, 87 RCAD! 195, 334 (1955). McDoUGAL &
FELICIANO continue analysis by criticizing commentators' narrow views, e.g., Kunz, Individual, n. 189, on
self-defense's scope in the Charter era, but regardless of a position taken on scope, necessity qualifies all self-defense
claims.

514. Sec nn.II.224-27, 305, 34547 and accompanying text.
515. See nn. 521-85 and accompanying te.'(t.
516. Sec nn.II.368-72 and accompanying te.'(t.
517. See nn.II.264, 336, 354-55, 357, 374, 384-87, 43742, 454-56 and accompanying te.'(t.
518. In 1992 Iran sued the United States in the IC] for the attacks on the oil platforms; in 1997 the Court held for
jurisdiction. See nn.II.432-34 and accompanying text.

519. Sec n.II.459-76 and accompanying te.'(t.
520. Sec nn. 253-55 and accompanying te.'(t.
521. Legality of Threat of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 (1) IC] 245; Nicaragua Case, 1986IC] 94. Commentators agree,
whatever their view on anticipatory self-defense or if the restrictive Caroline Case formulation of necessity is a
component ofanticipatory self-defense. See, e.g., BOWElT, SELI'-DEFENCE 269; BROMS, THEDE~1NmoN, n.112, 129-30;
DINSTEIN 202·03; McDOUGAL & FELICIANO 24144; NWP I-14M Annotated 11 4.3.2; NWP 9A Annotated'll 4.3.2;
R1I'AAT,n. 23, 127; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 905(1)(b) & cmt. d,r.n. 2; SAN REi.IOMANuAL '113 & Commentary 3.3; Ago,
n. 493, 69·70; Christopher Greenwood,Self-Defence and the Conduct ofInternational Armed Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW, n. 11,273,274; Waldock, The Regulation, n. 52,463.
522. NWP I-14M Annotated '114.3.2; NWP 9A Annotated '114.3.2; SAN REi.IO JI.1ANUAL '114.
523. DINSTEIN 129; see also SAN REAlo MANUAL '11'11 3, Commentary 3.3; 4, Commentaries 4.1, 4.4-4.5.
524. DINSTEIN 225-26; HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT, n. 55, 201; Ago, n. 492, 69-70.
525. DINSTEIN 225-26; R1FAAT, n. 22,270-71.
526. DINSTEIN 215.
527. SAN REi.IO MANUAL '113, Commentary 3.3.
528. UN Charter, art. 103; see also nn. 10,205 and accompanying text.
529. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO 228, 24144.

530. Id. 244; SAN REMO MANUAL'll 3, Commentary 3.3.
531. See nn.II.368-72 and accompanying text.
532. See nn. 11.429-333 and accompanying text.
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follows with Ago, n. 493, 69 ("It would be mistaken ••• what matters is the result to be achieved by the 'defensive' action
and not the terms, substance and strength of the action itself'), DINSTEIN 232 cannot be understood to mean that in
all·out war proportionality goes overboard. What he undoubtedly means is that the key is not proportionality of
response in terms of reaction force(s) but proportionality in terms of result achieved, i.e., "stopping or preventing the
infringement." Ago 69; Waldock, The Regularion, n. 52,464.
536. DINSTEIN 233.

537. !d. 234, citing Kunz, Individual, n. 189,876.
538. Accord, SAN REi.IO MANUAL, '11'113, Commentary 3.3; 5, Commentary 5.1; bur see id. '115, Commentary 5.2.
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976-78,994-95; see also n. 357 and accompanying text.
541. DINSTEIN 234, citing S.H. Amin, The Iran-Iraq Conflict: Legal Implications, 31 ICLQ 167, 186 (1982).

542. Cf. UN Charter, art. 2(4), requiring respect for States' territorial integrity; see also nn. 47-157 and
accompanying text.
543. See nn. II.97, 192 and accompanying text.

544. See no. II.378, 484-502 and accompanying text.
545. Cf. O'CONNELL, THEINFLUENCE65; Greenwood,Self-Defence, n. 521,273; Greenwood,RepOrl, n. 533,20-27.
546. Greenwood, Self-Defence, n. 521,277; see also no. 259·64 and accompanying text.
547. O'CoNNELL, THE INFLUENCE 65; see also n. 244 and accompanying text.
548. Iraq had ordered frigates in Italy; they were being built there as the war sIarted. They sat out the war there. See
n. II.130 and accompanying texL
549. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO 242; Ago, n. 493, 69; Greenwood,RepOrl, n. 533, 16; Waldock, Tlte Regulation, n. 52,
464.

550. See n. 259 and accompanying text.

551. See no. 591-616 and accompanying text.
552. The Korean War and the 1990-91 Gulf War are nOIable exceptions. See nn. II.501-14, III.220-22, 281-84,
310-13 and accompanying text.

553. See no. 220-22, 281-84, 310-13 and accompanying text.
554. See no. 23543,249 and accompanying text.
555. See no. 259-64 and accompanying text.
556. See no. 24548 and accompanying text.
557. See n. 550 and accompanying text.
558. See nn. 533-38 and accompanying text.
559. UN Charter, arts. 2(1), 2(3); see also nn. 30, 47-157 and accompanying text.

560. See Walker, Crisis Over Kuwait 30 n. 27.
561. SAN RE/.IO MANUAL '11'113, CommenIary 3.3 refutes this view; see also nn. 546-51 and accompanying text.

562. See n. IIA57 and accompanying text.
563. See nn. II.224-17 and accompanying text.

564. See nn. II.367 (warning shots), 410 and accompanying text. The United States had concerns over atIacks from
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610. CABLE 63, 107-09, 193, noting an initial General Assembly resolution; O'CONNELL, THE INFLUENCE 137-38,
174-75, referring to S.C. Res. 221 (1965),232 (1966), in WELLENS 127-28; 16 KEESING22525 (1968). Mter Zimbabwe
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Convention by 2006, but only if the Pentagon comes up with an alternate weapon, particularly for land mines in
Korea. Steven Lee Myers, Clinton Agrees to Land-Mine Ban, but Not Yet, N.Y. TU.IES, May 22, 1998, A3.
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n.15, 354. However, in view of the ICJ and the LOS Tribunal opinions, n. 634, it is fairly clear that there is a customary
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653. UN Charter, artS. 36(1), 37(1), 38; see also GoODRICH et al. 277-89; SL\lI>IA 538-41, 547-52, 561-65.
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by a regional arrangement or agency. UN Charter, art. 52(3); GooDRICH et aL 360-64.
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664. S.C. Res. 82 (1950), in WELLENS 324.
665. See nn. 653-55 and accompanying texL
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697. S.C. Res. 216 (1965), in WELLENS 126. Previously the Council, noting the Assembly resolutions, had
"[r]equest[ed]" the UK government to act to prevent a unilateral independence declaration. S.C. Res. 202 (1965),in id.
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Argentina during the conflict; this came within its regional competence. See n. 259 and accompanying text. The EC
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O'CoNNELL, LAW OF THE SEA ch. 30; 2 OPPENHEIM, Part III; JOHN F.L. Ross, NEUTRALITY AND INTERNATIONAL
SANCfIONS: SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND AND CoLLECfIVESECURlTY (1989); STONE chs. 13-19,21; TUCKER chs. 6-12; Michael
Bothe, Neutraliryat Sea, ch. 6in DEKKER & POST; Bothe,NeutraliryinNaval Waifare: WhatIsLeftofTradltionalLaw?,in
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HUMANITARIAN LAW 367; Wiswall, Neutraliry, n. 11.295. 7 HACKWORTH ch. 24; 11 WHITEMAN ch. 33 give more modern
digest treatment.
832. CASTREN, n. 831,427.
833. Janis, n. 831, 148, citing NEILL H. ALFORD,JR., MODERN ECONOMIC WARFARE 326 (NAV. WAR C. INrL L. STUD.
v. 56, 1967);seealso Norton, n. 831, 249, citing Richard R. Baxter,Humanitarian Law or Humanitarian Pol,t,cs? The 1974
Conference on Humanitarian Law, 16 HARV. INrL L.J. 1,2 (1975) (Neutrality has had a "juridical half-life" since World
WarI!.)
834. Janis, n. 831, 148, citing C.G. Fenwick, Is Neutrality Still a Term ofPresent Law?, 63 AJIL 102 (1969).

835. Cf. UN Charter, preamble, arts. 2(3)-2(4); see also nn. 47-157 and accompanying text.
836. GABRIEL, n. 831,69; see also ORVIK, n. 831, 251-56.
837. Pact ofParis, n.160, arts. 1-2,46 Stat. at 2345-46, 94 LNTS at 63;seealso nn.160·63 and accompanying te.xt.

838. See SAN REMo MANUAL 68, '11'11 13(d), 14-26,29-32,34-36,67-71,74-75,86-88,92-94,99,106,109, Ill, 113-16,
118-20, 122-24, 126-27, 130, 132-34, 146-58.
839. INiERNATlONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, International Committee on Maritime Neutrality, Neutralit), and Nat'al
Waifare (Michael Bothe, rptr.), in International Law Association, Report of the Sixty-Fifth Conference: Cairo, Egypt
163 (1993); INTERNATIONAL LAW AsSOCIATION, International Committee on MaritimeNeutrality,Neutraliry and Naral
Waifare (Michael Bothe, rptr.) in International Law Association, Report ofthe Sixty-Sixth Conference: Buenos Aires,
Argentina 570 (1994); INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, International Committee on Maritime Neutrality,Neutraliry
and Naral Waifare (Michael Bothe, rptr.; Wo1ffHeintschei von Heinegg, alt. rptr.), in International Law Association,
Report of the Sixty-Seventh Conference: Helsinki, Finland 367 (1996); Helsinki Principles, completed at the 1998
ILA meeting in Taipei, Taiwan. For a critique of the Cairo report, see Walker, Maritime Neutraliry.

840. E.g., COLOMBOS § 759; McDOUGAL & FELICIANO 197-436; 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 1141-42; Bothe,
Neutraliry at Sea, n. 831, 205; Thomas A. Clingan, Jr., Submarine Mines in International Law, In Robertson 351, 352
(argument that neutrality no longer exists is specious); Gioia & Ronzitti, n. 831,223; Lowe, The Commander's, n. 318,
134-38; McNeill, Neutral Rights, n. 11.354, 642-43; Ronzitti, The Crisis, 6-12; Williams, n. 22, 47-48; Wiswall,
Neutraliry, n. 11.295, 619_ Even commentators arguing that the force of the law of neutrality has been greatly
diminished do not say it has disappeared in the Charter era. See, e.g., ALFORD, n. 833, 326; Janis, n. 831, 153; Norton, n.
831,311.
841. See, e.g., JESSUP, NEUTRALITY, n. 829; JESSUP & DEAl(, n. 830; W. ALISON PHILLIPS & ARTHUR H. REED£,
NEUTRALITY: THE NAPOLEONIC PERIOD (1936); EDGAR TURLINGTON, NEUTRALITY: ITS HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND LAW
(1936).
842. See Pact of Paris, n. 160; UN Charter, art. 103; TIF 430-31; nn. 160-63,837 and accompanying text.
843. See nn. 160-63 and accompanying text.
844. See n. 829 and accompanying text.

World Public Order

233

845. E.g., Convention Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27,1929, arts. 69-70, 72-73, 77,47 Stat. 2021,
2053-57, 118 LNTS 343, 385-86, superseded by Third Convention, arts. 4(b)(2), 10. The 1929 Convention also
continued usage of the term as well as referring to "non-be11igerents."
846. Convention on Maritime Neutrality; TIF 434. See also Convention Regarding Rights of Neutrals at Sea,July
22, 1854, 10 id. 1105, still in force among Nicaragua, Russia and the United States. TIF 431.
847. Stockholm Declaration.
848. Ove Bring, Commentary, in LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 839, 84l.

849. Budapest Articles ofInterpretation: Final Text, arts. 1-7, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AssoctATlON, Report of the 38th
Conference 67-68 (1935).

850. E.g., Lord Chancellor Viscount Sankey, in 95 Pari. Deb., H.L. (5th ser.) cols. 1007, 1043. On the other hand,
Secretary of State Stimson took the opposite view then. See Stimson, The Pact, n. 161, vii-viii.
851. JESSUP, NEUTRALITY, n. 829, 121-23; Hersch Lauterpacht, The Pact of Paris and the Budapest Articles of

Interpretation, 20 TRANS. GROTIUS So COy 178 (1935).
852. US Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson testimony, Jan. 29, 1941, Hearings Before the House Committee on
FOTCIgnAffairs on H.R.1776 Regarding the Lend-Lease Bill, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 89-90 (1941). Stimson, The Pact, n. 161,
vii-viii, c.~pressed the same view in 1932; Quincy Wright, The Transfer ofDestroyers to Great Britain, 34 AJIL 680,
685-89 (1940), made an analogous argument after the 1940 destroyers-bases deal, citing Budapest Articles, n. 849, and
the Harvard Draft Convention on Aggression, n. 130.
853. US Secretary of State Cordell Hull testimony, Jan. 15, 1941, in it!. 9-10; Robert H. Jackson, Address to the

Inter-American Bar Association, 35 AJIL 349 (1941).
854. BudapestArticles, arts. 4(b)-4{d), n. 849, 67.
855. Sec nn. 396-417 and accompanyingte.~L
856. Lend-Lease Act, ch. 11,55 Stat. 31.
857. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 5, citing The Scotia, 81 US (5 Wall.) 170, 181-82 (1872). Most Lend-Lease
agreements were not formalized until after the United States was at war with the A.xis, but at least two were in force
between the United States and countries at war with Axis States before then. Lend-Lease Agreement, Aug. 9, 1941,
Neth.-US, 10 Bevans 140; Lend Lease Agreement, Nov. 21, 1941, Ice.-US, 58 Stat. 1455. Informal arrangements had
undoubtedly already begun, e.g., with Great Britain. See Preliminary Agreement, Feb. 23, 1942, UK-US, arts. 1-2,56
id. 1433-34. Sec also Walker, Anticipatory Collective Self-Defense, in LtBER &IICORUM 379, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. at 347,
referring to ROBERT H. SHERWOOD,RoOSEVELT AND HOPKINS: AN INTIMATE HISTORY 308, 310-11 (1950 rev. ed.) and an
informal UK-US defense arrangement.
858. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 5; 1 OPPENHEtM § 10, at 28. 2 id. § 292Aa, 639 says US practice was resurrected
older custom that had not died out. The United States negotiated Lend-Lease agreements with States not at war with
the A.~is before it went to war. To the e.~tent that these agreements benefited the United States after it was at war, and
before the other State declared war, the other State became a nonbe11igerent. Examples of nonbe11igerent provisions
included reciprocal commodity pledges and pledges to supply the United States with "defense articles, strategic or
critical materials, or defense information." See, e.g., Lend-Lease Agreement, Oct. 1, 1941, Brazil-US, 5 BEVANS 905,
906-07. The United States had Lend-Lease agreements with 36 countries, including the USSR. See 13 iii. 64. As citing
BEVANS indicates, some agreements were not published and were perhaps not available for consideration as practice
until 1968-76, when 1-13 id. were published.
859. Exchange of Notes, Sept. 2, 1940, UK-US, 54 Stat. 2405, 203 LNTS 201, supplemented by Agreement
Relating to Defense of Newfoundland, Mar. 27, 1941, UK-US, 55 it!. 1560. BowETT, SELF-DEFENCE 166 characterizes
Lend-Lease and the destroyers-bases deal as violating international law in 1958 when he wrote. When viewed in the
conte.~t of trends, particularly the law of self-defense as then stated, his view is not the law now, and BoWETT might
have concluded differently in 1958 if all Lend-Lease agreements had been published then. See n. 589 and
accompanying te.~t.
860. McDOUGAL & FELlCtANO 425.
861. ORVIK, n. 831, 194-215.

862. Id. 587.
863. See nn. 857-58 and accompanying te.~t.

234

The Tanker War

864. CASTREN, n. 831, 450-51, listing Bulgaria, China, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Spain and Turkey
besides the United States, which pursued these policies, without stating which side Spain favored. Although
Francisco Franco's Spain played both sides, throughout the war it supported the Axis, primarily Germany, providing
ports for submarine support, infra-red, radar and sonar listening stations, the Blue Division for the USSR front,
civilian labor in Germany, war material, credits and other services. These countries signed a Treaty of Friendship on
March 31, 1939, and a Secret Protocol on February 12, 1943, which was not implemented; US Department of State,
The Spanish Government and the Axis (1946); PAUL PRESTON, FMNCO: A BIOGRAPHY, chs.13-21. Italy later joined the
Axis as a cobelligerent.
865. Harvard Draft Convention on Aggression, arts. 1-2,6,10,12-13.

866. ld., Comment, 33 AJIL SuPP. 879-85 (1939). See also id., Comment, 33 AJIL SUPP. 902 (1939). BOWEn,
SELF-DEFENCE 161 says the Convention principles are de lege ferenda.
867. JESSUP, NEUTRALITY, n. 829,7,160-62,181, referring to JESSUP & DEAK,n. 830,44, 109, 117, 160; PHILLIPS &
REEDE,n. 841, ch. 4. The United States was among the maritime powers recognizing the 1780armed neutrality; that of
1800 collapsed with the Danish fleet's defeat. COLOMBOS §§ 700·01; 2 OPPENHEtM § 290. Bilateral treaties, no longer in
force, restated these principles during the 19th century. See, e.g., Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce &
Navigation, Dec. 12, 1828, Brazil-US, arL 22, 8 StaL 390, 395; TIF 29.
868. Wright, The Transfer, n. 852, 689, cited the Convention for legitimacy of the destroyers·bases deal, n. 859 and
accompanying text.

869. See generally 1 SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS DURING WORLD WAR
II: THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC: SEPTEMBER 1939-MAY 1943, at 56-113 (1947).
870. See n. 857 and accompanying text.
871. See nn. II.350-56, 447, 470-71 and accompanying text.
872. See nn. II.359·62 and accompanying text.
873. CASTREN, n. 831,434,651.
874. TUCKER 199 n.5,citingSToNE383; CASTREN,n. 831,452; Deak,Neutrality, n.l0, 153;JosefKunz,Neutralityand

the European War 1939-1940, 39 MICH. L. REv. 747-54 (1941).
875. TUCKER 199 n.5.

876. See nn. 591-616, 646·49 and accompanying text.
877. See nn. 593-94 and accompanying text.
878. E.g., McDOUGAL & FELICIANO 492, 499 (indirect aid to North Korea, PRC, the subjects of Security Council
and General Assembly resolutions); Norton, n. 831, 263-67, 294.
879. Norton, n. 831, 257-62, 295-97, 298-301, 304-05; Ronzitti, The Crisis 4.
880. Norton, n. 831, 262-63. The short duration of the conflicts was a factor.
881. E.g., E.C. Council Regulation, n. 259; E.C.S.C. Council Decision, n. 259; Statement ConcerningAssistance to and
Sales toArgentina, n. 259; 3 CORDESMAN & WAGNER260-63, 270, 280-81, 331-32;seealso n. 259 and accompanying text.
882. Gioia & Ronzitti, n. 831,226-31.
883. For a record of other conflicts through 1975, see Norton, n. 830,268-75 (Vietnam, 27 civil wars); su also
CASTREN, n. 831, 452.
884. To the extent that these older treaty obligations conflict with Charter obligations, the Charter prevails. Deak,

Neutrality, n. 10,143, citing UN Charter, art. 103. The later in time rule states the same principle for newer agreements
to assist an aggression victim with aid. Vienna Convention, art. 30. To the extent that the Charter, and action pursuant
to it, is considered customary law, or perhaps jus cogens, later custom orjus cogens would trump an inconsistent earlier
customary obligation or perhaps an older treaty. See n. 10 and accompanying text.

885. See n. 69 and accompanying text.
886. See nn. 591-649 and accompanying text.
887. See n. 259 and accompanying text.
888. See nn. II. 147, 295, 348,350-55,361-62,437-41,446-56,469-71,494-95,498, III. 648 and accompanying text.
889. See nn. 485-590 and accompanying text.

World Public Order

235

890. Lalive, n. 831,78-81; see also CASTREN, n. 831,434; nn. 69, 651-52 and accompanying text.
891. UN Charter, art. 2(5); Quincy Wright, The Outlawry of War and the Law o/War, 47 AJIL 365, 371-72 (1953).
Permanently neutral countries have supported UN action. GABRIEL, n. 831, 132-33 (Swedish, Swiss economic aid
and/or support during Korean War); Ross, n. 831, chs. 7-9 (Swedish, Swiss actions against Rhodesia).
892. Jordan was the chief applicant, but 20 other States invoked UN Charter, arL 50. Schrijver, n. 609, 149-50; see

also Walker, Crisis Over Kuwait 37-38.
893. Compare S.C. Res. 661 (1990) (Iraq embargo), in WELLENS 528, with S.C. Res. 757, 760(1992), in 31 ILM 1453,
1461 (1992)(former Yugoslavia embargo). S.C. Res. 665 (1990),in WELLENS 530, called for enforcing the Iraq embargo.
S.C. Res. 670 (1990), in id. 534, directed an end to civil air commerce with Iraq, except for humanitarian cargoes. S.C.
Res. 787 (1992), in 31 ILM 1481 (1992), expanded on S.C. Res. 724 (1991), in WELLENS 51, and called on States to use
individual and collective measures to halt inbound and outbound shipping to or from the former Yugoslavia.
Economic sanctions have been imposed for the Angola, Haiti, Liberia, Libya and Somalia crises. A Sanctions
Committee was appointed in all cases except Liberia. Schrijver, n. 609, 13243, lSI-54.
894. S.C. Res. 724 (1991), in WELLENS 51, decided on a limited embargo. The same procedure was followed for
South Africa. S.C. Res. 418 (1977), 569 (1985), 591 (1986), in id. 218,228,230. Arms and other commodity embargoes
were also imposed in the Angola, Haiti and Libya crises. Schrijver, n. 609, 129-32, 14647; n. 708 and accompanying
te.'(t.
895. Rhodesia also illustrates the interplay of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. See generally
O'CoNNELL, THE INFLUENCE 137-38,174-75; Schrijver, n. 609, 129-30; Walker, State Practice 14243; nn. 695-707 and
accompanying te.'(L
896. CASTREN, n. 831,435.
897. UN Charter, arL 39; see also nn. 651-56 and accompanying texL
898. "The unusual situation [contemplated by the Charter for applying the law of neutrality has] bec[o]me the
rule•••• The originally anticipated interstitual situation in which assumption ofa neutral status might be permissible
under the Charter has arisen ... in every international armed conflict of the last three decades[, 1945-75]." Norton, n.
831,252.

899. Sec Shrijver, n. 609, 135-44; nn. 695-708, 893-95 and accompanying te.XL
900. Sec nn. 763-73 and accompanying texL Williams, n. 22, 15, seems to overemphasize importance of the UFP
Resolution process as a law-promulgating mechanism; see also McDOUGAL & FEUCIANO 429-35.
901. Sec Taubenfeld,Intemational, n. 285, 393-94 (relative success of General Assembly call for embargo against the
PRC).
902. North Sea Continental Shelf{W.Ger. v. Den., W.Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 ICJ 4, 43 (North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases); BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 5; 1 OPPENHEIM § 10, at 30-31; RESTATEAlENT (THIRD) § 102 cmL b & r.n. 2.
903. CASTREN, n. 831,433-34.
904. UN Charter, arts. 4347. The MSC was a Cold War casualty. See DD. 789-96 and accompanying texL
905. Walker, Crisis Over Kuwait 48-50.
906. MALCOLM W. CAGLE & FRANK A. l>lANSON, THESEA WAR IN KOREA281-83,299-300, 304, 353-57, 370-73 (1957);
JAMES A. FIELD, HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS: KOREA 42, 54, 58-59, 61, 126, 158,349, 395,444 (1962);
Walker, Statc Practice 126.

907. See, e.g.;Michael R Gordon, In Test ofSerbia Embargo, U.S. Presses to Seize a Ship, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,1993.
The UN command center for peacekeeping operations has been relatively spartan, running on a shoestring budget
from the UN New York headquarters, although that could change. Nevertheless, when compared with modern
national command centers, the Organization has a way to go and is likely to rely on the agency concept in the future.
Gioia,Neutrality, n. 831,14, says the Council cannot delegate powers to a single State. The record of Council practice
appears to be otherwise.
908. Cf, TIF 428-29.
909. First Convention, art. 8 ("neutral powers"); Second Convention, arts. 11,16 (same; also "neutral warship or a
neutral aircraft"); Third Convention, arts. 4(b)(2), 10 ("neutral or non-belligerent powers," "neutral power"); Fourth
Convention, arts. 4, 9 ("neutral," "belligerent"); see also 1 PICThT 86-98; 2 id. 78-82, 112-16; 3 id.69-70, 121-22; 4
id.45-51, 8-89. Moreover, Protocol I, arts. 2(a), 9(2), 22(2), 30(3), 37(I)(d), 39(1), 64(1) consistently uses phrases, e.g.,
"neutral or other State not party to the conflicL" See also Deak,Neutrality n.lO, 443; Norton, n. 831,254-56. "Neutral"

236

The Tanker War
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at 137; n. 819 and accompanying te.xt.
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617-18; McNair 516-18; SINCLAIR 163-64 (International Law Commission view that Vienna Convention, art. 54[b]
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Integration and Disintegration 71; see also nn. 485-520, 631-44 and accompanying te.xt.
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Disintegration 63-64.
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REsTATEMl!NT (THIRD) § 338 cmt. e; Walker, Integration and Disintegration 70.
934. UN Charter, art. 2(2); Vienna Convention, art. 26; Nicaragua Case, 1986 ICJ at 135-42; Te.xaco Overseas
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UN Doc. NCONF.80/31 (1978), preamble, in 17 lLAl.1488 (1978); BROWNUE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 616; ILCRep., n.
192,211; HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 216 (Ma.x Knight trans. 1967); 1 OPPENHEIM § 584; REsTATEMENT
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(1963); Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, n. 922, art. 20, at 661; Tariq Hassan, Good Faith in Treaty
Formation, 21 VJIL 443, 480-81 (1981); Walker, Integration and Disintegration 58.
935. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 5,13-14; 1 OPPENHEIM § 10, at 28; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102(3) & cmt. f.
936. ICJ Statute, art. 38(1); REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 102-03.
937. Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 US 243 (1984); see also Charlton v. Kelly, 229 US 447,
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278,280 (1986); id., Regulations Regarding the Effect a/War on Treaties, 1912, art. 2(1), in 7 AJIL 153 (1913); Walker,
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513, at 383-84; 2 OPPENHEIM §§ 99(2),99(5); Harvard Draft Convention on the Law ofTreaties, n. 922, art. 35(a), at 664;
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id. 1125 (1994). See also nn. 819, 928-29 and accompanying text; VI.76, 665 and accompanying text for NAFTA
analysis in the maritime environmental law context.
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1984, in 6 BENEDICf, Doc. 6-4A (1984 Civil Liability Convention Protocol); Protocol to Convention on Civil Liability
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954. Compare, e.g., LOS Convention, preamble, arts. 2(3) (territorial sea), 19, 21, 31 (territorial sea innocent
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World Public Order

239

955. The General Assembly elects the34 ILC members from government nominees. The ILC drafted the 1958 Los
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87.9(i), 88.1-88.7(d); Russo, Targeting, n. 624, 8; see also Helsinki Principle 1.2; Boczek,Peaceful, n. 956; Oxman, The
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960. Id., arts. 2(4), 51; see also nn. 47-590, 617-30 and accompanying text.
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